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Chapter 1
Introduction
In daily life, computers are omnipresent. As a matter of fact, we are surrounded
by computers, which we use to search for or share information on the Internet,
to communicate via email and social networks, to keep track of financial data,
or to express ourselves by writing blogs or by podcasting our voices. The vast
majority of computers in use, however, are much less visible: They run the engine,
brakes, seat belts, airbags, and audio system in our cars and control aircrafts and
trains. They digitally encode our voices and construct radio signals to send from
our cell phones to a base station. They control our microwave oven, refrigerator,
and dishwasher. They command robots on a factory floor, power generation in a
power plant, processes in a chemical plant, and traffic lights in a city. They search
for microbes in biological samples, construct images of the inside of a human body,
and measure vital signs. These less visible computers are called embedded systems.
Embedded systems are redefining how we perceive and interact with the phys-
ical world. Since the beginning of the 21st century, our society has witnessed a
great increase in technological advances, and this has affected our lifestyle in vari-
ous ways. On the one hand the young toddlers learn to deal with a wide variety of
tools and devices, from digital toys to electronic games, as a part of the world in
which they are supposed to live; on the other hand, the elderly adapt themselves
appropriately to interact with every-day-coming new machines which are to make
life easier. We go jogging with an iPod in our pocket which not only plays music
for us but also computes our speed.
Strong demand for adding more features to software applications has led to
much larger and more complex embedded systems. While mission-critical em-
bedded applications raise obvious reliability concerns, unexpected or premature
failures in even noncritical applications such as game boxes and portable video
players can erode a manufacturer’s reputation and greatly diminish acceptance of
new devices. The advent of more sophisticated embedded systems that support
more powerful functions have brought reliability concerns to the forefront. The
design of reliable systems requires assuring that the system never moves through
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a dangerous state and verification and validation is the key. Indeed, verification
and validation (V & V) is the process of checking that a software system meets
its specifications and that it fulfills its intended purpose. Testing is used in asso-
ciation with verification and validation to disclose possible errors of the system,
whereas model checking and theorem proving are using mathematical methods to
prove the correctness of the model of the system.
In almost every engineering discipline, models have been used to manage system
complexity. Developers have employed them as reusable and analyzable artifacts
to bridge the conceptual gap between requirements and target-system implemen-
tations. Model-based development (MBD) relies on the use of explicit models to
describe development activities and products. Applying MBD in embedded-system
applications development encourages practitioners to use testing techniques that
take another track than that of traditional techniques. The construction of models
typically requires significant manual effort, implying that in practice often models
are not available, or become outdated as the system evolves. Automated support
for constructing behavioral models of implemented components would therefore
be extremely useful.
This dissertation approaches V & V of embedded systems with two different
analogies: in the first part, modeling and verification of a real-world case-study
provided by the Chess eT International B.V. is described, whereas the second part
investigates automata learning (automatic modeling of systems) using abstraction
refinement.
This introduction is organized, as follows. In section 1.1, embedded systems
are briefly introduced and a short account of their V & V challenges is presented,
then in section 1.2, Chess case is informally described. Afterwards, section 1.3
presents automata learning and describes the problem which is explained in the
second part of the thesis. Finally, the structure of this thesis is outlined in section
1.4.
1.1 V & V of Embedded Systems
Embedded systems are information processing systems embedded into enclosing
products [60]. In other words, embedded systems are integrated hardware/software
systems built into devices that are not necessarily recognized as computerized de-
vices or computers. However, these embedded processing units control and actually
define the functionality and quality of these devices. Embedded systems are typ-
ically not monolithic, but consist of multiple processing units, connected through
wired or wireless networks. The size of the system components ranges from tiny
battery-powered intelligent sensors and actuators, to large multiple-rack comput-
ing devices. These distributed or networked systems come with a large number of
common characteristics, including real-time constraints, and dependability as well
as efficiency requirements and strict resource constraints, and ranging from limited
energy supply, memory and processing power to space and weight constraints. The
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design of embedded systems is therefore intrinsically a multi-disciplinary activity,
requiring skills from computer science, electronics and mechatronics and control,
along with a thorough understanding and interaction with the application field.
See [44].
For embedded systems, the link to physics and physical systems is rather im-
portant. Accordingly, the term cyber-physical systems (CPS) was coined by Lee
[61] to refer to the integration of computation with physical processes. Cyber-
physical systems are embedded computers and networks monitoring and control-
ling the physical processes, usually with feedback loops where physical processes
affect computations and vice versa. Unlike more traditional embedded systems,
a full-fledged CPS is typically designed as a network of interacting elements with
physical input and output instead of as standalone devices [62]. This notion is
closely tied to concepts of robotics and sensor networks.
In connection with the concept of cyber-physical systems, embedded systems
are defined as integrations of software and hardware where the software reacts
to sensory data and/or issues commands to actuators. The physical system is
an integral part of the design and the software must be conceptualized to act
jointly with that physical system. Physical systems are intrinsically concurrent
and temporal. Actions and reactions happen simultaneously and over time, and
the metric properties of time are an essential part of the behavior of the system [59].
In embedded software, therefore, time matters and concurrency and interaction
with hardware are intrinsic, since embedded software engages the physical world
in non-trivial ways (more than keyboards and screens).
Our reliance on embedded systems makes their reliable operation of large so-
cial importance. Besides, offering a good performance in terms of response times,
processing capacity and the absence of annoying errors is one of the major quality
indications. Consequently, there is a crucial need for formalisms, techniques, and
tools that enable the efficient design of correct and well-functioning systems de-
spite their complexity, and make it possible to guarantee their correctness, during
maintenance. The availability of such tools could contribute to significant sav-
ings in the time and the cost of developing and certifying embedded systems. For
safety-critical systems, these tools could save lives (e.g., in avionics and military
systems).
Prevailing industrial practice in embedded software relies on bench testing
for concurrency and timing properties. This has worked reasonably well, because
programs are small, and because the software gets encased in a box with no outside
connectivity that can alter the behavior of the software. However, applications
today demand that embedded systems be feature-rich and networked, so bench
testing become inadequate. In a networked environment, it becomes impossible
to test the software under all possible conditions, because the environment is
not known. Moreover, general-purpose networking techniques themselves make
program behavior much more unpredictable.
Formal methods are a particular kind of mathematically-based techniques for
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the specification, development and verification of software and hardware systems,
where models are created that can be rigorously analyzed using techniques from
mathematics and logic that provide objective evidence of well-formedness, sound-
ness and completeness of the model. Formal methods can help detect flaws, and
in the process can improve the understanding that a designer has of the behavior
of a complex system.
In the coming subsections, a brief description of modeling and verification of
embedded systems is presented.
1.1.1 Modeling
Specification is a description of how a system is supposed to behave. Specifications
for embedded systems provide models of the system under design (SUD). A model
is a simplification of another entity, which can be a physical thing or another model
[50]. The model contains those characteristics and properties of the modeled entity
that are relevant for a given task.
Working with models has a major advantage. Models can have formal proper-
ties. We can say definitive things about models. For example, we can assert that
a model is deterministic, meaning that given the same inputs it will always pro-
duce the same outputs. If our model is a good abstraction of the physical system,
then the definitive assertion about the model gives us confidence in the physical
realization of the system. Such confidence is hugely valuable, particularly for em-
bedded systems where malfunctions can threaten human lives. Studying models of
systems gives us insight into how those systems will behave in the physical world.
Real-life systems are distributed, concurrent systems composed of components.
It is therefore necessary to be able to specify concurrency conveniently. Com-
ponents must be able to communicate and to synchronize. Furthermore, many
embedded systems are real-time systems. Therefore, explicit timing requirements
are one of the characteristics of embedded systems. The behavior of time-critical
systems is typically subject to rather stringent timing constraints. For a train
crossing it is essential that on detecting the approach of a train, the gate is closed
within a certain time bound in order to halt car and pedestrian traffic before the
train reaches the crossing. For a radiation machine the time period during which
a cancer patient is subjected to a high dose of radiation is extremely important; a
small extension of this period is dangerous and can cause the patients death. See
[65].
Classical finite state machines do not provide information about time. In order
to model time, classical automata have been extended to also include timing infor-
mation. Timed automata [4] are essentially automata extended with real-valued
variables. The variables model the logical clocks in the system, that are initial-
ized with zero when the system is started, and then increase synchronously with
the same rate. Clock constraints, i.e. guards on edges, are used to restrict the
behavior of the automaton. Uppaal [17] is an integrated tool environment for
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modeling, validation and verification of real-time systems modeled as networks of
timed automata, extended with data types (bounded integers, arrays etc.).
1.1.2 Verification
Verification is the process of proving or demonstrating that the program correctly
complies to its specification. In a more formal way, verification shows that the
program satisfies a given specification by a (mathematical) proof. Briefly, system
verification is used to establish that the design or product under consideration
possesses certain properties. The properties to be validated are mostly obtained
from the system’s specification. A defect is found once the system does not fulfill
one of the specification’s properties. The system is considered to be “correct”
whenever it satisfies all properties obtained from its specification. Correctness is
always relative to a specification, and is not an absolute property of a system.
Model-based verification techniques are based on models describing the possible
system behavior in a mathematically precise and unambiguous manner. The sys-
tem models are accompanied by algorithms that systematically explore all states
of the system model. This provides the basis for a whole range of verification tech-
niques ranging from an exhaustive exploration (model checking) to experiments
with a restrictive set of scenarios in the model (simulation), or in reality (testing).
Model checking is a formal verification technique which allows for desired be-
havioral properties of a given system to be verified on the basis of a suitable model
of the system through systematic inspection of all states of the model. The attrac-
tiveness of model checking comes from the fact that it is completely automatic -i.e.
the learning curve for a user is very gentle- and that it offers counterexamples in
case a model fails to satisfy a property serving as indispensable debugging infor-
mation. Model checking requires a model of the system under consideration and
a desired property and systematically checks whether or not the given model sat-
isfies the property. Typical properties that can be checked are deadlock freedom,
invariants, and request-response properties [10]. Model checking is an automated
technique to check the absence of errors (i.e. property violation) and alternatively
can be considered as an intelligent and effective debugging technique.
With simulation, a model of the system at hand is constructed and simulated.
Based on inputs, execution paths of the system are examined using a simulator. A
mismatch between the simulators output and the output described in the specifi-
cation determines the presence of errors. Simulation is like testing, but is applied
to models. It suffers from the same limitations, though: the number of scenarios
to be checked in a model to get full confidence goes beyond any reasonable subset
of scenarios that can be examined in practice. In the other words, the main lim-
itation of simulation is that there is no guarantee that the corner cases are ever
reached (would require possibly infinite number of simulation runs, i.e. when real
values, concurrency or non-determinism are in the model).
6 Introduction
1.1.3 Testing
Testing is the process of exercising a product to verify that it satisfies specified
requirements or to identify differences between expected and actual results. In
testing the implementation of the system is taken as already realized and is stim-
ulated with certain (hopefully well-chosen) inputs and the reaction of the system
is observed. Whereas verification proves conformance with a given specification,
testing finds cases where a program does not meet its specification. It is important
to note, that testing can never be complete, since it is built up solely of observa-
tions. Hence, only a small subset of all possible instances of a systems behavior
can be taken into consideration. The purpose of testing is to make sure that a
manufactured embedded system behaves as intended. Testing can be done during
or after the fabrication (fabrication testing) and also after the system has been
delivered to the customer (field testing).
Software testing is a dynamic technique that actually runs the system. Soft-
ware testing constitutes a significant part of any software engineering project.
Usually, between 30% and 50% of the total software project costs are devoted to
testing [10]. Testing takes the piece of software under consideration and provides
its compiled code with input, called tests. Correctness is thus determined by forc-
ing the software to traverse a set of execution paths, sequences of code statements
representing a run of the software. Based on the observations during the test exe-
cution, the actual output of the software is compared to the output as documented
in the system specification. Although test generation and test execution can partly
be automated, the comparison is usually performed by human-beings. The main
advantage of testing is that it can be applied to all sorts of software, ranging
from application software (e.g., e-business software) to compilers and operating
systems. As exhaustive testing of all execution paths is practically infeasible; in
practice only a small subset of these paths is treated. Testing can thus never be
complete. That is to say, testing can only show the presence of errors, not their
absence.
Software testing methods are traditionally divided into white- and black-box
testing. White-box testing is when the tester has access to the internal data
structures and algorithms including the code that implement these. Black-box
testing treats the software as a “black-box” i.e. without any knowledge of internal
implementation. These two approaches are used to describe the point of view that
a test engineer takes when designing test cases.
Hardware testing is achievable through hardware description languages (HDL).
One of the first steps in hardware design is to write down the logical structure and
behavior of the circuit using an HDL which is a software-like language. This logical
description is later compiled into circuit elements. Functional design verification
aims to find problems at this early stage of design by analyzing the description
written in HDL. The behavior and the structure of designs are usually so complex
that, in many cases, the design is not entirely correct and will behave differently
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than expected once implemented as a circuit. Since it is prohibitively expensive
to fix problems after the design is fabricated, functional design verification proves
to be indispensable by finding problems early on, before additional work is done
on the design. With automatic test vector generation (see for example [26, 8,
55]), it is possible to run more tests more often and earlier in the development
process which probably results in improved quality of the system. The test vector
generation [25] produces a set of test vectors that include the inputs, expected
outputs, and requirement traceability link. Boundary-scan, as defined by the
IEEE Std.-1149.1 [94] standard, is an integrated method for testing interconnects
on printed circuit boards (PCBs) that are implemented at the integrated circuit
(IC) level.
Testing embedded/cyber-physical systems in their real environment may be
dangerous. For example, testing control software in a nuclear power plant can be
a source of serious, far-reaching problems. Model-based testing is the application of
model-based design for designing and optionally executing the necessary artifacts
to perform software testing. Models can be used to represent the desired behavior
of the System Under Test (SUT), or to represent the desired testing strategies and
testing environment. Innovative work is needed to make effective connections to
the design environments and tools that can produce formal models automatically
for embedded systems.
1.2 The Chess Wireless Sensor Network
The next evolutionary development step in building, utilities, industrial, home,
shipboard, and transportation systems automation is represented by smart envi-
ronments. Like any reactive system, the smart environment relies first and fore-
most on sensory data from the real world. Sensory data comes from multiple
sensors of different modalities in distributed locations. The smart environment
needs information about its surroundings as well as about its internal workings.
Most information needed by smart environments is provided by sensor networks,
which are responsible for sensing as well as for the first stage of the processing
hierarchy. The challenges in monitoring the environment, detecting the relevant
events, collecting the data, assessing and evaluating the information, formulat-
ing meaningful reports for the users, and performing decision-making and alarm
functions are enormous.
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a collection of nodes organized into a
cooperative network. Each node has a processing capability (one or more micro-
controllers, CPUs or DSP chips), may contain multiple types of memory (program,
data and flash memories), has a RF transceiver (usually with a single omnidirec-
tional antenna), has a power source (e.g., batteries and solar cells), and accommo-
date various sensors and actuators. The nodes communicate wirelessly and often
self-organize after being deployed in an ad hoc fashion. Systems of 1000s or even
10,000 nodes are anticipated. Wireless sensor networks are currently beginning to
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be deployed at an accelerated pace. Such systems can revolutionize the way we
live and work. It is not unreasonable to expect that in 10-15 years that the world
will be covered with wireless sensor networks which are connected to the Internet.
This new technology is exciting with unlimited potential for numerous ap-
plication areas including environmental, medical, military, transportation, enter-
tainment, crisis management, homeland defense, and smart spaces. The proper
design of wireless sensor networks is challenging as it requires an broad breadth
of knowledge from a wide variety of disciplines, such as communications, wireless
technologies, smart sensors, self-organization and signal processing.
An effective protocol for wireless sensor networks must consume little power,
avoid collisions, be implemented with a small code size and memory requirements,
be efficient for a single application, and be tolerant to changing radio frequency
and networking conditions. One of the greatest challenges in the design of wireless
sensor networks is to find suitable mechanisms for clock synchronization.
The Chess eT International B.V. has developed a WSN platform using a gossip
(epidemic) communication model. Gossiping in distributed systems refers to the
repeated probabilistic exchange of information between two members. In gossip
networks, information can spread within a group just as it would in real life.
The main advantage of gossiping is that the absence of explicit routing provides
a potentially scale free network, whereby message flooding provides robustness.
In order to meet strict energy constraints, Chess used a Time Division Multiple
Access (TDMA) protocol where the period in which nodes are active is limited
and for the remainder of the time, nodes switch to an energy saving mode. One of
the greatest challenges in the design of communication protocols is to find suitable
mechanisms for clock synchronization: we must ensure that whenever some node
is sending all its neighbors are listening. Each wireless sensor node has a low-cost
32 KHz crystal oscillator driving an internal clock used to determine the start and
end of each slot. The TDMA time slot boundaries might drift (i.e. oscillators are
sensitive to temperature changes) that makes the nodes go out of sync . Many
clock synchronization protocols have been proposed for WSNs. In most of these
protocols, clocks are synchronized to an accurate real-time standard like Universal
Coordinated Time (UTC). However Chess has employed a different approach in
which a node only needs to be synchronized to its immediate neighbors, not to
faraway nodes or to UTC. In the first part of this thesis, clock synchronization in
the Chess WSN is studied.
1.3 Automata Learning
The construction of models typically requires specialized expertise. It is time
consuming and involves significant manual effort, implying that in practice often
models are not available, or become outdated as the system evolves. In practice,
80% of software development involves legacy code, for which only poor documenta-
tion is available. Manual construction of models of legacy components is typically
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very labor intensive and often not cost effective. The possible solution that is
investigated in this thesis is to infer models automatically through observations
and test, that is, through black-box reverse engineering.
The problem of inducing, learning or inferring grammars and automata has
been studied for decades, but only in recent years grammatical inference a.k.a.
grammar induction has emerged as an independent field. Grammatical inference
techniques aim at building a grammar or automaton for an unknown language,
given some data about this language. Within the setting of active learning, it is
assumed that a learner interacts with a teacher. Inspired by the work of Angluin
[6] on the L∗ algorithm, Niese [76] developed an adaptation of the L∗ algorithm
for active learning of deterministic Mealy machines. This algorithm has been
further optimized in [83]. In the algorithm it is assumed that the teacher knows
a deterministic Mealy machine M. Initially, the learner only knows the action
signature (the sets of input and output symbols I and O) and her task is to learn
a Mealy machine that is equivalent to M. The teacher will answer two types of
questions – output queries (“what is the output generated in response to input
i ∈ I∗?”) and equivalence queries (“is a hypothesized machine H correct, i.e.,
equivalent to the machine M?”). The learner always records the current state
q of Mealy machine M. In response to query i, the current state is updated to
q′ and answer o is returned to the learner. At any point the learner can “reset”
the teacher, that is, change the current state back to the initial state of M. The
answer to an equivalence query H is either yes (in case M ≈ H) or no (in case
M 6≈ H). Furthermore, the teacher will give the learner a counterexample that
proves that the learner’s hypothesis is wrong with every negative equivalence query
response, that is, an input sequence u ∈ I∗ such that obsM(u) 6= obsH(u). This
algorithm has been implemented in the LearnLib tool [83].
State-of-the-art tools for active learning of state machines are able to learn
state machines with at most in the order of 10.000 states. This is not enough
for learning models of realistic software components which, due to the presence of
program variables and data parameters in events, typically have much larger state
spaces.
Abstraction is the key when learning behavioral models of realistic systems.
Hence, in most practical applications where automata learning is used to con-
struct models of software components, researchers manually define abstractions
which, depending on the history, map a large set of concrete events to a small
set of abstract events that can be handled by automata learning tools. Recently,
Aarts, Jonsson & Uijen have proposed a framework for regular inference with
abstraction in which, depending on the history, a large set of concrete events is
mapped to a small set of abstract events [1]. Using this framework they succeeded
to automatically infer models of several realistic software components with large
state spaces, including fragments of the TCP and SIP protocols.
In the second part of this thesis, it is shown how such abstractions can be
constructed fully automatically for a class of extended finite state machines in
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which one can test for equality of data parameters, but no operations on data are
allowed. This aim is reached through counterexample-guided abstraction refine-
ment: whenever the current abstraction is too coarse and induces nondeterministic
behavior, the abstraction is refined automatically. Using a prototype implemen-
tation of the algorithm, models of several realistic software components, including
the biometric passport and the SIP protocol were learned fully automatically.
1.4 Thesis Statement
This thesis is funded by the NWO project ARTS, Abstraction Refinement for
Timed Systems. In 2008, when I started as a PhD candidate, the european project
Quasimodo was started which introduced several industrial challenges including
Chess wireless sensor network case. In line with that project, we planned to use
Counterexample-guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) to verify the synchro-
nization of a an arbitrary size WSN. Although we succeeded to use invariant proof
techniques to verify an arbitrary size WSN with clique topology, and despite the
fact that we discovered a potential flaw in Chess implementation, after two years
of working on the project, we did not succeed to use CEGAR method in order
to conquer the state space explosion problem when verifying the Chess synchro-
nization protocol. However, in 2010, a new research project started in MBSD
in the field of automata learning, which seemed to be a good place for perform-
ing CEGAR method. Within that project, we decided to design and implement a
CEGAR-based algorithm which is capable of fully automatically learning a class of
parametric systems. Correspondingly, this dissertation is organized in two parts.
Part one is written based on the publications
1. F. Heidarian, J. Schmaltz and F.W. Vaandrager. Analysis of a Clock Syn-
chronization Protocol for Wireless Sensor Networks. In A. Cavalcanti and
D. Dams, editors. Proceedings FM 2009: Formal Methods, Eindhoven, The
Netherlands, November 2009. LNCS 5850, pp. 516-531, Springer-Verlag,
2009., and
2. M. Schuts, F. Zhu, F. Heidarian and F.W. Vaandrager. Modelling Clock
Synchronization in the Chess gMAC WSN Protocol. In S. Andova et.al.,
editors. Proceedings First Workshop on Quantitative Formal Methods: The-
ory and Applications (QFM’09), Eindhoven, the Netherlands, 3rd November
2009. Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 13, pp.41-54,
2009.
In part one, the industrial case-study of Chess on wireless sensor networks is in-
vestigated. Uppaal is used for modeling and verification of two synchronization
algorithms for wireless sensor networks. Chapter 2 introduces Chess WSN, in
detail. Afterwards, in chapter 3 a synchronization algorithm for wireless sensor
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networks is fully described. Furthermore, the timed automata model of the syn-
chronization protocol is depicted in detail and it is shown how Uppaal is used
to extract the error scenarios presenting the situations the network goes out of
sync. Based on such error scenarios, three conditions are introduced for a fully
connected network to work correctly. The conditions are proved to be necessary
and sufficient using invariant proof techniques. Isabelle/HOL supports the proofs.
In chapter 4 another synchronization protocol, named Median, is fully described,
and a detailed timed automata model of the protocol is presented in Uppaal.
The model is checked for synchronization, and an error scenario showing how the
network goes out of sync is presented. The error scenario is reproducible in reality.
While in chapter 3 the focus of modeling is simplicity to make verification easier,
in chapter 4 the model is attempted to be constructed as close to real implemen-
tation as possible. Chapter 5 concludes the research described in part one and
compares the obtained results with the most related researches.
Part two is written based on the publications
1. F. Aarts, F. Heidarian, H. Kuppens, P. Olsen, and F.W. Vaandrager. Au-
tomata Learning Through Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement.
To appear in 18th International Symposium on Formal Methods (FM 2012),
Paris, France, August 27-31, 2012. Springer-Verlag 2012., and
2. F. Aarts, F. Heidarian, and F.W. Vaandrager. A Theory of History Depen-
dent Abstractions for Learning Interface Automata. April 2012. Submitted.
Part two describes how counterexample-guided abstraction refinement can be em-
ployed to expand the learning ability of automata learning tools. Chapter 6 gives
a short introduction of automata learning and the way abstraction refinement
can be used to strengthen the abilities of the current tools. Chapter 7 provides
a solid theoretical foundation for learning interface automata using a large class
of abstractions. In chapter 8, it is explained how this theoretical results sup-
port building the tool Tomte to learn a limited class of interface automata, called
scalarset symbolic interface automata. Chapter 9 concludes the investigation and
represents the most related works. Finally, I end the thesis in chapter 10.
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Part I
Formal Analysis of
Synchronization Protocols
for Wireless Sensor
Networks

Chapter 2
Introduction to Part One
The research reported in the first part of this thesis was carried out within the
context of the EU project Quasimodo. The main goal of Quasimodo was to de-
velop new techniques and tools for model-driven design, analysis, testing and code-
generation for advanced embedded systems where ensuring quantitative bounds
on resource consumption is a central problem. Case studies have been the driv-
ing momentum behind the project. Quasimodo followed an iterative approach
where fundamental research on theory and algorithms —challenged by real-life
case studies— was developed and implemented in methods and tools, which were
evaluated through case studies. The Chess eT International B.V. was an industrial
party of Quasimodo project who provided several case studies including a wireless
sensor network running an epidemic communication protocol.
The first part of this thesis is devoted to modeling and analysis of synchroniza-
tion algorithms for Chess wireless sensor network case study.
A wireless sensor network (WSN) consists of spatially distributed autonomous
devices that communicate via radio and use sensors to cooperatively monitor phys-
ical or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound, vibration, pressure,
motion or pollutants, at different locations. WSNs consist of potentially thou-
sands of nodes where each node comes equipped with one (or sometimes several)
sensors. Each such sensor node has typically several parts: a radio transceiver
with an internal antenna or connection to an external antenna, a microcontroller,
an electronic circuit for interfacing with the sensors and an energy source, usually
a battery or an embedded form of energy harvesting. WSNs have numerous appli-
cations, ranging from monitoring of dikes to smart kindergartens, and from forest
fire detection to monitoring of the Matterhorn.
The Chess eT International B.V. develops a WSN platform using an epidemic
(gossip) communication model, in the context of the MyriaNed project [80]. Fig-
ure 2.1 displays a sensor node developed by Chess.
Gossiping in distributed systems refers to the repeated probabilistic exchange
of information between two members [53, 33]. The effect is that information can
16 Introduction to Part One
Figure 2.1: Chess MyriaNode 2.4 GHz wireless sensor node
spread within a group just as it would in real life. Their simplicity, robustness
and flexibility make gossip based algorithms attractive for data dissemination and
aggregation in wireless sensor networks. However, formal analysis of gossip algo-
rithms is a challenging research problem [11]. The Chess WSN distinguishes three
protocol layers: the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer, which is responsible for
regulating the access to the wireless shared channel, the intermediate Gossip layer,
which is responsible for insertion of new messages, forwarding of current messages
and deletion of old messages, and the Application layer, which has the business
logic that interprets messages and may generate new messages. This research
concentrates on the MAC layer of the Chess WSN.
The rest of this introduction is organized as follows. Section 2.1, gives a brief
account of MyriaNed design for MAC layer. Section 2.2 introduces a proposed
synchronization algorithm for Chess WSN and explains how the suggested protocol
is formally analyzed in chapter 3 this thesis. Section 2.3 presents the basics of
Median algorithm which is the focus of chapter ??.
2.1 Chess MAC model
The MAC layer uses specific protocols to ensure that signals sent from different
stations across the same channel don’t collide, as RF broadcasting is used to
transfer message. Characteristics of the other layers influence the design decisions
for the MAC layer. For instance, the redundant nature of the Gossip layer justifies
occasional message loss in the MAC layer.
Chess used a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol for the MAC
layer. In this approach, time is divided in fixed length frames, and each frame is
subdivided into slots (see Figure 2.2). Slots can be either active or idle. During
active slots, a node is either listening for incoming messages from neighboring
nodes (“RX ”) or it is sending a message itself (“TX ”). During idle slots a node
is switched to energy saving mode. In WSNs, nodes are usually battery operated
devices with an expected uninterrupted field deployment of several years. Hence,
energy efficiency is a major concern in the design of WSNs. For this reason, in
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Figure 2.2: The structure of a time frame
 
	
	



	
	
	


      


	




Figure 2.3: TX and RX slots
MyriaNed design the number of active slots is typically much smaller than the
total number of slots (less than 1% in the current implementation [80]). The
active slots are placed in one contiguous sequence which is placed at the beginning
of the frame. A node can only transmit a message once per time frame in its TX
slot. If two neighboring nodes choose the same send slot, a collision will occur
in the intersection of their ranges preventing delivery of either node’s message in
that intersection. Ideally, no neighboring pair would ever choose the same send
slot. This has proven to be very hard to achieve, especially in settings with node
mobility. In this thesis, the issue of slot allocation is not addressed and it is simply
assumed that the TX slots of all nodes are fixed and have been chosen in such a
way that no collisions occur. Actually, receiving is typically more expensive than
sending, as radio needs to be turned on longer. Furthermore, receiving usually
consumes more energy per bit.
One of the greatest challenges in the design of the MAC layer is to find suitable
mechanisms for clock synchronization, that is a distributed algorithm to ensure
that the start of all active periods of the nodes are synchronous. More precisely,
it must be guaranteed that whenever some node is sending all its neighbors are
listening.
In the setting of Chess, each wireless sensor node comes equipped with a low-
cost 32 KHz crystal oscillator that drives an internal clock that is used to determine
the start and end of each slot. This may cause the TDMA time slot boundaries to
drift and thus lead to situations in which nodes get out of sync. To overcome this
problem, the notion of guard time is introduced: at the beginning of its TX slot,
before actually starting transmission, a sender waits a certain amount of time for
the receiver to be ready to receive messages. Similarly, the sender also waits for
some time period at the end of its TX slot (see Figure 2.3).
In the implementation of Chess, each slot consisted of 29 clock cycles, out of
which 18 cycles were used as guard time. Assegei [7] calculated how the battery life
of a wireless sensor node is influenced by the guard time. Figure 2.4, taken from
[7], summarizes these results. Clearly, it is of vital importance to reduce the guard
time as much as possible, since this directly affects the battery life, which is a key
characteristics of WSNs. Intuitively, larger guard-time leads to larger slots which
leads to larger active time which implies more energy consumption. Reduction of
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Figure 2.4: Battery life as a function of guard time
the guard time is possible if the hardware clocks are properly synchronized.
To experiment with its designs, Chess builds prototypes and uses advanced
simulation tools. However, due to the huge number of possible network topologies
and clock speeds of nodes, although it is not difficult to discover flaws in the clock
synchronization algorithm via these methods, it is difficult to understand the root
cause of the flaws and to provide objective evidence that the algorithm is correct
under all circumstances.
Timed automata model checking has been successfully used for the analysis
of worst case scenarios for protocols that involve clock synchronization, see for
instance [16, 41, 97]. To enable model checking, models need to be much more
abstract than for simulation, and also the size of networks that can be tackled is
much smaller, but the big advantage is that the full state space of the model can
be explored.
The purpose of the research of this thesis was to use timed automata model
checking to help Chess with designing synchronization protocols for their WSN.
2.2 MyriaNed Protocol
In chapter 3, based on the model of Chess for the MAC layer, a synchronization
algorithm is proposed for WSN in which a node adjusts its clock whenever a mes-
sage arrives, and a timed automata model is presented for the suggested algorithm.
Then the use of timed automata model checker Uppaal [15] for analyzing WSNs
with full connectivity is explained. Various instances are verified and three differ-
ent scenarios are identified which may lead to situations where the network is out
of sync. Besides, a full parametric analysis of the protocol for cliques (networks
with a connection between every pair of nodes), is presented, that is, constraints
on the parameters are given that are both necessary and sufficient for correctness.
The results are checked using the proof assistant Isabelle [77]. In order to make
verification feasible, the model of chapter 3 abstracts from several aspects in the
implementation, including radio switching time: there is some time involved in
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the transition from sending mode to receiving mode (and vice versa), which in
some cases may affect the correctness of the algorithm. Finally, a result for the
special case of line topologies is presented: for any instantiation of the parameters,
the protocol will eventually fail if the network grows. Although this approach has
advantages, the practical usefulness of this algorithm still needs to be explored
further.
2.3 Median Protocol
Chess has implemented Median algorithm, an extension of an algorithm proposed
by Tjoa et al [91], on WSN. The idea is that in every frame, each node com-
putes its phase error to any of its direct neighbors. After the last active slot, each
node adjusts its frame length by the median of the phase errors of its immedi-
ate neighbors. In chapter 4, a detailed model of the Chess Median algorithm is
presented using the input language of Uppaal. The aim is to construct a model
that comes as close as possible to the specification of the clock synchronization
algorithm presented in [80]. Nevertheless, the model still does not incorporate
some features of the full algorithm and network, such as dynamic slot allocation,
synchronization messages, uncertain communication delays, and unreliable radio
communication. At places where the informal specification of [80] was incomplete
or ambiguous, the engineers from Chess kindly provided additional information
on the way these issues are resolved in the current implementation of the network
[100]. The Median algorithm works reasonably well in practice, but by means of
simulation experiments, Assegei [7] points out that the performance of the Me-
dian algorithm decreases if the network becomes more dynamic. In some test
cases where new nodes join or networks merge, the algorithm fails to converge or
nodes may stay out of sync for a certain period of time. Analysis with Uppaal as
presented in chapter 4, confirms these results. In fact, it is shown in chapter 4 that
the situation is even worse: in certain cases a static, fully synchronized network
may eventually become unsynchronized if the Median algorithm is used, even in a
setting with infinitesimal clock drifts. This theoretical result has been later repro-
duced experimentally in a real network of Chess. Assegei [7] proposes a variation
of the Median algorithm that uses Kalman filters, but as it is shown in [42], also
this variation leads to serious synchronization problems.
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Chapter 3
Modeling and Verification of
MyriaNed Synchronization
Protocol for Wireless Sensor
Networks
In this chapter, the MyriaNed algorithm for the Chess WSN is analyzed. In this
protocol a node adjusts its clock whenever a message arrives. This chapter is
structured as follows. In Section 3.1, the synchronization algorithm is modeled
using timed automata. Section 3.2 describes the use of the timed automata model
checker Uppaal to analyze WSNs with full connectivity. Various instances are
verified and three different scenarios that may lead to situations where the network
is out of sync, are identified. Section 3.3 presents a full parametric analysis of
the protocol for cliques. In Section 3.4 an exhaustive analysis is reported using
Uppaal of all networks with 4 nodes. Section 3.5 presents a result for the special
case of line topologies: for any instantiation of the parameters, the protocol will
eventually fail if the network grows. Section 3.6, finally, discusses related work
and draws conclusions.
Uppaal models, Isabelle sources and invariant proofs for this study are avail-
able at http://www.mbsd.cs.ru.nl/publications/papers/fvaan/HSV09/.
3.1 Uppaal Model
In this section, the Uppaal model of the Chess protocol is described. A detailed
account of the timed automata model checking toolUppaal, is presented in [15, 14]
and the website http://www.uppaal.com.
A wireless sensor network is defined as a finite, fixed set of wireless nodes
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Nodes = {0, . . . ,N − 1}. The behavior of each individual node i ∈ Nodes is
described by three timed automata: Clock(i), WSN(i) and Synchronizer(i).
Automaton Clock(i) models the hardware clock of the node, automaton WSN(i)
takes care of sending messages, and the Synchronizer(i) automaton resynchro-
nizes the hardware clock upon receipt of a message. The complete model consists
of the composition of timed automata Clock(i), WSN(i) and Synchronizer(i),
for each i ∈ Nodes.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the architecture of the model for a single node i. For each
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Figure 3.1: Model architecture for node i
i, there is a state variable clk[i] that records the (integer) value of i’s hardware clock
(initially 0), and a variable csn[i] that records the current slot number of node i
(also 0 initially). Variable clk[i] is incremented cyclically whenever Clock[i] ticks,
but it can also be reset by Synchronizer[i]. Automaton WSN[i] reads clk[i] in
order to determine when to transmit. Automaton WSN[i] both reads and write
variable csn[i]. The Synchronizer[i] needs to read variable csn[i] in order to
determine whether node i is active or idle. In Uppaal, a broadcast channel can
be used to synchronize transitions of multiple automata. If a is a broadcast channel
and one automaton in the network is in a state with an outgoing a! transition,
then this transition may always occur (provided the guard evaluates to true). In
this case, the transition synchronizes with the a? transitions of all automata that
enable such a transition. Automata that do not enable an a? transition remain in
the same state. Within the model, broadcast channel tick[i] is used to synchronize
the activities within node i, and broadcast channel start message[i] is used to
inform all the nodes in the network that node i has started transmission. More
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specifically, automaton WSN[i] performs a start message[i]! action to indicate that
node i starts transmission, and whenever some node j starts transmission and
node i is in an active slot (csn[i] < n), automaton Synchronizer[i] may perform
a start message[j]? transition.
Table 4.1 lists the parameters (constants in Uppaal terminology) that are used
in the model, together with some basic constraints. The domain of all parameters
is the set of natural numbers.
Parameter Description Constraints
N number of nodes 1 < N
C number of slots in a time frame 0 < C
n number of active slots in a time frame 0 < n ≤ C
tsn[i] TX slot number for node i ∈ Nodes 0 ≤ tsn[i] < n
k0 number of clock ticks in a time slot 0 < k0
g guard time 0 < g
t tail time 0 < t, g + t + 2 ≤ k0
min minimal time between two clock ticks 0 < min
max maximal time between two clock ticks min ≤ max
Table 3.1: Protocol parameters
3.1.1 Clock
Timed automaton Clock(i), displayed in Figure 3.2, models the behavior of the
hardware clock of node i. It has a single location and a single transition. It
comes equipped with a local clock variable x, which is initially 0, that is used to
measure the time in between clock ticks. Whenever x reaches the value min, the
automaton enables a tick[i]! action. The tick[i]! action must occur before x has
reached value max. Then x is reset to 0 and the (integer) value of i’s hardware
clock clk[i] is incremented by 1. For convenience and in order to make model
checking feasible, the hardware clock is reset after k0 ticks, that is, the clock takes
integer values modulo k0 (Uppaal’s modulo operator % is used). This is not an
essential modeling assumption and it is easy to change it. In the implementation
of the protocol, the clock domain is larger and additional program variables are
used to record, for instance, the clock value at which a frame starts. However,
in order to avoid state space explosion, it is tried to reduce the number of state
variables and the domains of these variables.
3.1.2 Wireless Sensor Node
Automaton WSN(i), displayed in Figure 3.3, is the most important component
in the model. It has three locations and four transitions. The automaton stays
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x<=max
tick[i]!
x:=0,
clk[i]:=(clk[i]+1)%k0
X0 x >= min
Figure 3.2: Timed automaton Clock(i)
in initial location WAIT until the current slot number of i equals the TX slot
number of i (csn[i] = tsn[i]) and the gth clock tick in this slot occurs. It then
jumps to location GO SEND. This is an urgent location that is left immedi-
ately via a start message[i]!-transition to location SENDING. Broadcast channel
start message[i] is used to inform all neigboring nodes that a new message trans-
mission has started. The automaton stays in location SENDING until the start of
the tail interval, that is, until the (k0− t)th tick in the current slot (cf. Figure 2.3),
and then returns to location WAIT. At the end of each slot, that is, when the k0
th
tick occurs, the automaton increments its current slot number (modulo C).
GO_SEND
WAIT
SENDINGstart_message[i]!
clk[i]==k0-1
tick[i]?
csn[i] := (csn[i]+1) % C
clk[i]==k0 - t -1
tick[i]?
csn[i]==tsn[i]
&& clk[i]==g -1
tick[i]?
Figure 3.3: Timed automaton WSN(i)
3.1.3 Synchronizer
Automaton Synchronizer(i), displayed in Figure 3.4, is the last component of
the model. It performs the role of the clock synchronizer in the TDMA protocol.
The automaton has two locations and two transitions. The automaton waits in
its initial location S0 until it detects the start of a new message, that is, until a
start message[j]? event occurs, for some j. The Uppaal select statement is used
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to nondeterministically select a j ∈ Nodes. The automaton then moves to location
S1, provided node i is active (csn[i] < n). Remember that at the moment when
the start message[j]? event occurs, the hardware clock of node j, clk[j], has value
g. Therefore, node i resets its own hardware clock clk[i] to g + 1 upon occurrence
of the first clock tick following the start message[j]? event. The automaton then
returns to its initial location S0.
S1S0
tick[i]?
clk[i]:= g+1
j:Nodes
csn[i] < n
start_message[j]?
Figure 3.4: Timed automaton Synchronizer(i)
In the model there is no delay between sending and receipt of messages. Fol-
lowing Meier & Thiele [70], it is assumed delay uncertainties are negligible, and
therefore the delays are eliminated from the analysis. When communication is
infrequent, this is reasonable since the impact of clock drift dominates over the
influence of delay uncertainties.
Automaton Synchronizer(i) has no constraint on the value of j, that is, node
i is assumed to be able to receive messages from any node in the network. Hence
the network has full connectivity. It is easy to generalize this model to a setting
with arbitrary network topologies by adding a guard neighbor(i, j) to the transition
from S0 to S1 that indicates that i is a direct neighbor of j. It is assumed that
neighbor(i, j)⇒ i 6= j. The neighbor(i, j) predicate does not have to be symmetric
since in a wireless sensor network it may occur that i can receive messages from
j, but not vice versa. For networks with full connectivity, it is assumed that all
nodes have unique TX slot numbers:
i 6= j ⇒ tsn[i] 6= tsn[j] (3.1)
For networks that are not fully connected, this assumption generalizes to the
requirements that neighboring nodes have distinct TX slot numbers, and distinct
nodes with the same TX slot number do not have a common neighbor:
neighbor(i, j) ⇒ tsn[i] 6= tsn[j] (3.2)
neighbor(i, j) ∧ neighbor(i, k) ⇒ tsn[j] 6= tsn[k] (3.3)
3.2 Uppaal Analysis Results for Cliques
A wireless sensor network is called synchronized if whenever a node is sending, all
neighboring nodes have the same slot number as the sending node. For networks
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with full connectivity this means that all nodes in the network agree on the current
slot, which leads to the following formal definition of correctness.
Definition A network with full connectivity is synchronized if and only if for all
reachable states (∀i, j ∈ Nodes)(SENDINGi ⇒ csn[i] = csn[j]).
The objective is to find necessary and sufficient constraints on the system parame-
ters that ensure that a network with full connectivity is synchronized. To this end,
different values are assigned to the parameters of the model and Uppaal is used
to verify the property of Definition 3.2. Based on the outcomes (and in particular
the counterexamples generated by Uppaal) general constraints are derived. For
networks with up to 4 nodes, the Uppaal model checker is able to explore the
state space within a few seconds.
Table 3.2 shows some example values of the parameters for which the model
is synchronized. In fact, via a series of model checking experiments, using binary
search, min and max are found to be the smallest consecutive natural numbers for
which the model with the values assigned to N, C, n, k0 and g is synchronized. Note
that for correctness of the WSN algorithm the exact values of min and max are
not important: what matters is their ratio. By setting min = m, max = m+ 1 and
letting m grow, the hardware becomes more and more accurate, until (hopefully)
we reach the point at which the algorithm becomes correct. Parameter t is chosen
equal to g and tsn(i) is chosen equal to i. n, k0 and g are kept constant while C,
the number of slots in a frame, is varying. Observe that if the value of C increases
also the values of min and max increase, i.e., if the length of a frame increases then
the hardware clocks must become more accurate to maintain synchronization.
N 2 3 4
C 6 8 10 6 8 10 6 8 10
n 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
k0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
g 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
min 49 69 89 39 59 79 29 49 69
max 50 70 90 40 60 80 30 50 70
Table 3.2: Some Uppaal verification results
Observe that these parameter values are not realistic: a realistic clock accuracy
is around 30 ppm (parts-per-million), C is about 1000 (instead of 10), and g is 9
(instead of 2). Uppaal cannot handle realistic values because of the state explosion
problem. Nevertheless, as we will see, the counterexamples provided by Uppaal
do provide insight.
In Table 3.3, all the parameters are kept constant and then the values of min
and max are considered for different numbers of nodes when n changes. Since, in
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accordance with the specification of the protocol, only slot allocations in which the
sending slots are placed at the very beginning of a frame are considered, increasing
n has no impact on network behavior: when no node is transmitting anyway, it
makes no difference whether nodes are sleeping or listening. In Table 3.4, all the
N 2 3 4
C 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
n 4 5 10 15 4 5 10 15 4 5 10 15
k0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
g 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
min 189 189 189 189 179 179 179 179 169 169 169 169
max 190 190 190 190 180 180 180 180 170 170 170 170
Table 3.3: Numerical results, changing n
parameters are kept constant and then the smallest values of min and max are con-
sidered for different number of nodes when k0 changes. It turns out that increasing
k0 necessitates the increase of min and max. In Table 3.5, all the parameters are
N 2 3 4
C 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
n 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
k0 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20 5 10 15 20
g 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
min 24 49 74 99 19 39 59 79 14 29 44 79
max 25 50 75 100 20 40 60 80 15 30 45 80
Table 3.4: Numerical results, changing k0
kept constant and then the smallest values of min and max are considered for dif-
ferent number of nodes when g changes. Increasing g, facilitates the decrease of
min and max.
The concrete counterexamples produced by the Uppaal model checker can
easily be transformed into parametric counterexamples: it is enough to replace the
concrete values of the timing constants by parameters and collect the constraints
on these parameters that are imposed by the guards and invariants that occur in
the counterexample execution. Inspection of the counterexamples for the WSN
protocol, which one can rerun step by step in the simulator, reveals that there are
essentially three different scenarios that may lead to a state in which the network
is not synchronized. In order to describe these scenarios parametrically at an
abstract level, a bit of notation is needed. s ∈ {0, . . . ,C − 1} is said to be a
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N 2 3 4
C 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
n 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
k0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
g 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
min 49 24 16 39 19 13 29 14 9
max 50 25 17 40 20 14 30 15 10
Table 3.5: Numerical results, changing g
transmitting slot, notation TX(s), if there is some node i that is transmitting in
s, that is,
TX(s) ⇔ (∃i ∈ Nodes)(tsn[i] = s).
PREV(s) denotes the nearest transmitting slot that precedes s (cyclically). For-
mally, function PREV : {0, . . . ,C− 1} → {0, . . . ,C− 1} is defined by
PREV((s+ 1)%C) =
{
s if TX(s)
PREV(s) otherwise
(3.4)
D(s) denotes the number of slots visited when going from PREV(s) to s, that
is, D(s) = (s − PREV(s))%C. M = maxsD(s) is defined to be the maximal
distance between transmitting slots. As we will see, M plays a key role in defining
correctness.
3.2.1 Scenario 1: Fast Sender - Slow Receiver
In the first error scenario, a sending node is proceeding maximally fast whereas a
receiving node runs maximally slow. The sender starts with the transmission of
a message while the receiver is still in an earlier slot. The scenario is illustrated
in Figure 3.5. It starts when the fast and the slow node receive a synchronization
message. Immediately following receipt of this message (at the same point in
time), the hardware clock of fast node ticks and the synchronizer resets this clock
to g + 1. Now, in the worst case, it may take M · k0 − 1 ticks before the fast node
is in its TX slot with its hardware clock equal to g. Since the hardware clock of
the fast node ticks maximally fast, the length of the corresponding time interval is
(M·k0−1)·min. The slow node will reach the TX slot of the fast node after M·k0−g
ticks. With a clock that ticks maximally slow, this may take (M · k0 − g) · max
time. If (M · k0 − g) · max is greater than or equal to (M · k0 − 1) · min then we
may end up in a state where the network is no longer synchronized since the fast
node is sending before the slow node has moved to the same slot. Hence, in order
to exclude this scenario, we must have:
(M · k0 − g) ·max < (M · k0 − 1) ·min (3.5)
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Figure 3.5: Scenario 1: Fast Sender - Slow Receiver
This constraint is consistent with the results in Table 3.2. Consider, for instance
the first column. According to Uppaal the protocol is correct if N = 2, C = 6,
n = 4, k0 = 10, g = 2, min = 49 and max = 50. Since it is assumed that the two
nodes are sending in the first two slots of a frame, it is easy to see that M = 5.
Now we can verify that
(5 · 10− 2) · 50 = 48 · 50 = 2400 < 2401 = 49 · 49 = (5 · 10− 1) · 49
However, if we increase the clock drift slightly by setting min and max to 48 and
49, respectively, then the protocol fails according to Uppaal. And indeed
(5 · 10− 2) · 49 = 48 · 49 = 2352 = 49 · 48 = (5 · 10− 1) · 48
Instead of the lower bound min and the upper bound max on the time between
clock ticks, sometimes it is convenient to consider the ratio
ρ =
min
max
Since 0 < min ≤ max, it follows that ρ is contained in the interval (0, 1]. The
following elementary lemma turns out to be quite useful.
Lemma 3.2.1 Constraint (3.5) is equivalent to g > (1− ρ) ·M · k0 + ρ.
This implies that the worst case scenario occurs when the distance between TX
slots is maximal: if the constraint holds for M it also holds when we replace M by
a smaller value.
The Chess implementation Constraint (3.5) allows us to infer a lower bound
on the guard time g. In the current implementation of the protocol by Chess [80],
a quartz crystal oscillator is used with a clock drift rate θ of at most 20 ppm. This
means that
ρ =
1− θ
1 + θ
=
1− 20 · 10−6
1 + 20 · 10−6 ≈ 0, 99996
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In the Chess implementation, one time frame lasts for about 1 second. It consists
of C = 1129 slots and each slot consists of k0 = 29 clock ticks. The number of
active slots is small (n = 10). A typical value for M is C− n = 1119. Hence
g > (1− ρ) ·M · k0 + ρ ≈ 0, 00004 · 1119 · 29 + 0, 99996 = 2.298
Thus, according to the theoretical model, a value of g = 3 should suffice. Chess
actually uses a guard time of 9. Of course one should realize here that the model
is overly simplified and, for instance, does not take into account (uncertainty in)
message delays and partial connectivity. We will see that these restrictions greatly
influence the minimal guard time.
3.2.2 Scenario 2: Fast Receiver - Slow Sender - before trans-
mission
In the second error scenario, a receiving node runs maximally fast whereas a
sending node proceeds maximally slow. The receiving node already leaves the slot
in which it should receive a message from the sender before the sender has even
started transmission. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Again, the scenario
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Figure 3.6: Scenario 2: Fast Receiver - Slow Sender - before transmission
starts when the fast and the slow node receive a synchronization message. But
now the node that has to send the next message runs maximally slow. It sends this
message after M ·k0 ticks have occurred, which takes M ·k0 ·max time. Meanwhile,
the fast node has made maximal progress: immediately after receipt of the first
synchronization message (at the same point in time), the hardware clock of the
fast node ticks and the synchronizer resets this clock to g + 1. Already after
(k0−g−1) ·min time the node proceeds to the next slot. Another (M ·k0−1) ·min
time units later the fast node sets its clock to k0− 1 and is about to leave the slot
in which the slow node will send a message. If the slow node starts transmission
after this point it is too late: after the next clock tick the fast node will increment
its slot counter and the network is no longer synchronized. In order to exclude the
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second scenario, the following constraint must hold:
M · k0 ·max < ((M + 1) · k0 − g − 2) ·min (3.6)
Also this constraint can be rewritten:
Lemma 3.2.2 Constraint (3.6) is equivalent to g < (1− 1ρ ) ·M · k0 + k0 − 2.
Thus constraint (3.6) imposes an upper bound on guard time g. Since in practice
one will always try to minimize the guard time in order to save energy, this con-
straint is only of theoretical interest. If we fill in the values of Example 3.2.1, we
obtain g < 25.8, which is close to the slot length k0 = 29.
3.2.3 Scenario 3: Fast Receiver - Slow Sender - during trans-
mission
The third scenario involves a fast receiver and a slow sender. The receiver moves
to a new slot while the sender is still transmitting a message. Figure 3.7 illustrates
the scenario. As in the previous scenarios, the hardware clock of the fast node is
set to g + 1 immediately after receipt of the synchronization message.
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Figure 3.7: Scenario 3:Fast Receiver- Slow Sender - during transmission
To exclude this scenario, the following condition should be satisfied:
(k0 − g − t) ·max < (k0 − g − 1) ·min (3.7)
Essentially, constraint (3.7) provides a lower bound on t: to rule out the scenario
in Figure 3.7, the sender should wait long enough before proceeding to the next
slot.
Lemma 3.2.3 Constraint (3.7) is equivalent to t > (1− ρ)(k0 − g) + ρ.
If we fill in the values of Example 3.2.1 with g set to 3, we obtain t > 1.001. Hence
a value of t = 2 should suffice. Hence, for the simple case of a static network with
full connectivity and no uncertainty in message delays, we only need to reserve 5
clock cycles for guard and tail time together. In Section 3.5, we will see that for
different network topologies indeed much larger values are required.
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3.3 Proving Sufficiency of the Constraints
This section outlines the proof that the three constrains derived in Section 3.2 are
sufficient to ensure synchronization in networks with full connectivity.
First the key invariants used in the proof are presented and then the formal-
ization of the full proof using Isabelle/HOL is discussed.
3.3.1 Invariants
Let’s start the proof by stating some elementary invariants.
Lemma 3.3.1 For any network with full connectivity the following invariant as-
sertions hold, for all reachable states and for all i ∈ Nodes:
0 ≤ xi ≤ max (3.8)
0 ≤ clk[i] < k0 (3.9)
0 ≤ csn[i] < C (3.10)
GO SENDi ⇒ xi = 0 (3.11)
GO SENDi ⇒ csn[i] = tsn[i] (3.12)
GO SENDi ⇒ clk[i] ∈ {g, g + 1} (3.13)
SENDINGi ⇒ csn[i] = tsn]i] (3.14)
SENDINGi ⇒ g ≤ clk[i] < k0 − t (3.15)
Invariants (3.8)-(3.10) assert that the state variables indeed take values in their
intended domains: clock variables stay within the (real-valued) range [0,max],
hardware clocks stay within the integer range [0, k0), and current slot numbers stay
within the integer range [0,C). Invariants (3.11)-(3.15) directly follow from the
definitions of the individual automata in the network. For invariant (3.13), observe
that since the tick?-transition from WAIT to GO SEND may synchronize with the
tick?-transition from S1 to S0, the value of clk[i] in GO SENDi is potentially g+ 1.
In order to be able to state more interesting invariants, two auxiliary global
history (or ghost) variables are introduced. Clock y records the time that has
elapsed since the last synchronization message (or the beginning of the protocol).
Variable last records the last slot in which a synchronization message has been
sent (initially last = −1). Figure 3.8 shows the version of the WSN(i) automaton
obtained after adding these variables.
The only change is that upon occurrence of a synchronization start message[i]!
clock y is reset to 0 and variable last is reset to csn[i]. First a few basic invariants
are stated which restrict the values of the new variables.
Lemma 3.3.2 For any network with full connectivity the following invariant as-
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sertions hold, for all reachable states and for all i ∈ Nodes:
0 ≤ y (3.16)
−1 ≤ last < C (3.17)
S1i ⇒ y ≤ xi (3.18)
last = −1 ⇒ S0i (3.19)
Invariant (3.16) says that y is always nonnegative, and invariant (3.17) says that
last takes values in the integer domain [−1,C − 1). If the system is in S1i then
a synchronization occurred after the last clock tick (invariant (3.18)), and if the
system is in S0i then no synchronization occurred yet (invariant (3.19)).
GO_SEND
WAIT
SENDINGstart_message[i]!
y :=0,
last := csn[i]
clk[i]==k0-1
tick[i]?
csn[i] := (csn[i]+1) % C
clk[i]==k0 - t -1
tick[i]?
csn[i]==tsn[i]
&& clk[i]==g -1
tick[i]?
Figure 3.8: WSN(i) with history variables
The key idea behind the correctness proof is that, given the local state of
some node i and the value of last, we can compute the number c(i) of ticks of
i’s hardware clock that has occurred since the last synchronization. Since the
minimal and maximal clock speeds are known, we can then derive an interval
that contains the value of y, the amount of real-time that has elapsed since the
last synchronization. Next, given the value of y, we can compute an interval that
contains the value of c(j), for arbitrary node j. Once we know the value of c(j),
this gives us some information about the local state of node j. Through these
correspondences, we are able to infer that if node i is sending the slot number of
i and j must be equal.
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Formally, for i ∈ Nodes, the state function c(i) is defined by
c(i) = if last = −1 then clk[i] else
if S1i then 0 else
((csn[i]− last)%C) · k0 + clk[i]− g
fi
fi
If there has been no synchronization yet (last = −1) then c(i) is just equal to the
hardware clock clk[i]. If the synchronizer is in location S1i, then we know that
there has been no tick since the last synchronization, so c(i) is set to 0. Otherwise,
c(i) is k0 times the number of slots since the last synchronization, incremented by
the number of ticks in the current slot, minus g to take into account that the
hardware clock has been reset to g + 1 after the last synchronization.
Now the main invariant result from this section can be stated.
Theorem 3.3.3 Assume constraints (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7), 3 ≤ N and assume
that some node transmits in the initial slot.1 Then for any network with full
connectivity the following invariant assertions hold, for all reachable states and
for all i, j ∈ Nodes:
y ≤ c(i) ·max + xi (3.20)
c(i) > 0 ⇒ y ≥ (c(i)− 1) ·min + xi (3.21)
csn[i] = tsn[i]∧ (3.22)
(clk[i] < g ∨ GO SENDi) ⇒ last 6= csn[i] (3.23)
csn[i] = tsn[i] ∧ clk[i] = g ⇒ (GO SENDi ∨ SENDINGi) (3.24)
csn[i] = tsn[i] ∧ clk[i] > g ⇒ last = csn[i] (3.25)
SENDINGi ⇒ csn[i] = csn[j] = last (3.26)
GO SENDi ⇒ csn[i] = csn[j] ∧ clk[i] = g (3.27)
last 6= −1 ∧ last 6= PREV(csn[i]) ⇒ (TX(csn[i]) ∧ last = csn[i]) (3.28)
TX(csn[i]) ∧ clk[i] = k0 − 1 ⇒ last = csn[i] (3.29)
S1i ⇒ clk[i] < k0 − 1 ∧ last = csn[i] (3.30)
c(i) ≥ 0 (3.31)
last = −1 ⇒ csn[i] = 0 (3.32)
Proof By induction, using the invariants from Lemma’s 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.
For a manual proof see http://www.mbsd.cs.ru.nl/publications/papers/
fvaan/HSV09/.
1The last two assumptions have been made for convenience. They are not needed, even though
they are used in the proof.
3.3. Proving Sufficiency of the Constraints 35
Invariants (3.20) and (3.21) are the key invariants that relate the values of c(i)
and y. Invariant (3.26) implies that the network is synchronized. This is the main
correctness property we are interested in. All the other invariants in Theorem 3.3.3
are auxiliary assertions, needed to make the invariant inductive.
3.3.2 On the formal proof
The manual proof of the invariants from the previous subsection has been fully
checked using the proof assistant Isabelle [77]. Below some general remarks about
the formalization are made and some of the subtleties encountered are discussed.
The main motivation for discussing some of the proof details is that this sheds light
on the type of reasoning that will be necessary in order to completely automate
the verification.
The length of the Isabelle/HOL proof is about 5300 lines, whereas the manual
proof is around 1000 lines. Formal proofs are usually longer than their manual
counterpart. Wiedijk [101, 21] proposes the De Bruijn factor as a way to quantify
this difference. This factor basically compares the size of two proof files, com-
pressed using the Unix utility gzip. Wiedijk [101] observes that the average De
Bruijn factor is about 4. In this case, 4.58 is obtained. This is a bit larger than
usual, since the formal proof includes the definition of the Uppaal model and its
semantics, which are not included in the manual proof. All the invariants are also
needed to be defined (about 500 lines). In the manual proof, the 12 basic invari-
ants defined in Lemmas 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 are all disposed of by the word “trivial”.
The formal proof is indeed straightforward but still occupies about 440 lines.
Key aspects of the Isabelle formalization are (1) an alternative definition of
function PREV and a proof of lemmas showing particular properties of it, and (2)
a formalization of the claim that there are at least three transmitting slots per
frame. Common to these two issues is the introduction of the largest slot number
in which a message is transmitted. This is the maximum of function tsn and is
obtained for node imax. The properties needed are basic facts like PREV(s) cannot
be s or that in the idle period of a frame PREV(s) equals the transmitting slot of
imax, i.e., tsn[imax]. Altogether, the definition of PREV, the introduction of imax,
the formal proof that there are at least three transmitting slots, and the proof of
basic properties about these notions occupy about 600 lines.
In the remainder of this section, first imax is formally introduced. Then, the
definition of function PREV is rephrased and a sequel of properties of that function
is proved. After that, the claim that there are at least three transmitting slots is
formalized. Finally, the formal proof is illustrated by two simple but representative
examples.
Definition of imax and PREV
As shown in Figure 2.2, a frame is composed of an active period and an idle period.
In the active period, there are slots where a node is transmitting and the other
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nodes are listening, and also slots where no node is sending and all nodes are
listening. Consequently, there is a last slot in which a message is emitted. Let imax
be the node that is transmitting in this slot. This transmitting node maximizes
function tsn:
TXmax(imax) ≡ TX(tsn[imax]) ∧ ∀i 6= imax.tsn[imax] > tsn[i] (3.33)
The formal definition of function PREV in Isabelle slightly differs from Equa-
tion 3.4. The combination of modulo and the incrementation in the argument does
not translate to Isabelle, where functions must be total and proved to terminate.
Basically, the modulo is removed and frames are considered to be unbounded. The
assumption is still that function tsn returns a natural number strictly less than n.
The first basic invariants then prove that parameters take values in their intended
domain. Function PREV is the recursive function below:
Definition
PREV(0) = tsn[imax]
PREV(s+ 1) = if TX(s) then s else PREV(s)
Properties of PREV
In the formal proof, a sequel of properties showing the structure of a frame is
needed. The next lemma asserts that function PREV is constant during the idle
period, that is, if slot s is transmitting and all slots from s to y are not transmitting,
then PREV(y) is slot s.
Lemma 3.3.4 (TX(s) ∧ y > s ≥ 0 ∧ (∀z.s < z < y ⇒ ¬TX(z)))⇒ PREV(y) = s
Proof By induction on s.
From this above lemma it directly follows that after the last transmitting slot,
function PREV equals this slot:
Lemma 3.3.5 ∀y > tsn[imax].PREV(y) = tsn[imax]
Proof By definition imax is such that there is no transmitting slot after it. This
fact is used for instantiating Lemma 3.3.4 above.
The aim is to prove that the previous slot of slot s is strictly less than s.
Because of the cyclic nature of a frame, this is only true if s > 0.
Lemma 3.3.6 s > 0 =⇒ PREV(s) < s
Proof By induction on s.
Another useful lemma asserts that the “PREV” of a transmitting slot cannot
be tsn[imax].
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Lemma 3.3.7 (s > 0 ∧ TX(s)) =⇒ PREV(s) < tsn[imax]
Proof From TX(s) we obtain j such that tsn[j] = s. By definition of imax we
have tsn[j] ≤ tsn[imax]. Using Lemma 3.3.6, we obtain PREV(s) < s. Hence
PREV(s) < tsn[imax].
At least three sending nodes
In the informal case study description [80], it is assumed that for each node there
is a transmission slot. Translated to the setting of the model, this means that tsn
is a total function from nodes to slots. Interestingly, the Isabelle formalization
revealed that the assumption that tsn is total, is never used in the proof. 2 The
only assumption that is made is that there are at least three sending nodes.
In the formalization, a predicate TXn(i) is introduced which states that for
node i there exists a slot s that equals the transmitting slot of node i, that is,
node i is a transmitting node. Predicate TXn(i) complements predicate TX(s)
defined earlier. Predicate TXn(i) is defined as follows:
Definition TXn(i) = ∃s.tsn[i] = s
The assumption that there are at least three transmitting slots is formalized by
assuming that predicate TXn holds for nodes 0 to 2.
∀i ≤ 2.TXn(i) (3.34)
Two important facts are derived: tsn[imax] is at least 2, and between slot number
0 and slot number n− 1 there is at least one transmitting slot.
Lemma 3.3.8 tsn[imax] ≥ 2 ∧ ∃s.0 < s < n− 1 ∧ TX(s)
Proof The first part is trivial. Function tsn assigns different slots to different
nodes. Together with Equation 3.34 we can derive three distinct nodes – say i, j, k
– with distinct transmitting slots (tsn[i], tsn[j], tsn[k]). We do a case analysis on
their different possible orderings (e.g., tsn[i] < tsn[j] < tsn[k]). By definition a
slot number is not greater than n− 1 and positive. Consequently, the “tsn” in the
middle of the ordering is strictly positive and strictly less than n− 1. This shows
the second term of the conclusion.
A consequence of Lemma 3.3.8 is that function PREV is at least one for all
slots not smaller than n− 1.
Lemma 3.3.9 s ≥ n− 1 =⇒ PREV(s) ≥ 1
Proof We consider two cases. If s > n − 1, then s > tsn[imax]. Moreover there
is no transmitting slot between s and n − 1. So, from Lemma 3.3.4 we obtain
PREV(s) > tsn[imax] > 1. If s = n− 1, then we know from Lemma 3.3.8 that there
is at least one transmitting node between slot 0 and n− 1 and PREV(s) is then at
least equal to this slot.
2This observation may have practical implications. The results suggest that, at least in certain
situations, if nodes have nothing to say they may in fact remain silent.
38 Modeling and Verification of MyriaNed Synchronization Protocol for WSN
0 n í 1 C í 1
csn[k]
TX
PREV(csn[k])
PREV(csn[j])
last
1
TX
Figure 3.9: Proof example
Proof samples
In the remainder of this section, two examples are presented that show some of
the subtleties in the proof. These example illustrates why some of the lemmas
introduced earlier are needed, e.g., Lemma 3.3.7 and Lemma 3.3.8.
Example The situation of the first proof sample is pictured in Figure 3.9. This
situation appeared in the proof of Invariant 21 and 23 of Theorem 3.3.3. It involves
nodes k and an arbitrary different node j. Node k is sending in its current slot
number, i.e. we have csn[k] = tsn[k] and TX(csn[k]). The last transmitting slot
(depicted in the gray slot) is the previous transmitting slot of both nodes j and k.
PREV(csn[k]) = PREV(csn[j]) = last (3.35)
The goal is to prove that these two nodes agree on the current slot number, i.e.,
that csn[k] = csn[j].
The formal proof needs a case analysis on the relative positions of csn[j] and
csn[k]. Assume csn[j] < csn[k]. Node k is in a later slot. Because of the cyclic
nature of frames, we must consider two cases: csn[j] = 0 and csn[j] > 0.
If csn[j] = 0, by definition of PREV we have PREV(csn[j]) = tsn[imax], and
PREV(csn[k]) = tsn[imax] also. From Lemma 3.3.7 we have PREV(csn[k]) < csn[k].
So, we have tsn[imax] < csn[k] = tsn[k]. By definition of imax, this is clearly
impossible.
The case when csn[k] < csn[j] is similar. We know that TX(csn[k]), so k is
transmitting and has to be in the active region, i.e., csn[k] < n. We do not
have such information for csn[j] and need to consider extra cases: csn[j] < n and
csn[j] ≥ n.
Example Now the proof of Invariant 3.22 in Theorem 3.3.3 is illustrated. This
invariant assumes that node i is in a transmitting slot. We have csn[i] = tsn[i],
hence TX(csn[i]). It also considers that node i is either in state WAIT with clk[i] <
g) or in state GO SEND. (By basic Invariant 3.15 node i cannot be in state
SENDING.) In brief, node i is about to send a message. The conclusion asserts that
the last slot with a synchronization is not the current slot (last 6= csn[i]). Before
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the first synchronization, last is negative (last = −1) and the conclusion holds as
any csn is a nonnegative number (basic Invariant 3.10). Before a start message
action, node i is in state GO SEND with its clock equal to g. Variable clk[i] is not
modified by this action. Hence the invariant is trivially true in the target state
because its premises are false. The case of a tick action is more complicated.
We only consider the end of the current slot (csn[i]). The situation is as follows.
Node i is in state WAIT with its clock counting the last tick of a slot (clk[i] = k0−1).
After the tick action the clock is reset to 0, a new slot starts (csn′[i] = (csn[i] +
1)%C), and other variables are left unchanged, in particular last′ = last. The last
transmitting slot is the previous transmitting slot of i (last = PREV(csn[i])). The
case where csn[i] = 0 or csn[i] = n− 1 is illustrated.
The latter implies that csn′[i] = 0. The conclusion rewrites to PREV(n−1) 6= 0.
This directly follows from the fact that PREV is at least one (Lemma 3.3.9).
If csn[i] = 0, we have csn′[i] = 1. The conclusion rewrites to PREV(0) 6= 1. By
definition, PREV(0) = tsn[imax] and the conclusion follows from the first term of
Lemma 3.3.8 (tsn[imax] ≥ 2).
3.4 Uppaal Analysis Results: Networks with 4
Nodes
In the two previous sections, the correctness of the clock synchronization protocol
for networks with full connectivity was studied. In practice, however, wireless
sensor networks are rarely fully connected. A fully parametric analysis of the
protocol for arbitrary network topologies will be quite involved.
In order to illustrate some of the complications, a small script is written to ex-
plore all possible network topologies with 4 nodes. As explained in Section 3.1, it
is easy to model arbitrary network topologies in Uppaal by appropriate instanti-
ation of the neighbor function. For parameters k0 = 15, C = 6 and n = 4, Uppaal
was used to find out for each topology for which guard time and min/max ratio the
synchronization property was satisfied. This took 30 hours for the 46 = 4096 pos-
sible topologies. The results of the model checking experiments for the connected
networks of Figure 3.10 in which communication is symmetric, is summarized in
Table 3.6. As in Section 3.2, min and max in this table are the smallest consecutive
natural numbers for which the model with the values assigned to C, n, k0 and g
is synchronized. As expected, topology number 6, requires the highest guard time
of all networks with 4 nodes. We observe that the more connected the network is,
the lower the guard time can be.
When communication is not symmetric, that is, it may occur that some node
A receives messages from a node B but not vice versa, the clock synchronization
behavior becomes highly unpredicatable and depends on time slot numbers as-
signed to each node. Table 3.7 summarizes the analysis results for the networks
depicted in Figure 3.11. Surprisingly, network 1 allows for smaller guard times
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Figure 3.10: Connected networks with 4 nodes
ID Diameter Time Slot Numbers Guard Time min/max Ratio
1 1 any 2 44/45
2 2
{0,1,2,3} 3 58/59
{0,2,1,3} 3 73/74
3 2
{0,1,2,3} 3 58/59
{0,2,1,3} 3 73/74
4 2
{0,1,2,3} 3 58/59
{0,1,3,2} 3 43/44
{0,3,1,2} 3 73/74
5 2 any 3 88/89
6 3
{0,1,2,3} 4 88/89
{0,3,1,2} 3 43/44
Table 3.6: Analysis results for the networks of Figure 3.10
than network 3, even though it has fewer links.
3.5 Uppaal Analysis Results: Line Topologies
Since the experiments indicate, among the symmetric topologies, line topologies
have the worst clock synchronization behavior, Uppaal was used for model check-
ing of some further instances of the protocol that involve line topologies, that is,
connected networks in which each node is connected to exactly two other nodes,
except for two nodes that only have a single neighbor.
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Figure 3.11: Some directed network topologies with 4 nodes
Time Slot Numbers ID Guard Time min/max Ratio
{0,1,2,3}
1 2 74/75
2 4 83/84
3 3 38/39
{1,0,2,3}
1 2 45/46
2 4 87/88
3 3 43/44
{2,1,3,0}
1 2 30/31
2 3 87/88
3 3 73/74
{1,2,0,3}
1 2 74/75
2 not synchronized at all
3 2 74/75
Table 3.7: Analysis results for the networks of Figure 3.11
A 3-node network with line topology was defined in Uppaal and the behavior
of the system for different variable valuations was checked. It turns out that,
unlike the fully connected network with three nodes (see Table 3.2), the network
will not always remain synchronized for g = 2, even when the clocks are perfect.
Table 3.8 lists some of the verification results. On the left the results are given for
a line network of size 3 and on the right those for a clique network of size 3. If we
compare these results then we see that, in order to keep the network synchronized,
the hardware clocks in a line topology must be more accurate than the hardware
clocks in a fully connected network (i.e., the min/max ratio must be closer to 1 if
we want the network to be synchronized). Intuitively, the reason is that in a line
topology the frequency of synchronization for each node is less than that in a fully
connected network.
In order to maintain synchronization, a line topology requires more accurate
hardware clocks and a larger guard time. The claim is that, for a fixed value of
the guard time, the network may become unsynchronized if we keep increasing the
number of nodes. In fact, the claim is that for a line topology of size N, the guard
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C 6 8 10 12
n 4 4 4 4
k0 10 10 10 10
g 3 3 3 3
min 58 78 98 118
max 59 79 99 119
C 6 8 10 12
n 4 4 4 4
k0 10 10 10 10
g 3 3 3 3
min 19 29 39 49
max 20 30 40 50
Table 3.8: Results for line network of size 3 (left) and for clique network of size 3
(right)
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Figure 3.12: Maximum distance between two consecutive clock synchronization
events
time g should be at least N.
Model checking of synchronization for line topology entails exploring a state
space that grows exponentially with the number of nodes. In order to reduce the
state space, only networks with perfect clocks are considered. However, even with
perfect clocks, Uppaal can only handle networks with at most 8 nodes. Table 3.9
shows the resource usage of Uppaal required for model checking of networks with
line topologies. A Sun Fire X4440 machine with 4 Opteron 8356 2.3 Ghz quad-
core processors and 128 Gb DDR2-667 memory was used. One processor on this
machine needs about half an hour to establish that a line network with 8 nodes is
synchronized if the guard time is 8.
The reason why we run into state space explosions even in a setting with
perfect clocks, is that race conditions are possible involving arrival of messages
and ticking of hardware clocks. As a result even a network with perfect clocks will
not necessarily remain synchronized for any parameter valuation. Figures 3.12
and 3.13 illustrate how race conditions may affect the time interval between two
synchronization events in the model. (For simplicity, we assume g = t.) We
consider the case where a node is the receiver in one slot and the sender in the next
slot. We know that the sender sends a message when the value of its clock equals
g, and that the receiver resets its clock counter to g+ 1 at the first clock tick after
receiving the message. Figure 3.12 shows that a synchronization signal is received
immediately after a clock tick at the receiver. In this scenario, the receiver waits a
full clock cycle before resetting its clock counter to g+ 1. Figure 3.13 illustrates a
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Nodes g Collision Time Memory
1 yes 0.008 s 240852 KB
2
2 no 0.039 s 240852 KB
2 yes 0.160 s 240852 KB
3
3 no 0.200 s 240852 KB
3 yes 1.007 s 240852 KB
4
4 no 1.012 s 240852 KB
4 yes 2.570 s 240852 KB
5
5 no 2.587 s 240852 KB
5 yes 17.000 s 240852 KB
6
6 no 18.006 s 240852 KB
6 yes 163.154 s 326892 KB
7
7 no 173.922 s 336672 KB
7 yes 1624.481 s 2328572 KB
8
8 no 1681.874 s 2451884 KB
Table 3.9: CPU time and memory usage of Uppaal for line networks of different
sizes
different scenario in which a synchronization signal is received immediately before
the receiver clock ticks and the receiver immediately resets its clock counter to
g + 1. We see that the length of the time interval between two synchronization
events in the first scenario is one clock cycle longer than that in the second scenario.
Now it will be shown that in a line network of size N and with guard time
g = N − 1, there is a reachable state in which the network is no longer synchro-
nized. Thus synchronization of line networks can only be ensured if g ≥ N. In
the examples, tsn[i] = i%3, that is, the transmission slot number of node i equals
i modulo 3. Note that, for line topologies, this allocation of transmission slot
numbers satisfies the conditions (3.2) and (3.3) defined at the end of Section 3.1.
Figures 3.14, 3.16 and 3.17 illustrate three abstract error scenarios, extracted from
concrete counterexamples produced by Uppaal, resulting in a loss of synchroniza-
tion. Figure 3.14 applies to the case in which N modulo 3 equals 0, Figure 3.16
to the case in which N modulo 3 equals 1, and Figure 3.17 to the case in which N
modulo 3 equals 2. The example of Figure 3.14 is explained in detail. The other
two scenarios are similar.
The scenario of Figure 3.14 consists of two “staircases”. One “fast” staircase
has steps with minimum time between synchronizations (using the mechanism of
Figure 3.13), where a synchronization signal is received immediately before the
receiver clock ticks and the receiver resets its clock counter to g + 1 immediately,
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Figure 3.13: Minimum distance between two consecutive clock synchronization
events
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Figure 3.14: Error scenario for line topologies when N mod 3 = 0
while the other “slow” staircase has steps with the maximum time between syn-
chronizations (using the mechanism of Figure 3.12), where a synchronization signal
is received immediately after the receiver clock ticks, and it takes an additional
clock tick before resetting the clock is reset to g+1. Both staircases start from the
same point, viz. when node number 1, the second node in the line, sends messages
to its neighboring nodes 0 and 2. After N − 1 steps the two staircases join again
when node N−2 tries to communicate with node N−1. At that point, node N−2
has gone through g time units since its previous synchronization and is about to
send a message to node N− 1. However, node N− 1 is about to make a clock tick
and enter its new time slot, which is convenient for receiving the message from
its neighbor. Synchronization is lost when node N− 2 starts sending before node
N− 1 ticks.
This proof, in sum, shows that for each network of line topology in which guard
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Figure 3.15: Guide to figures 3.14, 3.16 and 3.17
time is less than N clock cycles, based on the given error scenarios, the network
may fail to keep synchronization. Accordingly, to guarantee synchronization in a
network of line topology with N nodes, guard time should be equal to or grater
than N.
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Figure 3.16: Error scenario when N mod 3 = 1
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated the application of timed automata model checking and
Uppaal in modeling and analysis of a synchronization protocol for wireless sensor
networks, provided by the Chess eT International B.V.
We have seen timed automata model checking led to discovery of some inter-
esting error scenarios for line topologies: for any instantiation of the parameters,
the protocol will eventually fail if the network grows.
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Figure 3.17: Error scenario when N mod 3 = 2
Moreover, in this chapter, a parametric verification for the very restrictive case
of cliques (network with full connectivity) was presented. Indeed, model checking
was used to find the key error scenarios that underly the parameter constraints
for correctness. The parameter constraints were then proved to be sufficient and
necessary for the network to be synchronized. Afterwards, the correctness of the
manual invariant proof was checked by automatic theorem proving.
Despite its limitations, Uppaal proved to be indispensable for the formal anal-
ysis of the Chess protocol. Modeling the protocol in terms of timed automata is
natural, the graphical user interface helped to visualize the models, the simulator
was of great help during the initial validation of the model, and the ability of Up-
paal to generate counterexamples and to replay them in the simulator was helpful
for finding the parameter constraints that are needed for correctness. Since Up-
paal does not support parametric verification, the sufficiency of the constraints
was proved manually. But Uppaal was also helpful in checking the validity of
various invariants for instances of the model, and obtaining confidence in their
correctness before embarking on the (long and tedious) invariant proofs.
Using Uppaal, we have only been able to analyze models of some really small
networks, and in order to carry out the analysis making some drastic simplifying
assumptions were inevitable. Clearly, there is a lot of room for improving timed
automata model checking technology, enabling the analysis of larger and dynamic
network topologies. Nevertheless, it is concluded that the ability of model checkers
to find worst-case error scenarios appears to be quite useful in this application
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domain.
In practical applications of WSNs, cliques rarely occur and therefore the veri-
fication results should primarily be seen as a first step towards a correctness proof
for arbitrary and dynamically changing network topologies. Nevertheless, these
results give us an upper bound on allowable clock drift of a generic WSN.
Methodologically, the approach of this research is similar to the study of the
Biphase Mark Protocol [97], which also uses Uppaal to analyze instances of the
protocol and a theorem prover for the full parametric analysis. Theorem provers
have been frequently and successfully applied for the analysis of clock synchro-
nization protocols, see for instance [86, 88]. An interesting research challenge is to
synthesize (or prove the correctness of) the parameter constraints for the Chess
protocol fully automatically. Recently, some approaches have been presented by
which, for instance, the (parametric) Biphase Mark Protocol can be verified fully
automatically [20, 96]. Very interesting also is the work of [22, 39] on parameter-
ized verification (using the SMT based tool MCMT) of networks with an arbitrary
number of identical timed automata. However, it seems that these approaches
are not powerful enough (yet) to handle this WSN protocol in which the number
N of sensor nodes is not fixed, and the parameter constraints and the length of
the corresponding counterexamples depend on N. Moreover, in the case of this
WSN algorithm the parameter constraints involve a product of three parameters,
whereas the mentioned techniques can only handle linear constraints on the param-
eters. Finally, these new tools still lack the graphical user interface and expressive
input language of Uppaal, which are key features that enable the application of
formal methods in practice.
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Chapter 4
Modeling of Median
Algorithm for
Synchronization of Wireless
Sensor Networks
In this chapter, a detailed model of the synchronization algorithm used in the
implementation of the Chess wireless sensor network is presented. The algorithm,
named Median, is an extension of an algorithm proposed by Tjoa et al [91], and the
idea is that in every frame each node computes its phase error to any of its direct
neighbors. After the last active slot, each node adjusts its clock by the median of
the phase errors of its immediate neighbors. A detailed model of the Chess Median
algorithm is presented in this chapter using the input language of Uppaal. The
objective is to construct a model that comes as close as possible to the specification
of the clock synchronization algorithm presented in [80]. This chapter is organized
as follows. In Section 4.1, the Median algorithm is presented in detail. Section 4.2
describes the Uppaal model of Median algorithm. In Section 4.3, the analysis
results are described. Finally, in Section 4.4, some conclusions are drawn.
The Uppaal model described in this chapter is available at http://www.mbsd.
cs.ru.nl/publications/papers/fvaan/chess09/.
4.1 The Median Protocol
In this section additional details are provided about the Median protocol as it has
been implemented by Chess.
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4.1.1 The Synchronization Algorithm
In each frame, each node broadcasts one message to its neighbors. The timing
of this message is used for synchronization purposes: a receiver may estimate the
clock value of a sender based on the time when the message is received. Thus there
is no need to send around (logical) clock values. In the current implementation
of Chess, clock synchronization is performed once per frame using the following
algorithm [7, 100]:
1. In its sending slot, a node broadcasts a packet which contains its transmission
slot number.
2. Whenever a node receives a message it computes the phase error, that
is the difference (number of clock cycles) between the expected receiving
time and the actual receiving time of the incoming message. Note that the
difference between the sender’s sending slot number (which is also the current
slot number of the sender) and the current slot number of the receiving node
must also be taken into account when calculating the phase errors.
3. After the last active slot of each frame, a node calculates the offset from
the phase errors of all incoming messages in this frame with the following
algorithm:
if (number of received messages == 0)
offset = 0;
else if (number of received messages <= 2)
offset = gain *
the phase error of the first received message;
else
offset = gain * the median of all phase errors
Here gain is a coefficient with value 0.5, used to prevent oscillation of the
clock adjustment.
4. During the sleeping period, the frame length of each node is adjusted by the
computed offset obtained from step 3.
In situations when two networks join, it is possible that the phases of these
networks differ so much that the nodes in one network are in active slots whereas
the nodes in the other network are in sleeping slots and vice versa. In this case,
no messages can be exchanged between two networks. Therefore in the Chess
design, a node will send an extra message in one (randomly selected) sleeping slot
to increase the chance that networks can communicate and synchronize with each
other. This slot is called the synchronization slot and the message is in the same
format as in the transmission slot. The extreme value of offset can be obtained
when two networks join: it may occur that the offset is larger than half the total
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number of clock cycles of sleeping slots in a frame. Chess uses another algorithm
called join to handle this extreme case. For simplicity, the join algorithm is not
modeled, so joining of networks and synchronization messages are not covered in
this research.
4.1.2 Guard Time
The desirable correctness condition for gMAC is that whenever a node is sending
all its neighbors are in receiving mode. However, at the moment when a node enters
its TX slot it cannot be guaranteed, due to the phase errors, that its neighbors have
entered the corresponding RX slot. This problem is illustrated in Figure 4.1 (a).
Given two nodes 1 and 2, if a message is transmitted during the entire sending slot
of node 1 then this message may not be successfully received by node 2 because of
the imperfect slot alignment. Taking the clock of node 1 as a reference, the clock
of node 2 may drift backwards or forwards. In this situation, node 1 and node
2 may have a different view of the current slot number within the time interval
where node 1 is sending a message.
Figure 4.1: The need for introducing guard times
To cope with this problem, messages are not transmitted during the entire
sending slot but only in the middle, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 (b). Both at the
beginning and at the end of its sending slot, node 1 does not transmit for a preset
period of g clock ticks, in order to accomodate the forwards and backwards clock
drift of node 2. Therefore, the time available for transmission equals the total
length of the slot minus 2g clock ticks.
4.1.3 Radio Switching Time
The radio of a wireless sensor node can either be in sending mode, or in receiving
mode, or in idle mode. Switching from one mode to another takes time. In the
current implementation of the Chess gMAC protocol, the radio switching time is
around 130µsec. The time between clock ticks is around 30µsec and the guard time
g is 9 clock ticks. Hence, in the current implementation the radio switching time
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is smaller than the guard time, but this may change in future implementations. If
the first slot in a frame is an RX slot, then the radio is switched to receiving mode
some time before the start of the frame to ensure that the radio will receive during
the full first slot. However if there is an RX slot after the TX slot then, in order
to keep the implementation simple, the radio is switched to the receiving mode
only at the start of the RX slot. Therefore messages arriving in such receiving
slots may not be fully received. This issue may also affect the performance of the
synchronization algorithm.
4.2 Uppaal Model
In this section, the Uppaal model of the gMAC protocol is described.
A finite, fixed set of wireless nodes Nodes = {0, . . . ,N − 1} is assumed. The
behavior of an individual node id ∈ Nodes is described by five timed automata
Clock(id), Receiver(id), Sender(id), Synchronizer(id) and Controller(id). Fig-
ure 4.2 shows how these automata are interrelated. All components interact with
the clock, although this is not shown in Figure 4.2. Automaton Clock(id) mod-
els the hardware clock of node id, automaton Sender(id) the sending of messages
by the radio, automaton Receiver(id) the receiving part of the radio, automa-
ton Synchronizer(id) the synchronization of the hardware clock, and automaton
Controller(id) the control of the radio and the clock synchronization.
Figure 4.2: Message flow in the model
Table 4.1 lists the parameters that are used in the model (constants in Uppaal
terminology), together with some basic constraints. The domain of all parameters
is the set of natural numbers. Now, the five automaton templates used in the
model are described.
Clock Timed automaton Clock(id) models the behavior of the hardware clock
of node id. The automaton is shown in Figure 4.3. At the start of the system
state variable csn[id], that records the current slot number, is initialized to C −
1, that is, to the last sleeping slot. Hardware clocks are not perfect and so a
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Parameter Description Constraints
N number of nodes 1 < N
C number of slots in a time frame 0 < C
n number of active slots in a time frame 0 < n ≤ C
tsn[id] TX slot number for node id 0 ≤ tsn[id] < n
k0 number of clock ticks in a time slot 0 < k0
g guard time 0 < g
r radio switch time 0 ≤ r
min[id] minimal time between two clock ticks of node id 0 < min[id]
max[id] maximal time between two clock ticks of node id min[id] ≤ max[id]
Table 4.1: Protocol parameters
minimal time min[id] and a maximal time max[id] between successive clock ticks
are assumed. Integer variable clk[id] records the current value of the hardware
clock. For convenience (and to reduce the size of the state space), the hardware
clock is assumed to be reset at the end of each slot, that is after k0 clock ticks.
Also, a state variable csn[id], which records the current slot number of node id, is
updated each time at the start of a new slot.
tick[id]!
x >= min[id]X0
csn[id]:=C−1
x := 0,
clk[id] := (clk[id] + 1) % k0,
csn[id]:= (clk[id]==0)?((csn[id]+1)%C):csn[id]
x <= max[id]
Figure 4.3: Automaton Clock[id]
Sender The sending behavior of the radio is described by the automaton Sender[id]
shown in Figure 4.4. The behavior is rather simple. When the controller asks
the sender to transmit a message (via a start sending[id] signal), the radio first
switches to sending mode (this takes r clock ticks) and then transmits the message
(this takes k0 − 2 · g ticks). Immediately after the message transmission has been
completed, an end sending[id] signal is sent to the controller to indicate that the
message has been sent.
Receiver The automaton Receiver[id] models the receiving behavior of the radio.
The automaton is shown in Figure 4.5. Again the behavior is rather simple. When
the controller asks the receiver to start receiving, the receiver first switches to
receiving mode (this takes r ticks). After that, the receiver may receive messages
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counter := 0
counter++
counter++
end_sending[id]!
start_message[id]!
end_message[id]!
tick[id]?
tick[id]?
start_sending[id]?
Switching_on_TX Sending
counter := 0
counter == r
Idle
counter == k0 − 2*g
Figure 4.4: Automaton Sender[id]
from all its neighbors. A function neighbor is used to encode the topology of the
network: neighbor(j, id) holds if messages sent by j can be received by id. Whenever
the receiver detects the end of a message transmission by one of its neighbors, it
immediately informs the synchronizer via a message received[id] signal. At any
moment, the controller can switch off the receiver via an end receiving[id] signal.
end_receiving[id]?
urg!message_received[id]!
start_receiving[id]?
tick[id]?
neighbor(j,id)
counter++
counter:=0
end_message[j]?
Switching_on_RXReceiving
Idle
sender[id] := j
counter==r
j:Nodes
Figure 4.5: Automaton Receiver[id]
Controller The task of the Controller[id] automaton, displayed in Figure 4.6,
is to put the radio in sending and receiving mode at the appropriate moments.
Figure 4.7 shows the definition of the predicates used in this automaton. The radio
should be put in sending mode r ticks before message transmission starts (at time
g in the transmission slot of id). If r > g then the sender needs to be activated r−g
ticks before the end of the slot that precedes the transmission slot. Otherwise, the
sender must be activated at tick g − r of the transmission slot. If the first slot in
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a frame is an RX slot, then the radio is switched to receiving mode r time units
before the start of the frame to ensure that the radio will receive during the full
first slot. However if there is an RX slot after the TX slot then, as described in
Section 4.1.3, the radio is switched to the receiving mode only at the start of the
RX slot. The controller stops the radio receiver whenever either the last active
slot has passed or the sender needs to be switched on.
go_receive()
go_sleep() || go_send()
start_sending[id]!
go_send()
Radio_RX
Idle
end_sending[id]?
end_receiving[id]!
start_receiving[id]!
Radio_TX
Figure 4.6: Automaton Controller[id]
bool go_send(){return (r>g)
?((csn[id]+1)%C==tsn[id] && clk[id]==k0-(r-g))
:(csn[id]==tsn[id] && clk[id]==g-r);}
bool go_receive(){return
(r>0 && 0!=tsn[id] && csn[id]==C-1 && clk[id]==k0-r)
|| (r==0 && 0!=tsn[id] && csn[id]==0)
|| (0<csn[id] && csn[id]<n && csn[id]-1==tsn[id]);}
bool go_sleep(){return csn[id]==n;}
Figure 4.7: Predicates used in Controller[id]
All the channels used in the Controller[id] automaton (start sending, end sending,
start receiving, end receiving and synchronize) are urgent, which means that these
signals are sent at the moment when the transitions are enabled.
Synchronizer Finally, automaton Synchronizer[id] is shown in Figure 4.8.
The automaton maintains a list of phase differences of all messages received in
the current frame, using a local array phase errors. Local variable msg counter
records the number of messages received. Whenever the receiver gets a message
from a neighboring node (message received[id]), the synchronizer computes and
stores the phase difference using the function store phase error at the next clock
tick. Here the phase difference is defined as the expected time at which the mes-
sage transmission ends (tsn[sender] * k0 + k0 - g) minus the actual time at
which the message transmission ends (csn[id] * k0 + clk[id]), counting from
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offset := compute_phase_correction(),
clk[id] := (csn[id]*k0 + offset)%k0,
csn[id] := (csn[id]*k0 + offset)/k0,
clear_messages()
store_phase_error(sender[id]) message_received[id]?
urg!
tick[id]?
csn[id] == (C+n)/2 &&  has_message()
Figure 4.8: Automaton Synchronizer[id]
void store_phase_error(int sender)
{
phase_errors[msg_counter] =
(tsn[sender] * k0 + k0 - g)
- (csn[id] * k0 + clk[id]);
msg_counter++
}
Figure 4.9: Function used in Synchronizer[id]
the start of the frame. The complete definition is listed in Figure 4.9. Recall that
in the model transmission delays are ignored.
As explained in Section 4.1.1, the synchronizer computes the value of the phase
correction (offset) and adjusts the clock during the sleeping period of a frame.1
Hence, in order to decide in which slot the synchronization should be performed,
the maximal phase difference between two nodes should be known. In this model,
it is assumed no joining of networks occurs. When a node receives a message from
another node, the phase difference computed using this message will not exceed the
length of an active period. Otherwise one of these two nodes will be in sleeping
period while the other is sending, hence no message can be received at all. In
practice, the number of sleeping slots is much larger than the number of active
slots. Therefore it is safe to perform the adjustment in the middle of sleeping
period because the desired property described above holds. When the value of
gain is smaller than 1 the maximal phase difference will be even smaller.
The function of compute phase correction implements exactly the algorithm
listed in Section 4.1.1.
1Actually, in the implementation the offset is used to compute the corrected wakeup time,
that is the moment when the next frame will start [100]. In this model the clock is reset, but
this should be equivalent.
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4.3 Analysis Results
In this section, the verification results for simple instances of the model described
in Section 4.2 are presented. The following invariant properties were checked using
the Uppaal model checker:
INV1 : A[] forall (i: Nodes) forall (j : Nodes)
SENDER(i).Sending && neighbor(i,j) imply RECEIVER(j).Receiving
INV2 : A[] forall (i:Nodes) forall (j:Nodes) forall (k:Nodes)
SENDER(i).Sending && neighbor(i,k) &&
SENDER(j).Sending && neighbor(j,k) imply i == j
INV3 : A[] not deadlock
The first property states that always when some node is sending, all its neighbors
are listening. The second property states that never two different neighbors of a
given node are sending simultaneously. The third property states that the model
contains no deadlock, in the sense that in each reachable state at least one com-
ponent can make progress. The three invariants are basic sanity properties of the
gMAC protocol, at least in a setting with a static topology and no transmission
failures.
Uppaal was used on a Sun Fire X4440 machine (with 4 Opteron 8356 2.3 Ghz
quad-core processors and 128 Gb DDR2-667 memory) to verify instances of the
model with different number of nodes, different network topologies and different
parameter values. Table 4.2 lists some of the verification results, including the
resources Uppaal needed to verify if the network is synchronized or not. In all
experiments, C = 10 and k0 = 29.
Clearly, the values of network parameters, in particular clock parameters min
and max, affect the result of the verification. Table 4.2 shows several instances
where the protocol is correct for perfect clocks (min = max) but fails when the
ratio minmax is decreased. It is easy to see that the protocol will always fail when
r ≥ g. Consider any node i that is not the last one to transmit within a frame.
Right after its sending slot, node i needs r ticks to get its radio into receiving mode.
This means that — even with perfect clocks — after g ticks another node already
has started sending even though the radio of node i is not yet receiving. Even
when r < g, the radio switching time has a clear impact on correctness: the larger
the radio switching time is, the larger the guard time has to be in order to ensure
correctness. Using Uppaal, it is possible to fully analyze line topologies with at
most seven nodes if all clocks are perfect. For larger networks Uppaal runs out
of memory. A full parametric analysis of this protocol will be challenging, also
due to the impact of the network topology and the selected slot allocation. Using
Uppaal, it is discovered that for certain topologies and slot allocations the Median
algorithm may always violate the above correctness assertions, irrespective of the
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N/n Topology g r minmax CPU Time Peak Memory Usage Sync
3/3 clique 2 0 1 1.944 s 24, 180 KB YES
3/3 clique 2 0 100,000100,001 492.533 s 158, 064 KB NO
3/3 line 2 0 1 1.068 s 68, 144 KB YES
3/3 line 2 0 100,000100,000 441.308 s 68, 144 KB NO
3/3 clique 3 0 1 1.851 s 28, 040 KB YES
3/3 clique 3 0 100,000100,001 575.085 s 272, 312 KB NO
3/3 line 3 0 1 1.05 s 23, 348 KB YES
3/3 line 3 0 451452 29.545 s 148, 012 KB NO
3/3 line 3 0 452453 35.257 s 148, 012 KB YES
3/3 clique 3 2 1 1.827 s 24, 184 KB YES
3/3 clique 3 2 100,000100,001 109.633 s 26, 056 KB NO
3/3 line 3 2 1 1.052 s 22, 916 KB YES
3/3 line 3 2 100,000100,001 82.383 s 78, 360 KB NO
3/3 clique 4 2 100,000100,001 533.345 s 350, 504 KB NO
3/3 line 4 2 100,000100,001 414.201 s 53, 752 KB NO
4/4 clique 3 0 1 231.297 s 1, 437, 643 KB YES
4/4 clique 3 0 450451 Memory Exhausted
4/3 line 3 0 1 4.749s s 94, 748 KB YES
4/3 line 3 0 450451 Memory Exhausted
4/4 clique 3 2 1 229.469 s 1, 438, 368 KB YES
4/4 clique 3 2 100,000100,001 14, 604.531 s 2, 317, 040 KB NO
4/3 line 3 2 1 4.738 s 94, 748 KB YES
4/3 line 3 2 100,000100,001 1, 923.655 s 1, 264, 844 KB YES
5/5 clique 3 0 1 Memory Exhausted
5/3 line 3 0 1 46.54 s 249, 976 KB YES
6/3 line 3 0 1 508.19 s 2, 316, 416 KB YES
7/3 line 3 0 1 Memory Exhausted
Table 4.2: Model checking experiments
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choice of the guard time. For example, in a 4 node-network with clique topology
and min and max of 100.000 and 100.001, respectively, if the median of the clock
drifts of a node becomes −1, the median algorithm divides it by 2 and generates 0
for clock correction value and indeed no synchronization happens. If this scenario
repeats in three consecutive time frames for the same node, that node runs g = 3
clock cycles behind and gets out of sync.
Another example in which the algorithm may fail is displayed in Figure 4.10.
This network has 4 nodes, connected by a line topology, that send in slots 1,
2, 3, 1, respectively. Since all nodes have at most two neighbors, the Median
tsn[0]=1
Node 0 Node 1 Node 2 Node 3
tsn[1]=2 tsn[2]=3 tsn[3]=1
Figure 4.10: A problematic network configuration
algorithm prescribes that nodes will correct their clocks based on the first phase
error that they see in each frame. For the specific topology and slot allocation
of Figure 4.10, this means that node 0 adjusts its clock based on phase errors of
messages it gets from node 1, node 1 adjusts its clock based on messages from
node 0, node 2 adjusts its clock based on messages from node 3, and node 3
adjusts its clock based on messages from node 2. Hence, for the purpose of clock
synchronization, we have two disconnected networks! Thus, if the clock rates
of nodes 0 and 1 are lower than the clock rates of nodes 2 and 3 by just an
arbitrary small margin, then two subnetworks will eventually get out of sync.
These observations are consistent with results obtained using Uppaal. If, for
instance, we set min[id] = 99 and max[id] = 100, for all nodes id then neither INV1
nor INV2 holds. In practice, it is unlikely that the above scenario will occur due to
the fact that in the implementation slot allocation is random and dynamic. Due
to regular changes of the slot allocation, with high probability node 1 and node 2
will now and then adjusts their clocks based on messages they receive from each
other.
However, variations of the above scenario may occur in practice, even in a set-
ting with dynamic slot allocation. In fact, the above synchronization problem is
also not restricted to line topologies. A subset C of nodes in a network is called
a community if each node in C has more neighbors within C than outside C [75].
For any network in which two disjoint communities can be identified, the Median
algorithm allows for scenarios in which these two parts become unsynchronized.
Due to the median voting mechanism, the phase errors of nodes outside a com-
munity will not affect the nodes within this community, independent of the slot
allocation. Therefore, if nodes in one community A run slow and nodes in another
community B run fast then the network will become unsynchronized eventually,
even in a setting with infinitesimal clock drifts. Figure 4.11 gives an example of a
network with two communities.
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Figure 4.11: Another problematic network topology with two communities
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Figure 4.12: A network with two communities that was analyzed using Uppaal
Using Uppaal, instances of the simple network with two communities displayed
in Figure 4.12 were analyzed. The numbers on the vertices are the node identifiers
and the transmission slot numbers, respectively. Table 4.3 summarizes the results
of the model checking experiments.
It is still needed to explore how realistic these counterexamples are. Network
topologies with multiple communities occur in many WSN applications. Never-
theless, in practice the gMAC protocol appears to perform quite well for static
networks. It might be that problems do not occur so often in practice due to the
probabilistic distributions of clock drift and jitter.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter represented a detailed Uppaal model of relevant parts of the clock
synchronization algorithm implemented in a wireless sensor network developed by
Chess [80, 100].
Using Uppaal, it was established that in certain cases a static, fully synchro-
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g r
Fast Clock Slow Clock
CPU Time Peak Memory Usage
Cycle Length Cycle Length
2 0 1 1 Memory Exhausted
2 0 99 100 457.917 s 2, 404, 956 KB
2 1 99 100 445.148 s 2, 418, 032 KB
3 0 99 100 416.796 s 2, 302, 548 KB
3 2 1 1 Memory Exhausted
3 2 99 100 22.105 s 83, 476 KB
3 2 451 452 798.121 s 3, 859, 104 KB
3 2 452 453 Memory Exhausted
4 0 99 100 424.935 s 2, 323, 004 KB
4 1 99 100 464.503 s 2, 462, 176 KB
4 2 99 100 420.742 s 2, 323, 952 KB
Table 4.3: Model checking experiments of a network with two communities
nized network may eventually become unsynchronized if the Median algorithm is
used, even in a setting with infinitesimal clock drifts.
In another research, presented in chapter 3, another synchronization algorithm
for WSN was presented that does not have the correctness problems of the Median
algorithm. However, that algorithm has never been tested in practice. Advantages
of that approach are (a) unlike the Median approach and its variants we need
almost no guard time at the end of a sending slot (2 clock ticks suffice instead of 9
ticks in the current implementation), and (b) the computational overhead becomes
essentially zero.
Assegei [7] proposed and simulated three alternative algorithms, to be used
instead of the Median algorithm, in order to achieve decentralized, stable and
energy-efficient synchronization of the Chess gMAC protocol. It should be easy to
construct Uppaal models for Assegei’s algorithms: basically, only the definition
of the compute phase correction function should be modified.
Overall, starting from the Uppaal model introduced in this chapter it should
be relatively easy to construct models for alternative synchronization algorithms
in order to explore their properties.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion of Part One
Wireless sensor networks are beginning to be deployed at an accelerated pace due
to their wide range of application potential in areas such as target detection and
tracking, environmental monitoring, industrial process monitoring, and tactical
systems. Low power capacities of sensor nodes makes the design of medium access
protocols pretty challenging. One of the greatest challenges in the design of the
MAC layer is to find suitable mechanisms for clock synchronization: we must
ensure that whenever some node is sending all its neighbors are listening.
Many clock synchronization protocols have been proposed for WSNs, see e.g.
[90, 35, 91, 70, 7, 63, 79]. However, these protocols (with the exception of [91, 7]
and possibly [79]) involve a computation and/or communication overhead that is
unacceptable given the extremely limited resources (energy, memory, clock cycles)
available within the Chess nodes. In most of these protocols, clocks are synchro-
nized to an accurate real-time standard like Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
In [90] an overview of this type of protocols is presented. However, these protocols
are based on the exchange of time stamp messages, and for the Chess WSN this
creates an unacceptable computation and communication overhead. It is possible
to come up with more efficient algorithms, since for the MAC layer a weak form
of clock synchronization suffices: a node only needs to be synchronized to its im-
mediate neighbors, not to faraway nodes or to UTC. Fan & Lynch [35] study the
gradient clock synchronization (GCS) problem, in which the difference between
any two network nodes’ clocks must be bounded from above by a non-decreasing
function. Thus nearby nodes must be closely synchronized but faraway nodes are
allowed to be more loosely synchronized. In the approach of Fan & Lynch [35],
nodes compute logical clock values based on their hardware clocks and message
exchanges, and the goal is to synchronize the nodes’ logical clocks as closely as
possible, while satisfying certain validity conditions. Logical clocks have been in-
troduced by Lamport [56] to totally order the events in a distributed system. A
key property of Lamport’s logical clocks is that they never run backwards: their
value can only increase. In fact, Fan & Lynch [35] assume a constant lower bound
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on clock speed. Also Meier & Thiele [70] and Pussente & Barbosa [79], who adapt
the work of Fan & Lynch to the setting of wireless sensor networks, make a similar
assumption (with minimal clock rates 12 and
1
D , respectively, where D is the net-
work diameter). For certain applications of WSNs it is important to have Lamport
style logical clocks. For example, if two sensor nodes observe a moving object, then
logical clocks allow one to establish the object’s direction by determining which
node observed the object first [70]. However, for the MAC layer there is no need
to compute a total order on events: we only need to ensure that whenever one
node is sending all neighbors are listening. Since it is allowed to set back clocks,
the lower bounds of [35, 70] do not apply in this case.
Quasimodo research on the Chess WSN case study had a significant impact
on the design of the network [82]. But equally important, it also provided major
challenges for research on theory and algorithms for model checking. Most indus-
trial applications of Uppaal thus far involve small networks with a fixed topology.
The size and dynamic nature of the Chess WSN, and the resulting complexity of
clock synchronization, provides a major challenge for model checking technology
that goes beyond what we have seen in other Uppaal case studies. Another chal-
lenge raised by the present research is in the area of parametric model checking:
the parameter constraints that were derived in chapter 3 for clique topologies are
nonlinear, and appear to be beyond reach of existing algorithms for parametric
model checking. We have seen, even the analysis of a basic clock synchronization
algorithm for an industrial WSN platform turns out to be quite difficult.
Meier & Thiele [70] provide a lower bound for the achievable synchronization
quality in sensor networks, but no algorithms that attain or come close to this
bound. Pussente & Barbosa [79] also proposed a clock synchronization algorithm
that achieves an O(1) worst-case skew between the logical clocks of neighbors, but
this cannot be applied in the TDMA based setting of the Chess algorithm. Basic
assumptions of [70, 79] are that (a) messages sent between neighbors are always
delivered instantaneously, and (b) consecutive communications between any two
neighbors in the same direction are no farther apart in time than some given time
d. Pussente & Barbosa [79] derive a strict upper bound of c + 2(1 + 2ρˆ)d on the
difference between the clocks of neighboring nodes, where c > 0 is a constant and
ρˆ ∈ [0, 1) is the maximal clock drift. But since this bound exceeds 2d and in
a TDMA setting d basically equals the length of a frame, the algorithm of [79]
is unable to guarantee that whenever some node is sending all its neighbors are
listening.
All in all, a fundamental open question is to establish an impossibility result
along the lines of Fan & Lynch [35] for the setting of the Chess MAC layer in which
clocks can be set back. The MyriaNed algorithm analyzed in chapter 3 appears
to perform well for networks with a small diameter, but the results of section 3.5
show that performance may degrade if the diameter increases. However, the coun-
terexample scenarios described in this thesis require a very specific combination
of events and clock drifts; hence it may not appear so often in practice. Chess has
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already demonstrated twice that a network of the size in the order of 1000 nodes
works without encountering these error scenarios.
Wireless sensor networks also constitute a potentially very important but also
extremely challenging application area for formal methods. For quantitative formal
methods, one challenge is to come up with the right abstractions that will facilitate
verifying larger instances of the model.
Using state-of-the-art model checking technology, we have only been able to
analyze models of some really small networks. In order to carry out the analysis
making some drastic simplifying assumptions were inevitable. Clearly, there is a
lot of room for improving timed automata model checking technology, enabling the
analysis of larger and dynamic network topologies. Nevertheless, it is concluded
that the ability of model checkers to find worst-case error scenarios appears to
be quite useful in this application domain. In particular, error scenarios— found
using Uppaal by exploring simple models of small networks — are reproducible
in real implementations of larger networks [81].
The use of simulations is essential for providing insight into the robustness
and usefulness of MAC layer protocols, also because occasional flaws of the MAC
layer protocols may be resolved by the redundancy of the gossip layer. However,
this research asserts that it is unlikely that simulation techniques will be able to
produce worst case counterexamples, such as the example of Figure 3.14 that was
produced by Uppaal. Work of [24] also shows that one has to be extremely careful
in using the results of MANET simulators.
Wireless sensor networks algorithms pose many challenges for probabilistic
model checkers and specification tools such as PRISM [54] and CaVi [36]. A first
challenge is to make a more detailed, probabilistic model of radio communication
that involves the possibility of message loss. Another challenge is to consider
dynamic slot allocation. In the research of this thesis, a fixed slot allocation
was assumed. However, in the actual implementation of Chess, a sophisticated
probabilistic algorithm is used for dynamic slot allocation. Formal analysis of this
algorithm would be very interesting. Another simplifying assumption made in
this research is that the network topology is fixed. A probabilistic model in which
nodes may join or leave will be more realistic. Finally, the gossiping algorithms
used by the Chess network are intrinsically probabilistic in nature. Formal analysis
of the gossip layer is a largely unexplored research field [11]. Practical obstacles
for the application of probabilistic model checkers to the Chess case study are the
limited expressivity of the input language of existing tool, and the small network
sizes that can be handled. An interesting alternative approach for some of the
problems in this area is the use of mean-field analysis, as proposed by Bakhshi et
al [12].
Several other researches report on the application of Uppaal for the analysis
of protocols for wireless sensor networks, see e.g. [37, 36, 95, 43]. In [103], Up-
paal is also used to automatically test the power consumption of wireless sensor
networks. This research confirms the conclusions of [37, 95]: despite the small
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number of nodes that can be analyzed, model checking provides valuable insight
in the behavior of protocols for wireless sensor networks, insight that is comple-
mentary to what can be learned through the application of simulation and testing
or theorem proving.
Part II
Automata Learning through
Counterexample-guided
Abstraction Refinement

Chapter 6
Introduction to Part Two
Model-based system development is becoming an increasingly important driving
force in the software and hardware industry. In this approach, models become
the primary artifacts throughout the engineering lifecycle of computer-based sys-
tems. Requirements, behavior, functionality, construction and testing strategies
of computer-based systems are all described in terms of models. Models are not
only used to reason about a system, but also used to allow all stakeholders to
participate in the development process and to communicate with each other, to
generate implementations, and to facilitate reuse. The construction of models typ-
ically requires significant manual effort, implying that in practice often models are
not available, or become outdated as the system evolves. Tools that are able to
infer state machine models automatically by systematically “pushing buttons” and
recording outputs have numerous applications in different domains. For instance,
they support understanding and analyzing legacy software, regression testing of
software components [48], protocol conformance testing based on reference imple-
mentations, reverse engineering of proprietary/classified protocols, fuzz testing of
protocol implementations [29], and inference of botnet protocols [27]. Automated
support for constructing behavioral models of implemented components would
therefore be extremely useful.
The problem to build a state machine (automata) model of a system by pro-
viding inputs to it and observing the outputs resulting, which often referred to as
black-box system identification, is fundamental and has been studied for decades.
A major challenge is to let computers perform this task in a rigorous manner
for systems with large numbers of states. Moore [74] first proposed the prob-
lem of learning automata, provided an exponential algorithm, and proved that
this problem is inherently exponential. Many techniques for constructing mod-
els from observation of component behavior have been proposed, for instance in
[6, 84, 83, 45].
The most efficient such techniques use the setup of active learning, where a
model of a system is learned by actively performing experiments on that system.
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In other words, within the setting of active learning, a learner interacts with a
teacher. This problem was addressed by Angluin [6] in her L∗ algorithm for learn-
ing of finite state automata (FSA). Niese [76] adapted the L∗ algorithm for active
learning of deterministic Mealy machines. This algorithm has been further op-
timized in [83]. The assumption, in the algorithm, is that the teacher knows a
deterministic Mealy machine M, and the learner, initially, knows the action sig-
nature (the sets of input and output symbols I and O). The learner’s task is to
learn a Mealy machine that is equivalent to M. The teacher reacts to two types
of queries: –output queries (“what is the output generated in response to input
i ∈ I∗?”) and equivalence queries (“is a hypothesized machine H correct, i.e.,
equivalent to the machine M?”). The learner always records the current state q
of Mealy machine M. In response to output query i, the current state is updated
to q′ and answer o is returned to the learner. At any point the learner can “re-
set” the teacher, that is, change the current state back to the initial state of M.
The answer to an equivalence query H is either yes (in case M ≈ H) or no (in
case M 6≈ H). Furthermore, with every negative equivalence query response, the
teacher will provide the learner with a counterexample, that is an input sequence
u ∈ I∗ such that obsM(u) 6= obsH(u). This algorithm has been implemented in
the LearnLib tool [83, 46, 71], the winner of the 2010 Zulu competition on regular
inference. In practice, when a real implementation is used instead of an ideal-
ized teacher, the implementation cannot answer equivalence queries. Therefore,
LearnLib “approximates” such queries by generating a long test sequence that is
computed by standard methods such as state cover, transition cover, W-method,
and the UIO method among which fully randomized testing turn out to be most
effective. (see [58]).
LearnLib has been applied successfully to learn various kinds of systems, such
as computer telephony integrated (CTI) systems [48]. Nevertheless, a lot of further
research will be required to make automata based learning tools suitable for routine
use on industrial case studies. An issue is the extension of automata learning
techniques to nondeterministic systems (see e.g. [102]). Furthermore, in practice,
the characteristic of Mealy machines that each input corresponds to exactly one
output is overly restrictive. Sometimes several inputs are required before a single
output occurs, sometimes a single input triggers multiple outputs, etc. In [3],
Aarts & Vaandrager addressed this problem by developing a method for active
learning of I/O automata. The I/O automata of Lynch & Tuttle [67, 68] and
Jonsson [52] constitute a popular modeling framework which does not suffer from
the restriction that inputs and outputs have to alternate. Aarts & Vaandrager
used LearnLib, and their idea was to place a transducer in between the IOA
teacher and the Mealy machine learner, which translates concepts from the world
of I/O automata to the world of Mealy machines, and vice versa. The transducer
and Mealy machine learner together then implement an IOA learner. Another
important issue, clearly, is the development of abstraction techniques in order to
be able to learn much larger state spaces (see [1], also for further references). State-
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of-the-art methods for learning automata such as LearnLib are currently able to
only learn automata with at most in the order of 10.000 states. Hence, powerful
abstraction techniques are needed to apply these methods to practical systems.
There are many reasons to expect that by combining ideas from verification, model-
based testing and automata learning, it will become possible to learn models of
realistic software components with state-spaces that are many orders of magnitude
larger than what state-of-the-art tools can currently handle. See e.g. [18, 64, 83].
The second part of this dissertation presents a framework for automata learn-
ing. In chapter 7 this framework is described in full mathematical details. There-
after, in chapter 8, the tool Tomte is introduced. Tomte enables learning of a
restricted class of parametrized Mealy machines (i.e. Mealy machines, for which
each action contains a few parameters), which are called scalarset Mealy machines.
in scalarset Mealy machines, one can test for equality of data parameters, but no
operations on data are allowed. In the rest of this introduction, a brief history of
this research is presented together with a rough description of the idea proposed
in this thesis. Furthermore, Tomte functionality is shortly explained.
6.1 History Dependent Abstraction
Applying existing automata learning methods on realistic applications is typically
achievable only through abstraction. Dawn Song at al [27], for instance, succeeded
to infer models of realistic botnet command and control protocols by placing an
emulator between botnet servers and the learning software, which concretizes the
alphabet symbols into valid network messages and sends them to botnet servers.
When responses are received, the emulator does the opposite — it abstracts the
response messages into the output alphabet and passes them on to the learning
software. The idea of an intermediate component that takes care of abstraction is
very natural and is used, implicitly or explicitly, in many case studies on automata
learning.
Within process algebra [19], the most prominent abstraction operator is the τI
operator from ACP, which renames actions from a set I into the internal action
τ . In order to establish that an implementation Imp satisfies a specification Spec,
one typically proves τI(Imp) ≈ Spec, where ≈ is some behavioral equivalence or
preorder that treats τ as invisible. In state based models of concurrency, such as
TLA+ [57], the corresponding abstraction operator is existential quantification,
which hides certain state variables. Both τI and ∃ abstract in a way that does
not depend on the history of the computation. In practice, however, we frequently
describe and reason about reactive systems in terms of history dependent abstrac-
tions. For instance, most of us have dealt with the following protocol: “If you
forgot your password, enter your email and user name in the form below. You will
then receive a new, temporary password. Use this temporary password to login
and immediately select a new password.” Here, essentially, the huge name spaces
for user names and passwords are abstracted into small sets with abstract values
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such as “temporary password” and “new password”. The choice which concrete
password is mapped to which abstract value depends on the history, and may
change whenever the user selects a new password.
History dependent abstractions are the key for scaling methods for active learn-
ing of automata to realistic applications. History dependent abstractions can be
described formally using the state operator known from process algebra [9], but
this operator has been mostly used to model state bearing processes, rather than
as an abstraction device. Implicitly, history dependent abstractions play an impor-
tant role in the work of Pistore et al [73, 38]: whereas the standard automata-like
models for name-passing process calculi are infinite-state and infinite-branching,
they provide models using the notion of a history dependent automaton which,
for a wide class of processes (e.g. finitary pi-calculus agents), are finite-state and
may be explored using model checking techniques. Aarts, Jonsson and Uijen [1]
formalized the concept of history dependent abstractions within the context of
automata learning. Inspired by ideas from predicate abstraction [66] and abstract
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Figure 6.1: Active learning with an abstraction mapping.
interpretation [30], they defined the notion of a mapper A, which is placed in be-
tween the teacher or system-under-test (SUT), described by a Mealy machineM,
and the learner. The mapper transforms the concrete actions of M (in a history
dependent manner) into a small set of abstract actions. Each mapper A induces
an abstraction operator αA that transforms a Mealy machine over the concrete
signature into a Mealy machine over the abstract signature. A teacher forM and
a mapper for A together behave line a teacher for αA(M). Hence, by interacting
with the mapper component, the learner may learn an abstract Mealy machine
H that is equivalent (≈) to αA(M). Mapper A also induces a concretization op-
erator γA. The main technical result of [1] is that, under certain assumptions,
αA(M) ≈ H implies M≈ γA(H).
Aarts et al [1] demonstrated the feasibility of their approach by learning models
of fragments of realistic protocols such as SIP and TCP [1], and the new biomet-
ric passport [2]. The learned SIP model, for instance, is an extended finite state
machine with 29 states, 3741 transitions, and 17 state variables with various types
(booleans, enumerated types, (long) integers, character strings,..). This corre-
sponds to a state machine with an astronomical number of states and transitions,
which is thus far, fully out of reach of current automata learning techniques.
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Despite its success, the theory of [1] has several limitations when facing real-
world case studies. Here is an example: In a (deterministic) Mealy machine, each
sequence of input actions uniquely determines a corresponding sequence of out-
put actions. This means that the login protocol that was described above cannot
be modeled in terms of a Mealy machine, since a single input (a request for a
temporary password) may lead to many possible outputs (one for each possible
password). The theory of chapter 7 applies to interface automata that are deter-
minate in the sense of Milner [72]. In a determinate interface automaton multiple
output actions may be enabled in a single state, which makes it straightforward
to model the login protocol. In order to learn the resulting model, it is crucial to
define an abstraction that merges all outputs that are enabled in a given state to
a single abstract output.
In brief, the theory presented in chapter 7, improved the framework of [1] in
four important directions: (a) interface automata instead of the more restricted
Mealy machines, (b) the concept of a learning purpose, which allows one to restrict
the learning process to relevant behaviors only, (c) a richer class of abstractions,
which includes abstractions that over-approximate the behavior of the system-
under-test, and (d) a conceptually superior approach for testing correctness of the
hypotheses that are generated by the learner.
6.2 Tomte
Chapter 8 presents an algorithm to construct fully automatically mappers for a
restricted class of extended finite state machines, called scalarset Mealy machines,
in which one can test for equality of data parameters, but no operations on data
are allowed. The notion of a scalarset data type originates from model checking,
where it is been used by Ip & Dill for symmetry reduction [49]. The algorithm of
chapter 8 is implemented in a tool named Tomte, after the creature that shrank
Nils Holgersson into a gnome and (after numerous adventures) changed him back
to his normal size again.
For the whole research, LearnLib is used as the basic learning tool and therefore
the abstraction of the SUT may not exhibit any nondeterminism: if it does then
LearnLib crashes. On the other hand, when abstraction is applied, nondetermin-
ism arises naturally: it may occur that the behavior of a SUT is fully deterministic
but that due to the mapper (which, for instance, abstracts from the precise value
of certain input parameters), the system appears to behave nondeterministically
from the perspective of the learner. In case of nondeterminism, abstraction has to
be refined in order to dissolve it. This procedure is formalized and the construc-
tion of the mapper is described in terms of a counterexample guided abstraction
refinement (CEGAR) procedure, similar to the approach developed by Clarke et
al [28] in the context of model checking. This is exactly what has been done re-
peatedly during the manual construction of the abstraction mappings in the case
studies of [1].
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Using the prototype tool implementation Tomte, models of several realistic
software components, including the biometric passport and the SIP protocol were
learned fully automatically. The Tomte tool and all the models used in the exper-
iments are available via http://www.italia.cs.ru.nl/.
Chapter 7
A Theory of History
Dependent Abstractions for
Learning
Interface Automata
This chapter offers a general theory of history dependent abstractions for learn-
ing interface automata. In section 7.1, the primary prerequisites are presented.
Section 7.2 gives a detailed account of automata learning. Next, mappers and
their functionality are introduced in section 7.3. Thereafter, the theory of his-
tory dependent abstractions for learning interface automata is fully described in
section 7.4. Finally, section 7.5 concludes the work.
7.1 Preliminaries
7.1.1 Interface automata
In this chapter reactive systems are modeled by a simplified notion of interface
automata [32], essentially labeled transition systems with input and output actions.
Definition An interface automaton (IA) is a tuple I = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉 where
• I and O are disjoint sets of input and output actions, respectively,
• Q is a non-empty set of states,
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and
• →⊆ Q× (I ∪O)×Q is the transition relation.
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We write q
a−→ q′ if (q, a, q′) ∈→. An action a is enabled in state q, denoted
q
a−→, if q a−→ q′ for some state q′. We extend the transition relation to sequences by
defining, for σ ∈ (I∪O)∗,→∗ to be the least relation that satisfies, for q, q′, q′′ ∈ Q
and a ∈ I ∪O,
• q −→∗ q, and
• if q σ−→∗ q′ and q′ a−→ q′′ then q σa−−→∗ q′′.
Here  is used to denote the empty sequence. A state q is said to be reachable if
q0
σ−→∗ q, for some σ. We write q σ−→∗ if q σ−→∗ q′, for some state q′. σ ∈ (I ∪O)∗ is
said to be a trace of I if q0 σ−→∗, and write Traces(I) for the set of traces of I.
A bisimulation on I is a symmetric relation R ⊆ Q×Q such that (q0, q0) ∈ R
and
(q1, q2) ∈ R ∧ q1 a−→ q′1 ⇒ ∃q′2 : q2 a−→ q′2 ∧ (q′1, q′2) ∈ R.
Two states q, q′ ∈ Q are said to be bisimilar, denoted q ∼ q′, if there exists
a bisimulation on I that contains (q, q′). Recall that relation ∼ is the largest
bisimulation and that ∼ is an equivalence relation [72].
Interface automaton I is said to be:
• finite if Q, I, and O are finite sets.
• finitary if I and O are finite and there exists a bisimulation R ⊆ Q×Q that
is an equivalence relation with finitely many equivalence classes.
• deterministic if for each state q ∈ Q and for each action a ∈ I ∪O, whenever
q
a−→ q′ and q a−→ q′′ then q′ = q′′.
• determinate [72] if for each reachable state q ∈ Q and for each action a ∈
I ∪O, whenever q a−→ q′ and q a−→ q′′ then q′ ∼ q′′.
• output-determined if for each reachable state q ∈ Q and for all output actions
o, o′ ∈ O, whenever q o−→ and q o
′
−→ then o = o′.
• behavior-deterministic if I is both determinate and output-determined.
• active if each reachable state enables an output action.
• output-enabled if each state enables each output action.
• input-enabled if each state enables each input action.
An I/O automaton (IOA) is an input-enabled IA. Our notion of an I/O automaton
is a simplified version of the notion of IOA of Lynch & Tuttle [68] in which the
set of internal actions is empty, the set of initial states has only one member, and
the equivalence relation is trivial.
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7.1.2 The ioco relation
A state q of I is quiescent if it enables no output actions. Let δ be a special action
symbol. In this article, we only consider IAs I in which δ is not an input action.
The δ-extension of I, denoted Iδ, is the IA obtained by adding δ to the set of
output actions, and δ-loops to all the quiescent states of I. Write Oδ = O ∪ {δ}.
The following lemma easily follows from the definitions.
Lemma 7.1.1 Let I be an IA with outputs O. Then
1. Iδ is active,
2. Iδ is an IOA iff I is an IOA,
3. if I is determinate then Iδ is determinate,
4. if δ 6∈ O and Iδ is determinate then I is determinate,
5. Iδ is output-determined iff I is output-determined, and
6. if I is behavior-deterministic then Iδ is behavior-deterministic.
Write outI(q), or just out(q) if I is clear from the context, for {a ∈ O | q a−→},
the set of output actions enabled in state q. For S ⊆ Q a set of states, write
outI(S) for
⋃{outI(q) | q ∈ S}. Write I after σ for the set {q ∈ Q | q0 σ−→∗ q} of
states of I that can be reached via trace σ.
The next technical lemma easily follows by induction on the length of trace σ.
Lemma 7.1.2 Suppose I is a determinate IA. Then, for each σ ∈ Traces(Iδ), all
states in Iδ after σ are pairwise bisimilar.
Let I1 = 〈I1, O1, Q1, q01 ,→1〉, I2 = 〈I2, O2, Q2, q02 ,→2〉 be IAs with I1 = I2 and
Oδ1 = O
δ
2. Then I1 and I2 are input-output conforming, denoted I1 ioco I2, if
∀σ ∈ Traces(Iδ2) : out(Iδ1 after σ) ⊆ out(Iδ2 after σ).
Informally, an implementation I1 is ioco-conforming to specification I2 if any
experiment derived from I2 and executed on I1 leads to an output from I1 that
is allowed by I2. The ioco relation is one of the main notions of conformance in
model-based black-box testing [92, 93].
7.1.3 XY -simulations
In the technical development of this chapter, a major role is played by the notion of
an XY -simulation. Below we recall the definition of XY -simulation, as introduced
in [3], and establish three (new) technical lemma’s.
Let I1 = 〈I,O,Q1, q01 ,→1〉 and I2 = 〈I,O,Q2, q02 ,→2〉 be IAs with the same
sets of input and output actions. Write A = I ∪ O and let X,Y ⊆ A. An XY -
simulation from I1 to I2 is a binary relation R ⊆ Q1 × Q2 that satisfies, for all
(q, r) ∈ R and a ∈ A,
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• if q a−→1 q′ and a ∈ X then there exists a r′ ∈ Q2 s.t. r a−→2 r′ and (q′, r′) ∈ R,
and
• if r a−→2 r′ and a ∈ Y then there exists a q′ ∈ Q1 s.t. q a−→1 q′ and (q′, r′) ∈ R.
We write I1 ∼XY I2 if there exists an XY -simulation from I1 to I2 that contains
(q01 , q
0
2). Since the union of XY -simulations is an XY -simulation, I1 ∼XY I2
implies that there exists a unique maximal XY -simulation from I1 to I2. AA-
simulations are just bisimulations [72], A∅-simulations are (forward) simulations
[69], and OI-simulations are alternating simulations [5]. AI-simulations appear in
[3]. We write I1 ∼ I2 instead of I1 ∼AA I2.
The first lemma, which is trivial, states some basic transitivity, inclusion and
symmetry properties of XY -simulations.
Lemma 7.1.3 Suppose I1, I2 and I3 are IAs with inputs I and outputs O, X ⊆
V ⊆ A and Y ⊆W ⊆ A = I ∪O. Then
1. I1 ∼XW I2 and I2 ∼V Y I3 implies I1 ∼XY I3.
2. I1 ∼VW I2 implies I1 ∼XY I2.
3. I1 ∼XY I2 implies I2 ∼Y X I1.
The next technical lemma is the big work horse in this chapter.
Lemma 7.1.4 Suppose I1 and I2 are IAs with I1 ∼XY I2. Let R be the maximal
XY -simulation from I1 to I2. Let q1, q2 ∈ Q1 and q3, q4 ∈ Q2, where Q1 and
Q2 are the state sets of I1 and I2, respectively. Then q1 ∼ q2 ∧ q2 R q3 ∧ q3 ∼
q4 ⇒ q1 R q4.
Proof Let R′ = {(q1, q4) | ∃q2, q3 : q1 ∼ q2 ∧ q2 R q3 ∧ q3 ∼ q4}. It is routine
to prove that R′ is an XY -simulation from I1 to I2. Since R is the maximal
XY -simulation from I1 to I2, R′ ⊆ R. Now suppose q1 ∼ q2 ∧ q2 R q3 ∧ q3 ∼ q4.
By definition, (q1, q4) ∈ R′. Hence (q1, q4) ∈ R, as required.
The following lemma is used to link alternating simulations and the ioco rela-
tion.
Lemma 7.1.5 Let I1 and I2 be determinate IAs such that I1 ∼XY I2. Assume
that X ∪Y = A, where A is the set of all (input and output) actions. Let R be the
maximal XY -simulation from I1 to I2. Let σ ∈ A∗, q1 ∈ Q1 and q2 ∈ Q2 such
that q01
σ−→∗ q1 and q02 σ−→∗ q2. Then (q1, q2) ∈ R.
Proof By induction on the length of σ.
If | σ |= 0 then σ = , q1 = q01 and q2 = q02 . Since I1 ∼XY I2 and R is the
maximal XY -simulation, (q01 , q
0
2) ∈ R. Hence (q1, q2) ∈ R.
Now suppose | σ |> 0. Then there exist ρ ∈ A∗ and a ∈ A such that σ = ρa.
Hence there exists states q′1 ∈ Q1 and q′2 ∈ Q2 such that q01 ρ−→∗ q′1 a−→ q1 and
q02
ρ−→∗ q′2 a−→ q2. By induction hypothesis, (q′1, q′2) ∈ R. Since X ∪ Y = A, either
a ∈ X or a ∈ Y . We consider two cases:
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Figure 7.1: Relations Hierarchy
• a ∈ X. Since q′1 a−→ q1, (q′1, q′2) ∈ R and R is an XY -simulation, there exists
a q′′2 such that q
′
2
a−→ q′′2 and (q1, q′′2 ) ∈ R. Since I2 is determinate, q′′2 ∼ q2
and thus (q1, q2) ∈ R, by Lemma 7.1.4.
• a ∈ Y . Since q′2 a−→ q2, (q′1, q′2) ∈ R and R is an XY -simulation, there exists
a q′′1 such that q
′
1
a−→ q′′1 and (q′′1 , q2) ∈ R. Since I1 is determinate, q1 ∼ q′′1
and thus (q1, q2) ∈ R, by Lemma 7.1.4.
7.1.4 Relating alternating simulations and ioco
The results below link alternating simulation and the ioco relation. Variations of
these results occur in [3, 98].
Definition Let I1 and I2 be IAs with inputs I and outputs O, and let A = I ∪O
and Aδ = A ∪ {δ}. Then I1 . I2 ⇔ Iδ1 ∼OδI Iδ2 and I1 / I2 ⇔ Iδ1 ∼AδI Iδ2 .
In general, I1 . I2 implies I1 ∼OI I2, but the converse implication does not hold.
Similarly, I1 / I2 implies I1 ∼AI I2, but not vice versa.
Figure 7.1 depicts the hierarchy of these relations.
Lemma 7.1.6 Let I1 and I2 be determinate IAs. Then I1 . I2 implies I1 ioco I2.
Proof Suppose that I1 . I2. Let σ ∈ Traces(Iδ2) and o ∈ out(Iδ1 after σ).
We must prove o ∈ out(Iδ2 after σ). By the definitions, there exists q1 ∈ Q1
and q2 ∈ Q2 such that q01 σ−→∗ q1, q1 o−→ and q02 σ−→∗ q2. Let R be the maximal
alternating simulation from Iδ1 to Iδ2 . Since both I1 and I2 are determinate, Iδ1
and Iδ2 are determinate, by Lemma 7.1.1. Hence we can use Lemma 7.1.5 to obtain
(q1, q2) ∈ R. It follows that q2 o−→, and hence o ∈ out(Iδ2 after σ), as required.
Lemma 7.1.7 Let I1 be an IOA and let I2 be a determinate IA. Then I1 ioco I2
implies I1 . I2.
Proof Suppose I1 ioco I2. Let I1 = 〈I,O,Q1, q01 ,→1〉 and I2 = 〈I,O,Q2, q02 ,→2
〉. Define
R = {(q1, q2) ∈ Q1 ×Q2 | ∃σ ∈ (I ∪Oδ)∗ :
q01
σ−→1∗ q1 ∧ q02 σ−→2∗ q2}.
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We claim that R is an alternating simulation relation from Iδ1 to Iδ2 .
Suppose that (q1, q2) ∈ R and q1 o−→ q′1, for some o ∈ Oδ. Then there exists
a σ ∈ (I ∪ Oδ)∗ such that q01 σ−→1∗ q1 and q02 σ−→2∗ q2. Thus σ ∈ Traces(Iδ2) and
o ∈ out(Iδ1 after σ). Using that I1 ioco I2, we obtain o ∈ out(Iδ2 after σ). This
means that there exists a state q3 such that q
0
2
σ−→2∗ q3 and q3 o−→2. Since I2 is
determinate, Iδ2 is also determinate, by Lemma 7.1.1. Hence, by Lemma 7.1.2,
q2 ∼ q3. Hence there exists a state q′2 such that q2 o−→2 q′2. By definition of R,
(q′1, q
′
2) ∈ R.
Now suppose that (q1, q2) ∈ R and q2 i−→2 q′2, for some i ∈ I. As I1 is input-
enabled, there exists a state q′1 such that q1
i−→1 q′1. By definition of R, (q′1, q′2) ∈ R.
By taking σ =  in the definition of R, we obtain (q01 , q
0
2) ∈ R. Hence I1 . I2,
as required.
7.2 Basic Framework for Inference of Automata
This section presents (a slight generalization of) the framework of [3] for learning
interface automata. We assume there is a teacher, who knows a determinate IA
T = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉, called the system under test (SUT). There is also a learner,
who has the task to learn about the behavior of T through experiments. The
type of experiments which the learner may do is restricted by a learning purpose
[3, 87, 99, 51], which is a determinate IA P = 〈I,Oδ, P, p0,→P〉, satisfying T . P.
In practice, there are various ways to ensure that T . P. If T is an IOA then
T . P is equivalent to T ioco P by Lemmas 7.1.6 and 7.1.7, and so we may use
model-based black-box testing to obtain evidence for T . P. Alternatively, if T
is an IOA and P is output-enabled then T . P trivially holds.
After doing a number of experiments, the learner may formulate a hypothesis,
which is a determinate IA H with outputs Oδ satisfying H / P. Informally, the
requirement H / P expresses that H only displays behaviors that are allowed by
P, but that any input action that must be explored according to P is indeed present
in H. Hypothesis H is correct if T ioco H. In practice, we will use black-box
testing to obtain evidence for the correctness of the hypothesis. In general, there
will be many H’s satisfying T ioco H / P (for instance, we may take H = P),
and additional conditions will be imposed on H, such as behavior-determinacy.
In fact, section 7.2.1 establishes that if T is behavior-determininistic there always
exists a behavior-deterministic IA H such that T ioco H / P. If, in addition, T
is an IOA then this H is unique up to bisimulation equivalence.
Learning purpose A trivial learning purpose Ptriv is displayed in Figure 7.2 (left).
Here notation i : I means that we have an instance of the transition for each input
i ∈ I. Notation o : O is defined similarly. Since Ptriv is output-enabled, T . Ptriv
holds for each IOA T . If H is a hypothesis, then H / Ptriv just means that H is
input enabled.
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i : I o : O
δ
Figure 7.2: A trivial learning purpose (left) and a learning purpose with a non-
trivial δ-transition (right).
The learning purpose Pwait displayed in Figure 7.2 (right) contains a nontrivial
δ-transition. It expresses that after each input the learner has to wait until the
SUT enters a quiescent state before offering the next input. It is straightforward
to check that T . Pwait holds if T is an IOA.
We now present the protocol that learner and teacher must follow. At any time,
the teacher records the current state of T , initially q0, and the learner records the
current state of P, initially p0. Suppose the teacher is in state q and the learner
is in state p. In order to learn about the behavior of T , the learner may engage in
four types of interactions with the teacher:
1. Input. If a transition p
i−→P p′ is enabled in P, then the learner may present
input i to the teacher. If i is enabled in q then the teacher jumps to a state
q′ with q i−→ q′ and returns reply > to the learner. Otherwise, the teacher
returns reply ⊥. If the learner receives reply > it jumps to p′, otherwise it
stays in p.
2. Output. The learner may send an output query ∆ to the teacher. Now
there are two possibilities. If state q is quiescent, the teacher remains in q
and returns answer δ. Otherwise, the teacher selects an output transition
q
o−→ q′, jumps to q′, and returns o. The learner jumps to a state p′ that can
be reached by the answer o or δ.
3. Reset. The learner may send a reset to the teacher. In this case, both
learner and teacher return to their respective initial states.
4. Hypothesis. The learner may present a hypothesis to the teacher: a determi-
nate IA H with outputs Oδ such that H / P. If T ioco H then the teacher
returns answer yes. Otherwise, by definition, Hδ has a trace σ such that an
output o that is enabled by T δ after σ, is not enabled by Hδ after σ. In
this case, the teacher returns answer no together with counterexample σo,
and learner and teacher return to their respective initial states.
The next lemma, which is easy to prove, implies that the teacher never returns
⊥ to the learner: whenever the learner performs an input transition p i−→P p′,
the teacher can perform a matching transition q
i−→ q′. Moreover, whenever the
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teacher performs an output transition q
o−→ q′, the learner can perform a matching
transition p
o−→P p′.
Lemma 7.2.1 Let R be the maximal alternating simulation from T δ to Pδ. Then,
for any configuration of states q and p of teacher and learner, respectively, that
can be reached after a finite number of steps (1)-(4) of the learning protocol, we
have (q, p) ∈ R.
Proof Routine, by induction on the number of steps, using Lemma 7.1.4 and the
assumption that both T and P are determinate.
We are interested in effective procedures which, for any finite (and some infi-
nite) T and P satisfying the above conditions, allow a learner to come up with a
correct, behavior-deterministic hypothesis H after a finite number of interactions
with the teacher. In [3], it is shown that any algorithm for learning Mealy machines
can be transformed into an algorithm for learning finite, behavior-deterministic
IOAs. Efficient algorithms for learning Mealy machines have been implemented in
the tool Learnlib [83].
7.2.1 Existence and Uniqueness of Correct Hypothesis
In this section, it is established that if T is a behavior deterministic IOA and P
is a determinate IA with T . P, there exists a unique behavior-deterministic IA
H (up to bisimulation) such that T ioco H / P.
Lemma 7.2.2 Suppose I1, I2, I3 and I4 are determinate IAs with the same sets
I and O of inputs and outputs, respectively, such that I1 is active, and I3 and I4
are output-determined. Then I1 ∼OI I3 ∼AI I2 and I1 ∼OI I4 ∼AI I2 implies
I3 ∼ I4.
Proof Let R1 be the maximal alternating simulation from I1 to I3, R2 be the
maximal alternating simulation from I1 to I4, S1 be the maximal AI-simulation
from I3 to I2, S2 be the maximal AI-simulation from I4 to I2, and let R be the
relation between states of I3 and I4 given by:
(q3, q4) ∈ R ⇔ ∃q1, q2 : (q1, q3) ∈ R1 ∧
(q3, q2) ∈ S1 ∧
(q1, q4) ∈ R2 ∧
(q4, q2) ∈ S2.
We claim that R is a bisimulation (AA-simulation) from I3 to I4.
Suppose (q3, q4) ∈ R and q3 a−→ q′3. The there exist q1 and q2 such that
(q1, q3) ∈ R1, (q3, q2) ∈ S1, (q1, q4) ∈ R2, and (q4, q2) ∈ S2. We consider two cases:
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• a ∈ I. Since S1 is an AI-simulation, there exists a state q′2 such that q2 a−→ q′2
and (q′3, q
′
2) ∈ S1. Since S2 is an AI-simulation, there exists a state q′4 such
that q4
a−→ q′4 and (q′4, q′2) ∈ S2. Since R2 is an OI-simulation, there exists a
state q′1 such that q1
a−→ q′1 and (q′1, q′4) ∈ R2. Since R1 is an OI-simulation,
there exists a state q′′1 such that q1
a−→ q′′1 and (q′′1 , q′3) ∈ R1. Since I1 is
determinate, q′1 ∼ q′′1 . Combination of q′1 ∼ q′′1 and (q′′1 , q′3) ∈ R1 gives
(q′1, q
′
3) ∈ R1, using Lemma 7.1.4 and the assumption that R1 is maximal.
Hence (q′3, q
′
4) ∈ R, by definition of R.
• a ∈ O. Since I1 is active, there exists a transition q1 o−→ q′1, for some output
o. Since R1 is an OI-simulation, there exists a state q
′′
3 such that q3
o−→ q′′3
and (q′1, q
′′
3 ) ∈ R1. Since I3 is behavior-deterministic, o = a and q′′3 ∼ q′3.
Hence (q′1, q
′
3) ∈ R1. Since R2 is an OI-simulation, there exists a state q′4
such that q4
a−→ q′4 and (q′1, q′4) ∈ R2. Since S2 is an AI-simulation, there
exists a state q′2 such that q2
a−→ q′2 and (q′4, q′2) ∈ S2. Since S1 is an AI-
simulation, there exists a state q′′2 such that q2
a−→ q′′2 and (q′3, q′′2 ) ∈ S1. Since
I2 is determinate, q′′2 ∼ q′2. Combination of (q′3, q′′2 ) ∈ S1 and q′′2 ∼ q′2 gives
(q′3, q
′
2) ∈ S1, using Lemma 7.1.4 and the assumption that S1 is maximal.
Hence (q′3, q
′
4) ∈ R, by definition of R.
The proof of the case that (q3, q4) ∈ R and q4 a−→ q′4 is fully symmetric.
It is immediate from the definitions that (q03 , q
0
4) ∈ R. Hence I3 ∼ I4, as
required.
Suppose that I1 ∼XY I2. XY (I1, I2) is defined to be the product interface
automaton induced by ∼XY , as the structure 〈I,O,R, (q01 , q02),→〉 where R is the
maximal XY -simulation relation from I1 to I2 and (q, r) a−→ (q′, r′) ⇔ q a−→1
q′ ∧ r a−→2 r′.
Lemma 7.2.3 Suppose that I1 ∼XY I2. Then I1 ∼XA XY (I1, I2) ∼AY I2.
Proof Let R be the maximal XY -simulation from I1 to I2. Let R1 = {(q, (q, r)) |
(q, r) ∈ R} and R2 = {((q, r), r)) | (q, r) ∈ R}. It is straightforward to check that
R1 is an XA-simulation from I1 to XY (I1, I2), and r2 is an AY -simulation from
XY (I1, I2) to I2. Since R is an XY -simulation from I1 to I2, it contains the
pair (q01 , q
0
2). Hence R1 contains (q
0
1 , (q
0
1 , q
0
2)) and R2 contains ((q
0
1 , q
0
2), q
0
2), so the
initial states are related, as required.
Lemma 7.2.4 Suppose that I1 ∼XY I2.
1. If I1 and I2 are determinate, then XY (I1, I2) is determinate.
2. If I1 or I2 is output-determined, then XY (I1, I2) is output-determined.
The following theorem proves that for a given behavior-deterministic SUT and
a determinate learning purpose, learner will necessarily find a behavior-deterministic
learning hypothesis.
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Theorem 7.2.5 Suppose T is a behavior-deterministic IA and P is a determinate
IA such that T . P. Then there exists a behavior-deterministic IA H such that
T ioco H / P.
Proof By expanding the definition of ., we obtain T δ ∼OδI Pδ. Thus, by
Lemma 7.2.3,
T δ ∼OδAδ OδI(T δ,Pδ) ∼AδI Pδ.
Let H = OδI(T δ,Pδ). Since H is active, Hδ = H. Hence, by Lemma 7.1.3(2),
T δ ∼OδI Hδ ∼AδI Pδ.
By the definitions of . and /, we obtain T . H / P. Lemma 7.1.1 and
Lemma 7.2.4 imply thatH is behavior-deterministic, as required. By Lemma 7.1.6,
T ioco H.
Next theorem, proves that for a given behavior-deterministic SUT and a de-
terminate learning purpose, learning hypothesis is unique.
Theorem 7.2.6 Let T be a behavior-deterministic IOA over I and O, H1 and
H2 behavior-deterministic IAs over I and Oδ, and P a determinate IA over I and
Oδ such that T ioco H1 / P and T ioco H2 / P. Then Hδ1 ∼ Hδ2.
Proof Since T is an IOA, H1 is determinate and T ioco H1, it follows by
Lemma 7.1.7 that T . H1. Similarly, we derive T . H2. By expanding the
definitions of . and /, we obtain:
T δ ∼OδI Hδ1 ∼AδI Pδ and T δ ∼OδI Hδ2 ∼AδI Pδ
From the assumptions and Lemma 7.1.1, it follows that T δ, Hδ1, Hδ2 and Pδ are
determinate, T δ is active, and Hδ1 and Hδ2 are output-determined. Hence we may
apply Lemma 7.2.2 to obtain Hδ1 ∼ Hδ2.
7.3 Mappers
In order to learn a “large” IA T , with inputs I and outputs O, a mapper is placed
between the teacher and the learner, which translates concrete actions in I and O
to abstract actions in (typically smaller) sets X and Y , and vice versa. The task
of the learner is then reduced to inferring a “small” IA with alphabet X and Y .
Our notion of mapper is essentially the same as the one of [1].
Mapper A mapper for a set of inputs I and a set of outputs O is a tuple A =
〈I, X, Y,Υ〉, where
• I = 〈I,Oδ, R, r0,→〉 is a deterministic IA that is input- and output-enabled
and has trivial δ-transitions: r
δ−→ r′ ⇔ r = r′.
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• X and Y are disjoint sets of abstract input and output actions with δ ∈ Y .
• Υ : R × Aδ → Z, where A = I ∪ O and Z = X ∪ Y , maps concrete actions
to abstract ones. We write Υr(a) for Υ(r, a) and require that Υr respects
inputs, outputs and quiescence:
(Υr(a) ∈ X ⇔ a ∈ I) ∧ (Υr(a) = δ ⇔ a = δ).
Mapper A is output-predicting if ∀o, o′ ∈ O : Υr(o) = Υr(o′)⇒ o = o′, that is, Υr
is injective on outputs, for each r ∈ R. Mapper A is surjective if ∀z ∈ Z ∃a ∈ Aδ :
Υr(a) = z, that is, Υr is surjective, for each r ∈ R. Mapper A is state-free if R is
a singleton set.
Example Consider a system with input actions LOGIN (p1), SET (p2) and LOGOUT .
Assume that the system only triggers certain outputs when a user is properly
logged in. Then we may not abstract from the password parameters p1 and
p2 entirely, since this will lead to nondeterminism. We may preserve behavior-
determinism by considering just two abstract values for p1: ok and nok. Since
passwords can be changed using the input SET (p2) when a user is logged in, the
mapper may not be state-free: it has to record the current password and whether
or not the user is logged (T and F, respectively). The input transitions are defined
by:
(p, b)
LOGIN (p)−−−−−−−→ (p,T)
p 6= p1 ⇒ (p, b) LOGIN (p1)−−−−−−−→ (p, b)
(p,T)
SET(p2)−−−−−→ (p2,T)
(p,F)
SET(p2)−−−−−→ (p,F)
(p, b)
LOGOUT−−−−−−→ (p,F)
For input actions, abstraction Υ is defined by
Υ(p,b)(LOGIN (p1)) =
{
LOGIN (ok) if p1 = p
LOGIN (nok) otherwise
Υ(p,b)(SET (p2)) = SET
For input LOGOUT and for output actions, Υ(p,b) is the identity. This mapper
is surjective, since no matter how the password has been set, a user may always
choose either a correct or an incorrect login.
Example Consider a system with three inputs IN1 (n1), IN2 (n2), and IN3 (n3),
in which an IN3 (n3) input triggers an output OK if and only if the value of n3
equals either the latest value of n1 or the latest value of n2. In this case, we
may not abstract away entirely from the values of the parameters, since that leads
to nondeterminism. We may preserve behavior-determinism by a mapper that
records the last values of n1 and n2. Thus, if D is the set of parameter values, the
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set of mapper states is defined by R = (D∪{⊥})× (D∪{⊥}), choose r0 = (⊥,⊥)
as initial state, and define the input transitions by
(v1, v2)
IN1(n1)−−−−−→ (n1, v2)
(v1, v2)
IN2(n2)−−−−−→ (v1, n2)
(v1, v2)
IN3(n3)−−−−−→ (v1, v2)
Abstraction Υ abstracts from the specific value of a parameter, and only records
whether it is fresh, or equals the last value of IN1 or IN2 . For i = 1, 2, 3:
Υ(v1,v2)(INi(ni)) =

INi(old1) if ni = v1
INi(old2) if ni = v2 ∧ ni 6= v1
INi(fresh) otherwise
This abstraction is not surjective: for instance, in the initial state IN1 (old1) is not
possible as an abstract value, and in any state of the form (v, v), IN1 (old2) is not
possible.
Each mapper A induces an abstraction operator on interface automata, which
abstracts an IA with actions in I and O into an IA with actions in X and Y . This
abstraction operator is essentially just a variation of the state operator well-known
from process algebras [9].
Abstraction Let T = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉 be an IA and let A = 〈I, X, Y,Υ〉 be a
mapper with I = 〈I,Oδ, R, r0,→〉. Then αA(T ), the abstraction of T , is the IA
〈X,Y,Q×R, (q0, r0),→abst〉, where transition relation →abst is given by the rule:
q
a−→ q′ r a−→ r′ Υr(a) = z
(q, r)
z−→abst (q′, r′)
Observe that if T is determinate then αA(T ) does not have to be determinate.
Also, if T is an IOA then αA(T ) does not have to be an IOA (if A is not surjec-
tive, as in Example 7.3, then an abstract input will not be enabled if there is no
corresponding concrete input). If T is output-determined then αA(T ) is output-
determined, but the converse implication does not hold. The following lemma
gives a positive result: abstraction is monotone with respect to the alternating
simulation preorder.
Lemma 7.3.1 If T1 . T2 then αA(T1) . αA(T2).
Proof Suppose T1 . T2. Let R be the maximal alternating simulation from T δ1
to T δ2 . Define the relation R′ between states of αA(T1) and αA(T2) as follows:
(q1, r1) R
′ (q2, r2) ⇔ q1 R q2 ∧ r1 = r2.
It is routine to prove that R′ is an alternating simulation from (αA(T1))δ to
(αA(T2))δ. Hence αA(T1) . αA(T2), as required.
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The concretization operator is the dual of the abstraction operator. It trans-
forms each IA with abstract actions in X and Y into an IA with concrete actions
in I and O.
Concretization Let H = 〈X,Y, S, s0,→〉 be an IA and let A = 〈I, X, Y,Υ〉 be a
mapper for I and O. Then γA(H), the concretization of H, is the IA 〈I,Oδ, R ×
S, (r0, s0),→conc〉, where transition relation →conc is given by the rule:
r
a−→ r′ s z−→ s′ Υr(a) = z
(r, s)
a−→conc (r′, s′)
Whereas the abstraction operator does not preserve determinacy in general, the
concretization of a determinate IA is always determinate. Also, the concretization
of an output-determined IA is output-determined, provided the mapper is output-
predicting.
Lemma 7.3.2 If H is determinate then γA(H) is determinate.
Proof Routine. It is easy to show that the relation R = {(r, s), (r, s′) | s ∼ s′} is
a bisimulation on γA(H). Now suppose that (r, s) is a reachable state of γA(H)
with outgoing transitions (r, s)
a−→conc (r1, s1) and (r, s) a−→conc (r2, s2). Then, by
definition of γA(H), r a−→ r1, s z−→ s1, where z = Υr(a), r a−→ r2 and s z−→ s2.
Since the IA of A is deterministic, r1 = r2. Since (r, s) is reachable in γA(H),
s is reachable in H. Hence, because H is determinate, s1 ∼ s2. It follows that
((r1, s1), (r2, s2)) ∈ R. Since R is a bisimulation, we conclude (r1, s1) ∼ (r2, s2),
as required.
Lemma 7.3.3 If A is output-predicting and H is output-determined then γA(H)
is output-determined.
Proof Suppose thatA is output-predicting andH is output-determined. Let (r, s)
be a reachable state of γA(H) such that, for concrete outputs o and o′, (r, s) o−→conc
and (r, s)
o′−→conc. Then it follows from the definition of γA(H) that there exists
abstract outputs y and y′ such that s
y−→, s y
′
−→, Υr(o) = y and Υr(o′) = y′.
Since (r, s) is reachable in γA(H), it follows that s is reachable in H. Hence,
by the assumption that H is output-determined, y = y′. Next, using that A is
output-predicting, we conclude o = o′.
In an abstraction of the form γA(H) it may occur that a reachable state (r, s)
is quiescent, even though the contained state s of H enables some abstract output
y: this happens if there exists no concrete concrete output o such that Υr(o) = y.
This situation is ruled out by following definition.
Definition γA(H) is quiescence preserving if, for each reachable state (r, s), (r, s)
quiescent implies s quiescent.
88 A Theory of History Dependent Abstractions for Learning IA
Concretization is monotone with respect to the / preorder, provided the con-
cretization of the first argument is quiescence preserving.
Lemma 7.3.4 Suppose γA(H1) is quiescence preserving. Then H1 / H2 implies
γA(H1) / γA(H2).
Proof Suppose H1 / H2. Let R be the maximal AδI-simulation from Hδ1 to Hδ2.
Define relation R′ between states of γA(H1) and γA(H2) as follows:
(r1, s1) R
′ (r2, s2) ⇔ r1 = r2 ∧ s1 R s2.
We check that R′ is an AδI-simulation from (γA(H1))δ to (γA(H2))δ. Suppose
(r, s1) R
′ (r, s2).
• Suppose (r, s2) i−→ (r′, s′2) for some i ∈ I. Let Υr(i) = x. Then, by definition
of concretization, r
i−→ r′ and s2 x−→ s′2. Using that s1 R s2, we infer that
there exists a state s′1 such that s1
x−→ s′1 and s′1 R s′2. Hence (r, s1) i−→ (r′, s′1)
and (r′, s′1) R
′ (r′, s′2), as required.
• Suppose (r, s1) a−→ (r′, s′1) for some a ∈ Aδ, Υr(a) = z, r a−→ r′ and s1 z−→ s′1.
Using that s1 R s2, we infer that there exists a state s
′
2 such that s2
z−→ s′2
and s′1 R s
′
2. Hence (r, s2)
a−→ (r′, s′2) and (r′, s′1) R′ (r′, s′2), as required.
• Suppose (r, s1) is quiescent. Then, since γA(H1) is quiescence preserving,
s1 is quiescent. Since s1 R s2 and R is a A
δI-simulation from Hδ1 to Hδ2, it
follows that s2 is quiescent. Hence, by definition of concretization, (r, s2) is
quiescent.
SinceR is aAδI-simulation fromHδ1 toHδ2, s01 R s02. Hence we have (r0, s01)R′ (r0, s02)
and so R′ relates the initial states of γA(H1) and γA(H2). Thus γA(H1) / γA(H2),
as required.
The lemma below is a key result of this chapter. It says that if T is ioco-
conforming to the concretization of an hypothesis H, and this concretization is
quiescence preserving, then the abstraction of T is ioco-conforming to H itself.
Lemma 7.3.5 Suppose γA(H) is quiescence preserving. Then T ioco γA(H) im-
plies αA(T ) ioco H.
Proof Suppose T ioco γA(H). Let σ ∈ Traces(Hδ) and let y ∈ out((αA(T ))δ after σ).
We must show that y ∈ out(Hδ after σ). Let σ = z1 · · · zn. Then Hδ has a run
s0
z1−→ s1 z2−→ · · · zn−→ sn
with s0 = s
0, and (αA(T ))δ has a run
(q0, r0)
z1−→ (q1, r1) z2−→ · · · zn−→ (qn, rn) y−→
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with (q0, r0) = (q
0, r0). Then, by definition of (αA(T ))δ, there exists runs
q0
a1−→ q1 a2−→ · · · an−−→ qn o−→
r0
a1−→ r1 a2−→ · · · an−−→ rn o−→
of T δ and A, respectively, such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Υri−1(ai) = zi and
Υrn(o) = y. By definition of (γA(H))δ, this IA has a run
(r0, s0)
a1−→ (r1, s1) a2−→ · · · an−−→ (rn, sn)
Let ρ = a1 · · · an. Then ρ ∈ Traces((γA(H))δ). Moreover, o ∈ out(T δ after ρ).
Using T ioco γA(H), we obtain o ∈ out((γA(H))δ after ρ). Hence (γA(H))δ has
a run
(r0, s
′
0)
a1−→ (r1, s′1) a2−→ · · · an−−→ (rn, s′n) o−→
By definition of (γA(H))δ and using that γA(H) is quiescent preserving, we may
infer that Hδ has a run
s′0
z1−→ s′1 z2−→ · · · zn−→ s′n y−→
Hence, y ∈ out(Hδ after σ), as required.
By using a mapper A, we may reduce the task of learning an IA H such that
T iocoH / P to the simpler task of learning an IAH′ such that αA(T ) iocoH′ /
αA(P). However, in order to establish the correctness of this reduction, we need
two technical lemmas that require some additional assumptions on P and A. It
is straightforward to check that these assumptions are met by the mappers of
Examples 7.3 and 7.3, and the learning purposes of Example 7.2.
Definition Let A = 〈I, X, Y,Υ〉 be a mapper for I and O. ≡A is defined to be
the equivalence relation on I ∪Oδ which declares two concrete actions equivalent
if, for some states of the mapper, they are mapped to the same abstract action:
a ≡A b ⇔ ∃r, r′ : Υr(a) = Υr′(b). Let T = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉 be an IA. P and
A are called compatible if, for all concrete actions a, b with a ≡A b and for all
p, p1, p2 ∈ P , (p a−→⇔ p b−→) ∧ (p a−→ p1 ∧ p b−→ p2 ⇒ p1 ∼ p2).
Lemma 7.3.6 Suppose αA(P) is determinate and P and A are compatible. Then
γA(αA(P)) / P.
Proof We claim γA(αA(P)) ∼ P. In order to prove this, consider the relation
S = {((r2, (p1, r1)), p2) | p1 ∼ p2 ∧ (p1, r1) ∼ (p2, r2)}.
It is easy to check that S relates the initial states of γA(αA(P)) and P. We show
that S is a bisimulation.
Suppose ((r2, (p1, r1)), p2) ∈ S and p2 a−→ p′2. Since the IA for A is input- and
output-enabled, there exist a state r′2 such that r2
a−→ r′2. Let Υr2(a) = z. Then, by
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definition of the abstraction operator, (p2, r2)
z−→ (p′2, r′2). Since (p1, r1) ∼ (p2, r2),
there exists a pair (p′1, r
′
1) such that (p1, r1)
z−→ (p′1, r′1) and (p′1, r′1) ∼ (p′2, r′2). By
definition of the abstraction operator, there exists a concrete action b such that
Υr1(b) = z, p1
b−→ p′1 and r1 b−→ r′1. Since p1 ∼ p2, there exists a p′′2 such that
p2
b−→ p′′2 and p′1 ∼ p′′2 . Since P and A are compatible and a ≡A b, p′2 ∼ p′′2 . By
Lemma 7.1.4, p′1 ∼ p′2. By definition of the concretization operator, (r2, (p1, r1)) a−→
(r′2, (p
′
1, r
′
1)). Moreover, ((r
′
2, (p
′
1, r
′
1)), p
′
2) ∈ S, as required.
Suppose ((r2, (p1, r1)), p2) ∈ S and (r2, (p1, r1)) a−→ (r′2, (p′1, r′1)). Let Υr2(a) =
z. Then, by definition of the concretization operator, r2
a−→ r′2 and (p1, r1) z−→
(p′1, r
′
1). By definition of the abstraction operator, there exists a concrete action
b such that Υr1(b) = z, p1
b−→ p′1 and r1 b−→ r′1. Since P and A are compatible
and a ≡A b, there exists a p′′1 such that p1 a−→ p′′1 and p′′1 ∼ p′1. Since p1 ∼ p2, by
Lemma 7.1.4 there exists a p′2 such that p2
a−→ p′2 and p′1 ∼ p′2. By definition of the
abstraction operator, (p2, r2)
z−→ (p′2, r′2). Since αA(P) is determinate, it follows by
Lemma 7.1.4 that (p′1, r
′
1) ∼ (p′2, r′2). Hence, ((r′2, (p′1, r′1)), p′2) ∈ S, as required.
Now the lemma follows since, for all IA’s I1 and I2, I1 ∼ I2 ⇒ Iδ1 ∼ Iδ2 ⇒
I1 / I2.
Lemma 7.3.7 Suppose A and P are compatible, αA(P) is determinate and H /
αA(P). Then γA(H) is quiescence preserving.
Proof By contradiction. Assume that γA(H) is not quiescence preserving. Con-
sider a minimal run that shows this, that is, a run
(r0, s0)
a1−→ (r1, s1) a2−→ · · · an−−→ (rn, sn) an+1−−−→
of (γA(H))δ with (r0, s0) = (r0, s0), (rn, sn) quiescent in γA(H), so an+1 = δ, and
sn not quiescent in H. Let zj = Υrj−1(aj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and let zn+1 6= δ be an
output action enabled in state sn of H. Since (rn, sn) is quiescent, it follows that
there exists no concrete output o such that Υrn(o) = zn+1. From the definition of
concretization and the minimality of the run of (γA(H))δ, it follows that
r0
a1−→ r1 a2−→ · · · an−−→ rn an+1−−−→
is a run of the IA of A, and
s0
z1−→ s1 z2−→ · · · zn−→ sn zn+1−−−→
is a run of H. Let S be the maximal AδI-simulation from Hδ to (αA(P))δ. Then,
using the assumptions that αA(P) is determinate and that P andA are compatible,
we may construct runs
p0
a1−→ p1 a2−→ · · · an−−→ pn
and
(p0, r0)
z1−→ (p1, r1) z2−→ · · · zn−→ (pn, rn) zn+1−−−→
of Pδ and (αA(P))δ, respectively, such that, for all i ≤ n, (si, (pi, ri)) ∈ S. But
since (pn, rn)
zn+1−−−→, it follows that there exists a concrete output o such that
Υrn(o) = zn+1. Contradiction.
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7.4 Inference Using Abstraction
Suppose we have a teacher equipped with a determinate IA T , and a learner
equipped with a determinate learning purpose P such that T . P. The learner
has the task to infer some H satisfying T ioco H / P. After the preparations
from the previous section, we are now ready to show how, in certain cases, the
learner may simplify her task by defining a mapper A such that αA(T ) and αA(P)
are determinate, P and A are compatible, and T respects A in the sense that, for
i, i′ ∈ I and q ∈ Q, i ≡A i′ ⇒ (q i−→⇔ q i
′
−→). Note that if T is an IOA it trivially
respects A. In these cases, we may reduce the task of the learner to learning an
IA H′ satisfying αA(T ) ioco H′ / αA(P). Note that αA(P) is a proper learning
purpose for αA(T ) since it is determinate and, by monotonicity of abstraction
(Lemma 7.3.1), αA(T ) . αA(P).
A teacher for αA(T ) is constructed by placing a mapper component in be-
tween the teacher for T and the learner for P, which translates concrete and
abstract actions to each other in accordance with A. Let T = 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉,
P = 〈I,Oδ, P, p0,→P〉, A = 〈I, X, Y,Υ〉, and I = 〈I,Oδ, R, r0,→〉. The mapper
component maintains a state variable of type R, which initially is set to r0. The
behavior of the mapper component is defined as follows:
1. Input. If the mapper is in state r and receives an abstract input x ∈ X from
the learner, it picks a concrete input i ∈ I such that Υr(i) = x, forwards i
to the teacher, and waits for a reply > or ⊥ from the teacher. This reply is
then forwarded to the learner. In case of a > reply, the mapper updates its
state to the unique r′ with r i−→ r′. If there is no i ∈ I such that Υr(i) = x
then the mapper returns a ⊥ reply to the learner right away.
2. Output. If the mapper receives an output query ∆ from the learner, it
forwards ∆ to the teacher. It then waits until it receives an output o ∈ Oδ
from the teacher, and forwards Υr(o) to the learner.
3. Reset. If the mapper receives a reset from the learner, it resets its state to
r0 and forwards reset to the teacher.
4. Hypothesis. If the mapper receives a hypothesis H from the learner then, by
Lemma 7.3.7, γA(H) is quiescence preserving. SinceH / αA(P), monotonic-
ity of concretization (Lemma 7.3.4) implies γA(H) / γA(αA(P)). Hence, by
Lemma 7.3.6, γA(H) / P. This means that the mapper may forward γA(H)
as a hypothesis to the teacher. If the mapper receives response yes from the
teacher, it forwards yes to the learner. If the mapper receives response no
with counterexample σo, where σ = a1 · · · an, then it constructs a run
(r0, s0)
a1−→ (r1, s1) a2−→ · · · an−−→ (rn, sn)
of (γA(H))δ with (r0, s0) = (r0, s0). It then forwards no to the learner, to-
gether with counterexample z1 · · · zny, where, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, zj = Υrj−1(aj)
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and y = Υrn(o). Finally, the mapper returns to its initial state.
The next lemma implies that, whenever the learner presents an abstract input x
to the mapper, there exists a concrete input i such that Υr(i) = x, and the teacher
will accept input i from the mapper. So no ⊥ replies will be sent. Moreover,
whenever the teacher sends a concrete output o to the mapper, the learner will
accept the corresponding abstract output Υr(o) generated by the mapper.
Lemma 7.4.1 Let S be the maximal alternating simulation from T δ to Pδ. Then,
for any configuration of states q, r1 and (p, r2) of teacher, mapper and learner,
respectively, that can be reached after a finite number of steps (1)-(5) of the learning
protocol, we have (q, p) ∈ S and (p, r1) ∼ (p, r2) (here ∼ denotes bisimulation
equivalence in αA(P)).
Proof By induction on the number of steps.
Initially, the teacher is in state q0, the mapper is in state r0, and the learner
is in state (p0, r0). Since S relates the initial states of T δ and Pδ, (q0, p0) ∈ S.
Since ∼ is an equivalence relation, (p0, r0) ∼ (p0, r0).
For the induction step, observe that after a reset or hypothesis checking step,
teacher, mapper and learner all return to their initial states, which means that we
reach a configuration for which, as we observed, the required properties hold. So
the interesting cases are the input and output queries.
Suppose that the learner enables an abstract input x ∈ X, and takes transition
(p, r2)
x−→ (p′, r′2) after presenting x to the mapper. Since (p, r1) ∼ (p, r2), there
exists a transition (p, r1)
x−→ (p′′, r′1) such that (p′′, r′1) ∼ (p′, r′2). Hence, by the
definition of the abstraction operator, there exists a concrete input i such that
Υr1(i) = x, p
i−→ p′′ and r1 i−→ r′1. This means that the mapper accepts the
abstract input x, forwards a corresponding concrete input, say i, to the teacher,
and jumps to a new state r′1. Since (q, p) ∈ S and p i−→ p′′, there exists a state q′
such that q
i−→ q′ and (q′, p′′) ∈ S. This means that the teacher will accept the
input i from the mapper and jump to a state q′. Since (p, r2)
x−→ (p′, r′2), there
exists an i′ such that Υr2(i) = x and p
i′−→ p′. Because P and A are compatible
and i ≡A i′, p′′ ∼ p′. Hence, by Lemma 7.1.4, (q′, p′) ∈ S and so the required
properties hold.
Next suppose that the learner sends an output query to the mapper, which is
forwarded by the mapper to the teacher. Suppose that the teacher takes transition
q
o−→ q′ after returning concrete output o ∈ Oδ to the mapper. Then the mapper
jumps to the unique state r′1 with r1
o−→ r′1 and forwards y = Υr1(o) to the learner.
Since (q, p) ∈ S, there exists a state p′ such that p o−→ p′ and (q′, p′) ∈ S. By
definition of the abstraction operator, we have a transition (p, r1)
y−→ (p′, r′1). Since
(p, r1) ∼ (p, r2), there exists a transition (p, r2) y−→ (p′′, r′2) such that (p′, r′1) ∼
(p′′, r′2). This means that the learner will accept the abstract output y and jump
to a state (p′′, r′2). By definition of the abstraction operator, there exists a concrete
output o′ such that Υr2(o
′) = y and p o
′
−→ p′′. Because P and A are compatible
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and o ≡A o′, p′ ∼ p′′. Hence, by Lemma 7.1.4, (q′, p′′) ∈ S. It is straightforward
to check that bisimulation is a congruence for the abstraction operator (follows
also since the defining rules for αA are in the De Simone format, see [89, 40]),
that is p′ ∼ p′′ implies (p′, r′1) ∼ (p′′, r′1). Hence, since ∼ is an equivalence,
(p′′, r′1) ∼ (p′′, r′2), and so the required properties hold.
We claim that, from the perspective of a learner with learning purpose αA(P),
a teacher for T and a mapper for A together behave exactly like a teacher for
αA(T ). Since the notion of behavior has not been formalized for a teacher and a
mapper, the mathematical content of this claim may not be immediately obvious.
Clearly, it is routine to describe the behavior of teachers and mappers formally in
some concurrency formalism, such as Milner’s CCS [72] or another process algebra
[19]. For instance, we may define, for each IA T , a CCS process Teacher(T ) that
describes the behavior of a teacher for T , and for each mapper A a CCS process
Mapper(A) that models the behavior of a mapper for A. These two CCS processes
may then synchronize via actions taken from Aδ, actions ∆, δ, >, ⊥ and reset,
and actions hypothesis(H), where H is an interface automaton. If we compose
Teacher(T ) and Mapper(A) using the CCS composition operator |, and apply the
CCS restriction operator \ to internalize all communications between teacher and
mapper, the resulting process is observation equivalent (weakly bisimilar) to the
process Teacher(αA(T )):
(Teacher(T ) | Mapper(A)) \ L ≈ Teacher(αA(T )),
where L = Aδ ∪ {∆, δ,>,⊥, reset, hypothesis}. It is in this precise, formal sense
that one should read the following theorem. The reason why we do not refer to
the CCS formalization in the statement and proof of this theorem is that we feel
that the resulting notational overhead would obscure rather than clarify.
Theorem 7.4.2 Let T , A and P be as above. A teacher for T and a mapper for
A together behave like a teacher for αA(T ).
Proof Initially, the state of the teacher for T is q0 and the state of the mapper for
A is r0, which is consistent with the initial state (q0, r0) of the teacher for αA(T ).
Suppose the current state of the teacher for T is q, and the current state of the
mapper is r. We consider the possible interactions between the components:
• Input. Suppose the learner sends an abstract input x ∈ X. Using the
assumption that T respects A, it is easy to see that the mapper returns ⊥
to the learner exactly if there exists no concrete input i and state q′ such
that Υr(i) = x and q
i−→ q′. This behavior is consistent with the behavior of
a teacher for αA(T ) from state (q, r),
Now suppose that Υr(i) = x, r
i−→ r′, the mapper forwards i to the teacher,
the teacher jumps to a state q′ such that q i−→ q′, sends a reply > to the
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mapper, who jumps to state r′ and forwards > to the learner. This behavior
is consistent with the behavior of a teacher for αA(T ) from state (q, r), which
may jump to any state (q′, r′) such that (q, r) x−→abst (q′, r′).
• Output. Suppose the learner sends an output query ∆. The mapper will
then forwards ∆ to the teacher for T . If state q is quiescent then the teacher
for T forwards δ to the mapper, and the mapper forwards δ to the learner.
This behavior is consistent with the behavior of a teacher for αA(T ) from
state (q, r). If state q is not quiescent then the teacher for T selects a
transition q
o−→ q′, jumps to q′ and returns o to the mapper. The mapper
then forwards Υr(o) to the learner. This behavior is consistent with the
behavior of a teacher for αA(T ) from state (q, r), which nondeterministically
picks an output y and state (q′, r) such that (q, r)
y−→abst (q′, r).
• Reset. Suppose the learner sends a reset command. Then the learner returns
to its initial state (p0, r0). The mapper moves to its initial state r0 and
forwards the reset command to the teacher, who also returns to its initial
state q0. This behavior is consistent with the behavior of a teacher for αA(T )
which, upon receiving a reset, returns to its initial state (q0, r0).
• Hypothesis. Suppose that the learner sends a hypothesis H. The mapper
will then forward γA(H) as a hypothesis to the teacher for T . If the teacher
for T answers yes then the mapper forwards this answer to the learner. In
this case T ioco γA(H) and hence, by Lemma 7.3.5, αA(T ) ioco H. So
when the mapper forwards yes to the learner, this is the proper behavior for
a teacher for αA(T ).
If the mapper receives answer no with a counterexample σo then, by defini-
tion of a teacher, σ is a trace of (γA(H))δ and o is an output enabled by T δ af-
ter σ but not by (γA(H))δ after σ. So if σ = a1 · · · an, then the mapper indeed
may construct a corresponding run (r0, s0)
a1−→ (r1, s1) a2−→ · · · an−−→ (rn, sn)
of (γA(H))δ with (r0, s0) = (r0, s0). The mapper then forwards no to
the learner, together with counterexample ρy, where ρ = z1 · · · zn, zj =
Υrj−1(aj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and y = Υrn(o). By construction, ρ ∈ Traces(Hδ).
Since σo is a counterexample, σo is a trace of T δ. This means that we may
construct a run q0
a1−→ q1 a2−→ · · · an−−→ qn o−→ qn+1 of T δ with q0 = q0. Now
observe that
(q0, r0)
z1−→ (q1, r1) z2−→ · · · zn−→ (qn, rn) y−→ (qn+1, rn)
is a run of (αA(T ))δ. Hence, y ∈ out((αA(T ))δ after ρ). Since σo is a
counterexample generated by the teacher for T , o is not enabled by (γA(H))δ
after σ. In particular, state (rn, sn) does not enable o. This implies state sn
does not enable y. By Lemma 7.1.2, since H is determinate, no state of Hδ
reachable via trace ρ enables y. We conclude that y 6∈ out(Hδ after ρ), and
so ρy is a counterexample for a teacher for αA(T ).
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Since a teacher for T and a mapper for A together behave like a teacher
for αA(T ), it follows that we have reduced the task of learning an H such that
T ioco H / P to the simpler task of learning an H such that αA(T ) ioco H /
αA(P): whenever the learner receives the answer yes from the mapper, indicat-
ing that αA(T ) ioco H we know, by definition of the behavior of the mapper
component, that γA(H) is quiescent preserving and T ioco γA(H). Moreover, by
Lemmas 7.3.4 and 7.3.6, γA(H) / P.
Recall that for output-predicting abstractions, if H is behavior-deterministic
then γA(H) is behavior-deterministic. This implies that, for such abstractions,
provided T is an IOA, whenever the mapper returns an answer yes to the learner,
γA(H) is in fact the unique interface automaton (up to bisimulation) that satisfies
T ioco γA(H) / P.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided several generalizations of the framework of [1], leading
to a general theory of history dependent abstractions for learning interface au-
tomata. This work establishes some very interesting links between previous work
on concurrency theory, model-based testing, and automata learning.
The theory of abstractions presented in this chapter is not complete yet and
deserves further study. The link between this theory and the theory of abstract
interpretation [30, 31] needs to be investigated further. Also the concept of XY -
simulations, which nicely generalizes three fundamental concepts from concurrency
theory (bisimulations, simulations and alternating simulations), deserves further
study. Finally, an obvious challenge is to generalize the theory of this chapter to
SUTs that are not determinate.
Chapter 8 presents the prototype tool Tomte, which is able to automatically
construct mappers for a restricted class of scalarset automata, in which one can
test for equality of data parameters, but no operations on data are allowed.
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Chapter 8
Counterexample-Guided
Abstraction Refinement for
Learning
Scalarset Mealy Machines
This chapter introduces the tool Tomte, which is able to construct mappers similar
to those presented in chapter 7, fully automatically for a restricted class of extended
finite state machines where one can test for equality of data parameters, but no
operations on data are allowed. To fulfill its task, Tomte uses counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement: whenever the current abstraction is too coarse and
induces nondeterministic behavior, the abstraction is refined automatically. This
chapter is organized as follows. In section 8.1 the class of scalarset Mealy Machines
is introduced and the algorithm to learn mappers for them is presented. Section 8.3
explains the abstraction learning algorithm in more detail with an example, and
reports a summary of the experiments done with Tomte. Finally, the conclusions
are presented in section 8.4.
8.1 The World of Tomte
The general approach for using abstraction in automata learning is phrased most
naturally at a general, semantic level. And indeed, this is what was done in the
previous chapter. However, if we want to devise effective algorithms and implement
them, we must restrict attention to a class of automata and mappers that can be
finitely represented. This section describes the class of SUTs that the Tomte tool
can learn, as well as the classes of mappers and learning purposes that it uses.
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8.1.1 Scalarset Mealy Machines
We assume a universe V of variables. Each variable v ∈ V has a type type(v) ⊆
N ∪ {⊥}, where N is the set of natural numbers and ⊥ denotes the undefined
value. If V is a set of variables, then a valuation for V is a function ξ that maps
each variable in V to an element of its domain. We write Val(V ) for the set of
all valuations for V . We also assume a set C of constants which contains ⊥ˆ and
a function γ : C → N ∪ {⊥} that assigns a value to each constant. We define
γ(⊥ˆ) =⊥. If c ∈ C is a constant then we define type(c) = {γ(c)}. A term over V
is either a variable or a constant, that is, an element of C ∪ V . We write T for
the set of all terms. If t is a term over V and ξ is a valuation for V then we writeJtKξ for the value to which t evaluates:
JtKξ =
{
ξ(t) if t ∈ V
γ(t) if t ∈ C
A formula or guard ϕ over V is a Boolean combination of expressions of the
form t = t′, where t and t′ are terms over V . We write G for the set of all formulas
over V. If ξ is a valuation for V and ϕ is a formula over V , then we write ξ |= ϕ to
denote that ξ satisfies ϕ. We assume a set E of event primitives and for each event
primitive ε an arity arity(ε) ∈ N. An event term for ε is an expression ε(t1, . . . , tn)
where t1, . . . , tn are terms and n = arity(ε). We write ET for the set of event
terms.
Event signature An event signature Σ is a pair 〈TI , TO〉, where TI and TO are
finite sets of event terms such that TI ∩ TO = ∅ and each term in TI ∪ TO is of
the form ε(p1, . . . , pn) with p1, . . . , pn pairwise different variables. We require that
the event primitives as well as the variables of different event terms in TI ∪TO are
distinct. We refer to the variables occurring in an event signature as parameters.
Below scalarset Mealy machines are defined. The scalarset datatype was intro-
duced by Ip and Dill [49] as part of their work on symmetry reduction in verifica-
tion. Operations on scalarsets are restricted so that states are guaranteed to have
the same future behaviors, up to permutation of the elements of the scalarsets.
Using the symmetries implied by the scalarsets, a verifier can automatically gener-
ate a reduced state space. On scalarsets no operations are allowed, we only allow
the use of constants in C. The only predicate symbol that may be used is equality.
Definition A scalarset Mealy machine (SMM)M is a tuple 〈Σ, V, L, l0,Γ〉, where
• Σ = 〈TI , TO〉 is an event signature, with ⊥6∈ type(p), for each parameter p
of Σ,
• V ⊆ V is a finite set of state variables, with ⊥∈ type(v), for each v ∈ V ,
• L is a finite set of locations,
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expectedBit=1;
(b==0 && expectedBit==0) ||
(b==1 && expectedBit==1)
expectedBit==1expectedBit==0
(b==1 && expectedBit==0)||
(b==0 && expectedBit==1)||
b>1
IPleaseAck()/OAck(0)
IFrame(d,b)/ONOK()
IPleaseAck()/OAck(1)
expectedBit=0;
IPleaseAck()/ONOK()
IFrame(d,b)/OOut(d)
IFrame(d,b)/ONOK()
Figure 8.1: A sample SMM: alternating bit protocol receiver
• l0 ∈ L is the initial location,
• Γ ⊆ L×TI×G×(V → T )×ET ×L is a finite set of transitions. In a transition
〈l, εI(p1, . . . , pk), g, %, εO(u1, . . . , ul), l′〉 ∈ Γ, we refer to l as the source, g as
the guard, % as the update and l′ as the target. We require that g is a formula
over V ∪ {p1, . . . , pk}, there exists an event term εO(q1, . . . , ql) ∈ TO such
that, for each i, ui is a term over V with type(ui) ⊆ type(qi)∪ {⊥}, and, for
each v, %(v) ∈ V ∪ C ∪ {p1, . . . , pk} and type(%(v)) ⊆ type(v).
We say thatM is deterministic if, for all distinct transitions τ1 = 〈l1, eI1, g1, %1, e01, l′1〉
and τ2 = 〈l2, eI2, g2, %2, e02, l′2〉 in Γ, l1 = l2 and eI1 = eI2 implies g1 ∧ g2 ≡ false.
Example Figure 8.1 is a model of receiver running alternating bit protocol, which
is a SMM.
Semantics of SMM To each SMM M we associate an IA JMK in the obvious
way. Transitions of the Mealy machine are turned into pairs of consecutive input
and output transitions of the corresponding interface automaton.
The semantics of an event term ε(p1, . . . , pk) is the set of actions Jε(p1, . . . , pk)K
= {ε(d1, · · · , dk) | di ∈ type(pi), 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. The semantics of a set T of event
terms is defined by pointwise extension: JT K = ⋃e∈T JeK.
Let M = 〈Σ, V, L, l0,Γ〉 be a SMM with Σ = 〈TI , TO〉. The semantics of M,
denoted JMK, is the interface automaton 〈I,O,Q, q0,→〉 where
• I = JTIK and O = JTOK,
100 CEGAR for Learning SIA
IGet()/Out(c3)IGet()/Out(c2)
IN(d)/OK()IN(d)/OK()
IGet()/Out(c1)
IN(d)/OK()
c3=d;c2=d;c1=d;
Figure 8.2: A sample SMM which is not restricted: a LIFO biffer of size 3
• Q =  L× Val(V ) ∪  L× Val(V )×O,
• q0 = (l0, ξ0), where ξ0(v) =⊥, for v ∈ V ,
• →⊆ Q× (I ∪O)×Q is the smallest set that satisfies
〈l, εI(p1, . . . , pk), g, %, εO(u1, . . . , u`), l′〉 ∈ Γ
∀i ≤ k, ι(pi) = di ξ ∪ ι |= g
ξ′ = (ξ ∪ γ ∪ ι) ◦ %
∀i ≤ `, JuiKξ′ = d′i 6=⊥
(l, ξ)
εI(d1,...,dk)−−−−−−−−→ (l′, ξ′, εO(d′1, . . . , d′l))
(l′, ξ′, εO(d′1, . . . , d
′
l))
εO(d
′
1,...,d
′
`)−−−−−−−−→ (l′, ξ′)
Observe that ifM is a deterministic SMM then JMK is a behavior-deterministic
IA. Tomte can learn the subclass of deterministic SMMs, which only record the
first and the last occurrence of an input parameter:
Restricted SMMs Let M be a SMM. Variable v records the last occurrence of
input parameter p of M if for each transition 〈l, εI(p1, . . . , pk), g, %, e, l′〉 ∈ Γ, if
p ∈ {p1, . . . , pk} then %(v) = p else %(v) = v. Moreover, v may not occur in the
codomain of %. Variable v records the first occurrence of input parameter p if for
each transition 〈l, εI(p1, . . . , pk), g, %, e, l′〉 ∈ Γ, if p ∈ {p1, . . . , pk} and g ⇒ v = ⊥ˆ
holds then %(v) = p else %(v) = v. Moreover, v may not occur in the codomain of
%.
We say that M only records the first and the last occurrence of parameters
if, whenever %(v) = p in some transition, v either records the first or the last
occurrence of p.
Example Figure 8.1, the alternating bit protocol receiver, shows a restricted
SMM, because the state variables do not record any input parameter. But the
SMM of figure 8.2 is not restricted, as the model records three copies of input
parameter d. A restricted SMM may only record the first and the last occurrences
of an input parameter, that are at most two copies.
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Symmetry Reduction in Scalarset Mealy Machines
This section provides lemmas and theorems to prove the general bisimilarity of two
SMM’s in case of their bisimilarity when their variable domains are substituted
with a large enough finite subset of natural numbers. We assume in this section
that, all the variables in V and all variables of SMM’s have domain N ∪ {⊥}.
Definition An automorphism is a morphism1 from a mathematical object to
itself.
Definition We call an automorphism h : N∪ {⊥} → N∪ {⊥} constant respecting
if h(⊥) =⊥ and it maps the value of each constant in the language to itself, ie.
∀c ∈ C, h(γ(c)) = γ(c).
Lemma 8.1.1 states that applying a constant respecting automorphism on a valu-
ation of a set of variables preserves the logical values of the formulas under that
valuation. This lemma is needed to prove that computing the value of a term un-
der a valuation and applying a constant respecting automorphism on that value,
is equivalent to computing the value of that term under the composition of the
automorphism and the valuation.
Lemma 8.1.1 If h is a constant respecting automorphism, then
ξ |= ϕ⇔ h(ξ) |= ϕ
where ϕ is a formula over V , ξ is a valuation for V , and h(ξ) is the valuation for
V defined by h(ξ) = h ◦ ξ.
Proof We prove this lemma by induction on the number of operators in ϕ.
Basis ϕ has no operators, that is ϕ is an atomic formula. An atomic formula
has four possible forms
1. ϕ ≡ c = c′ where c, c′ ∈ C:
h(ξ) |= φ⇔
h(ξ) |= c = c′ ⇔
γ(c) = γ(c′)⇔
ξ |= c = c′ ⇔
ξ |= φ
1A morphism is an abstraction derived from structure-preserving mappings between two math-
ematical structures. The study of morphisms and of the structures (called objects) over which
they are defined, is central to category theory.
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2. ϕ ≡ v = c where v ∈ V and c ∈ C:
h(ξ) |= φ⇔
h(ξ) |= v = c⇔
h(ξ)(v) = γ(c)⇔ (h is constant respecting.)
h(ξ(v)) = h(γ(c))⇔ (h is a bijection.)
ξ(v) = γ(c)⇔
ξ |= v = c⇔
ξ |= φ
3. ϕ ≡ c = v where v ∈ V and c ∈ C:
h(ξ) |= φ⇔
h(ξ) |= c = v ⇔
γ(c) = h(ξ)(v)⇔ (h is constant respecting.)
h(γ(c)) = h(ξ(v))⇔ (h is a bijection.)
γ(c) = ξ(v)⇔
ξ |= c = v ⇔
ξ |= φ
4. ϕ ≡ v = v′ where v, v′ ∈ V :
h(ξ) |= φ⇔
h(ξ) |= v = v′ ⇔
h(ξ)(v) = h(ξ)(v′)⇔ (h is a bijection.)
ξ(v) = ξ(v′)⇔
ξ |= v = v′ ⇔
ξ |= φ
Induction Assume that for all formulas ϕ with at most k operators, we have
ξ |= ϕ⇔ h(ξ) |= ϕ.
We prove for any formula ϕ′ with k + 1 operators, we have
ξ |= ϕ′ ⇔ h(ξ) |= ϕ′.
ϕ′ has two possible forms:
1. ϕ′ ≡ ¬(ϕ0)
2. ϕ′ ≡ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
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For each possible form, we perform the induction assumption on the subformulas
of ϕ′:
1. ϕ′ ≡ ¬(ϕ0)
h(ξ) |= ϕ′ ⇔
h(ξ) |= ¬(ϕ0)⇔
h(ξ) 6|= ϕ0 ⇔ ( induction assumption)
ξ 6|= ϕ0 ⇔
ξ |= ¬(ϕ0)⇔
ξ |= ϕ′
2. ϕ′ ≡ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
h(ξ) |= ϕ′ ⇔
h(ξ) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇔
h(ξ) |= ϕ1 ∧ h(ξ) |= ϕ2 ⇔ ( induction assumption)
ξ |= ϕ1 ∧ ξ |= ϕ2 ⇔
ξ |= ϕ′
Lemma 8.1.2 asserts that applying a constant respecting automorphism on the
value of term under a valuation, is the same as computing the value of the term
under the composition of the automorphism and the valuation. This assertion
is required for proving that a constant respecting automorphism preserves the
structure of a SMM which is the semantics of a SMM.
Lemma 8.1.2 If h is a constant respecting automorphism, then
h(JtKξ) = JtKh(ξ)
where t is a term such that t ∈ C ∪ V , and ξ is a valuation of V .
Proof There are two possible cases:
1. t , c ∈ C:
h(JtKξ) = h(JcKξ)
= h(γ(c)) (h is constant respecting.)
= γ(c)
= JcKh(ξ)
= JtKh(ξ)
104 CEGAR for Learning SIA
2. t , v ∈ V
h(JtKξ) = h(JvKξ)
= h(ξ(v))
= h(ξ)(v)
= JvKh(ξ)
= JtKh(ξ)
Lemma 8.1.3 states that applying a constant preserving automorphism main-
tains the structure of a SMM which represents the semantics of a SMM. Applying
a constant preserving automorphism on a SMM means applying the automorphism
on the states of the SMM, that is for each state applying the automorphism on
the valuation represents that state, as well as applying the automorphism on the
value of the constants and terms appearing in the transitions.
Lemma 8.1.3 Let M be a SMM. If h is a constant respecting automorphism,
then for interface automaton I = JMK, we have
q
εI(d1,...,dk)−−−−−−−−→ q′ ⇒ h(q) εI(h(d1),...,h(dk))−−−−−−−−−−−→ h(q′),
and
q′
εO(d
′
1,...,d
′
`)−−−−−−−−→ q′′ ⇒ h(q′) εO(h(d
′
1),...,h(d
′
`))−−−−−−−−−−−−→ h(q′′),
where q, q′ and q′′ are states of I and have the form of (l, ξ), (l′, ξ′, εO(d′1, . . . , d′`))
and (l′, ξ′), respectively, and h(q) = (l, h(ξ)), h(q′) = (l′, h(ξ′), εO(h(d′1), . . . , h(d
′
`)))
and h(q′′) = (l′, h(ξ′)).
Proof Suppose q
εI(d1,...,dk)−−−−−−−−→ q′, then there exists a transition
〈l, εI(p1, . . . , pk), g, %, εO(u1, . . . , u`), l′〉
of M and a valuation ι of parameters of {p1, . . . , pk} such that if ι(pi) = di for
1 ≤ i ≤ k,
ξ ∪ ι |= g
ξ′ ≡ (ξ ∪ γ ∪ ι) ◦ %
If we apply a constant respecting automorphism h, we have:
ι(pi) = di ⇒ h ◦ ι(pi) = h(ι)(pi) = h(di) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (8.1)
ξ ∪ ι |= g ⇒ (lemma 8.1.1)
h ◦ (ξ ∪ ι) |= g ⇒
h(ξ) ∪ h(ι) |= g
(8.2)
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and
ξ′ ≡ (ξ ∪ γ ∪ ι) ◦ ρ⇒
h(ξ′) ≡ h ◦ (ξ ∪ γ ∪ ι) ◦ ρ⇒
h(ξ′) ≡ h(ξ ∪ γ ∪ ι) ◦ ρ⇒
h(ξ′) ≡ (h(ξ) ∪ γ ∪ h(ι)) ◦ ρ
(8.3)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ `,
JuiKξ′ = d′i ⇒
h(JuiKξ′) = h(d′i)⇒ (lemma 8.1.2)JuiKh(ξ′) = h(d′i)
(8.4)
From (8.1), (8.2), (8.3) and (8.4), we conclude
∀i ≤ k, h(ι)(pi) = h(di) h(ξ) ∪ h(ι) |= g
h(ξ′) = (h(ξ) ∪ γ ∪ h(ι)) ◦ %
∀i ≤ `, JuiKh(ξ′) = h(d′i)
(l, h(ξ))
εI(h(d1),...,h(dk))−−−−−−−−−−−→ (l′, h(ξ′), εO(h(d′1), . . . , h(d′`)))
h(q)
εI(h(d1),...,h(dk))−−−−−−−−−−−→ h(q′)
Furthermore, there exists state q′′ = (l′, ξ′) of M such that
q′
εO(d
′
1,...,d
′
`)−−−−−−−−→ q′′
and h(q′′) = (l′, h(ξ′)). Hence,
h(q′)
εO(h(d1),...,h(d`))−−−−−−−−−−−−→ h(q′′).
Theorem 8.1.1 is the heart of this section which proves that for bisimilarity
checking of two SMM’s with infinite domains, it is enough to substitute the do-
mains by finite subsets of the domains and do the checking.
Definition For each SMM S = 〈Σ, V, L, l0,Γ〉, we define Sn to be the SMM
obtained from S by replacing the types of the variables with {0, . . . , n− 1}∪ {⊥}.
Furthermore, we define Valn(V ) to be the set of all valuations of V over {0, . . . , n−
1} ∪ {⊥}.
Theorem 8.1.4 Let S1 = 〈Σ1, V1, L1, l10,Γ1〉 and S2 = 〈Σ2, V2, L2, l20,Γ2〉 be SMM’s
with Σ1 = Σ2. Let n0 be large enough (larger than the number of variables of S1
and S2 + sum of the number of parameters + number of constants) (n0 must be
larger than the value of the largest constant.) and assume Sn01 - Sn02 , that is Sn01
and Sn02 are bisimilar,
Then, S1 - S2.
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Proof Let R ⊆ (L1 × Valn0(V1) ∪ L1 × Valn0(V1) × O) × (L2 × Valn0(V2) ∪ L2 ×
Valn0(V2)×O) be a bisimulation from JSn01 K to JSn02 K.
Define
R′ = {(s1, s2) ∈ (L1 × Val(V1) ∪ L1 × Val(V1)×O)× (L2 × Val(V2) ∪ L2 × Val(V2)×O) |
∃ a constant respecting automorphism h : (h(s1), h(s2)) ∈ R}.
We claim that R′ is a bisimulation from JS1K to JS2K.
Since the initial states of S1 and S2 are also the initial states of Sn01 and Sn02 ,
and they are related by R, they are also related by R′ (take the the identity
function as automorphism).
 

Figure 8.3: Bisimulation between finite automata versus infinite automata
Suppose q1 and q
′
1 be states of JS1K such that q1 εI(d1,...,dk)−−−−−−−−→ q′1, and q2 be a
state of JS2K such that q1R′q2, Then
• There exists a constant respecting automorphism h such that
(h(q1), h(q2)) ∈ R.
• There is a transition
〈l, εI(p1, . . . , pk), g, %, εO(u1, . . . , ul), l′〉
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such that q = (l, ξ) and q′ = (l′, ξ′, εO(d′1, . . . , d
′
`)), where d
′
i = JuiKξ′ for
1 ≤ i ≤ `, and if ι is a valuation with ι(pi) = di (for 1 ≤ i ≤ k),
ξ ∪ ι |= g
ξ′ ≡ (ξ ∪ γ ∪ ι) ◦ %
• There exists a constant respecting automorphism h′ such that
h′(q1) = h(q1)
h′(q2) = h(q2)
h′(di) ≤ n0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k
(Follows since n0 is greater than | V1 | + | V2 | + | C | + | P |)
• By lemma 8.1.3,
h′(q1)
εI(h
′(d1),...,h′(dk))−−−−−−−−−−−−→ h′(q′1).
Since (h′(q1), h′(q2)) ∈ R, and R is a bismulation, there exists a state r such
that
h′(q2)
εI(h
′(d1),...,h′(dk))−−−−−−−−−−−−→ r
and
(h(q′1), r) ∈ R.
By the lemma 8.1.3, since h′−1 is a constant respecting automorphism such
that,
q2
εI(d1,...,dk)−−−−−−−−→ h′−1(r).
Observe
(q′1, h
′−1(r)) ∈ R′.
This construction is depicted in figure 8.3.
Using lemma 8.1.3, case of εO is similar.
8.1.2 Abstraction Table
For each event signature, we define a family of symbolic abstractions, parametrized
by what is called an abstraction table. For each parameter p, an abstraction
table contains a list of variables and constants. If v occurs in the list for p then,
intuitively, this means that for the future behavior of the SUT it may be relevant
whether p equals v or not.
Abstraction table Let Σ = 〈TI , TO〉 be an event signature, let P be the set of
parameters that occur in TI , and let U be the set of parameters that occur in TO.
Let vfp and v
l
p be fresh variables with type(v
f
p ) = type(v
l
p) = type(p) ∪ {⊥}, and
let V f = {vfp | p ∈ P} and V l = {vlp | p ∈ P}. An abstraction table for Σ is a
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function F : P ∪ U → (V f ∪ V l ∪C)∗, such that, for each p ∈ P ∪ U , all elements
of sequence F (p) are distinct, and, for each p ∈ U , F (p) lists all the elements of
V f ∪ V l ∪ C.
Mapper induced by abstraction table Let Σ = 〈TI , TO〉 be a signature and
let F be an abstraction table for Σ. Let P be the set of parameters in TI and
let U be the set of parameters in TO. Then the mapper AFΣ = 〈I, X, Y,Υ〉 with
I = 〈I,Oδ, R, r0,→〉 is defined as follows:
• Let, for p ∈ P ∪U , p′ be a fresh variable with type(p′) = {0, . . . , |F (p)|−1}∪
{⊥}. Let TX = {ε(p′1, . . . , p′k) | ε(p1, . . . , pk) ∈ TI} and TY = {ε(p′1, . . . , p′l) |
ε(p1, . . . , pl) ∈ TO}. Then I = JTIK, O = JTOK, X = JTXK, and Y = JTY K.
• R = Val(V f ∪ V l) and r0(vfp ) = r0(vlp) =⊥, for all p ∈ P .
• → and Υ are defined as follows, for all r ∈ R,
1. r
δ−→ r and Υr(δ) = δ.
2. Let o = εO(d1, . . . , dk) and let εO(q1, . . . , qk) ∈ TO. Then r o−→ r and
Υr(o) = εO(d
′
1, . . . , d
′
k), where, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, d′j is the smallest index
m such that JF (qj)mKr = dj , or d′j =⊥ if there is no such index.
3. Let i = εI(d1, . . . , dk) and let εI(p1, . . . , pk) ∈ TI . Let r0 = r and, for
1 ≤ j ≤ k,
rj =
{
rj−1[dj/vfpj ][dj/v
l
pj ] if rj−1(v
f
pj ) =⊥
rj−1[dj/vlpj ] otherwise
(8.5)
Then r
i−→ rk and Υr(i) = εI(d′1, . . . , d′k), where, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, d′j is
the smallest index m such that JF (pj)mKrj−1 = dj , or d′j =⊥ if there is
no such index.
Strictly speaking, the mappers AFΣ introduced above are not output-predicting.
In fact, in each state r of the mapper there are infinitely many concrete outputs
that are mapped to the abstract output ⊥. However, SUTs whose behavior can be
described by scalarset Mealy machines have a remarkable property: the only pos-
sible values for output parameters are constants and values of previously received
inputs. As a result, the mapper will never send an abstract output with a pa-
rameter ⊥ to the learner. This in turn implies that in the behavior-deterministic
hypothesis H generated by the learner ⊥ will not occur as an output parame-
ter. Since AFΣ is output-predicting for all the other outputs, it follows that the
concretization γAFΣ (H) is behavior-deterministic.
Theorem 8.1.5 Let M = 〈Σ, V, L, l0,Γ〉 be a SMM that only records the first
and last occurrence of parameters. Let F be an abstraction table for Σ. Then
αAFΣ (JMK) is finitary.
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Proof (sketch) Let S be the relation that deemes two states s1, s2 of αAF )Σ
(JMK)
equivalent iff there exists a constant respecting automorphism h with h(s1) = s2.
Then, clearly, S is an equivalence relation. We claim that S is a bisimulation
on αAFΣ (JMK). Suppose that (s1, s2) ∈ S with s1 = (q1, r1), s2 = (q2, r2), and
h a constant respecting automorphism that maps s1 to s2. Suppose further that
(q1, r1)
z−→ (q′1, r′1). Then, by definition of the abstraction operator, there exists an
a such that q1
a−→ q′1, r1 a−→ r′1, and Υr(a) = z. By Lemma 8.1.3, h(q1)
h(a)−−−→ h(q′1).
Moreover, by the definition of mapper AFΣ , h(r1)
h(a)−−−→ h(r′1). Also by definition
of mapper AFΣ , Υr(a) = Υh(r)(h(a)). We conclude (h(q1), h(r1)) z−→ (h(q′1), h(r′1)),
that is, h(s1)
z−→ h(s2). Hence, S is a bisimulation, as claimed.
To each state s = ((l, ξ), r) or s = ((l, ξ, o), r) of αAFΣ (JMK) we associate a
partial equivalence relation PER(s) on V ∪ V f ∪ V l ∪ C which puts variables or
constants in the same equivalence class whenever they evaluate to the same non-⊥
value:
PER(s) = {{t′ ∈ V ∪ V f ∪ V l ∪ C | Jt′Kξ∪r = JtKξ∪r 6=⊥} | t ∈ V ∪ V f ∪ V l ∪ C}.
The reader may check that s′ = h(s) implies that PER(s) = PER(s′). Since in all
(reachable) states of the form (l, ξ, O(d
′
1, . . . , d
′
l)) the values of the output param-
eters are determined by the event term O(u1, . . . , ul) and valuation ξ, it follows
that bisimulation S has finitely many equivalence classes. Hence the induced quo-
tient structure, which is behaviorally equivalent to αAF )Σ
(JMK), is a finite interface
automaton and. αAF )Σ
(JMK) is finitary.
Theorem 8.1.6 LetM = 〈Σ, V, L, l0,Γ〉 be a deterministic SMM that only records
the first and last occurrence of parameters. Let Full(Σ) be the abstraction table F
for Σ in which, for each p, F (p) has maximal length. Then αAFull(Σ)Σ
(JMK) is be-
havior deterministic.
Proof (sketch) Suppose a state s of αAFull(Σ)Σ
(JMK) has two distinct outgoing tran-
sitions. Then s must be of the form s = ((l, ξ), r). Suppose s has outgoing
transitions s
x−→ s′ and s x−→ s′′. Then s′ and s′′ can only be different because in
x some abstract parameter has value ⊥, leading to different concrete values in s′
and s′′. But since these concrete values are fresh, there exists a constant preserv-
ing automorphism h such that h(s′) = s′′. Hence, by the proof of the previous
theorem, s′ and s′′ are bisimilar, as required.
Definition Let I and O be disjoint sets of input and output actions. Then
Mealy(I,O) is the IA 〈I,O, {m0,m1},m0, {(m0, i,m1) | i ∈ I} ∪ {(m1, o,m0) |
o ∈ O}〉.
Lemma 8.1.7 Let Σ = 〈TI , TO〉 be an event signature, let I = JTIK and O =JTOK, let M be a SMM over Σ, let F be an abstraction table for Σ, and let P =
Mealy(I,O). Then AFΣ and P are compatible, JMK ioco P and γAFΣ (αAFΣ (P)) / P.
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We have now solved the problem of learning deterministic symbolic Mealy ma-
chines that only record the first and last occurrence of parameters, at least in
theory! By Theorem 8.1.6 and Lemma 8.1.7, we can apply the approach described
in Section 7.3 if we use mapper AFull(Σ)Σ and learning purpose Mealy(I,O). By
Theorem 8.1.5, we know that I = αAFull(Σ)Σ (JMK) is finite state and so if we use
our mapper component in combination with any tool that is able to learn finite
interface automata, the learning procedure will always terminate. The only prob-
lem is that in practice I will be much too large. For instance, if we have an event
signature with just 10 parameters including an event type with 4 parameters, then
the number of actions of I will be at least 214 ≈ 2.105, which is far beyond what
state-of-the-art learning tools can handle.
8.2 Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refine-
ment
In order to avoid the practical problems that arise with the abstraction table
Full(Σ), we take an approach based on counterexample-guided abstraction. We
start with the simplest mapper, which is induced by the abstraction table F with
F (p) = , for all p ∈ P , and only refine the abstraction (i.e., add an element to
the table) when we have to. Our CEGAR procedure starts with the simplest of
these abstractions (essentially the empty table). If using this abstraction we find a
correct hypothesis we are done. Otherwise, we refine the abstraction by adding an
entry to our table. Since there are only finitely many possible abstractions and we
know that the abstraction that corresponds to the full table is sound, our CEGAR
approach will always terminate (at least in theory).
The reason why refinement steps may be necessary is that αAFΣ (JMK) may
exhibit nondeterministic behavior. During the construction of a hypothesis we
will not observe nondeterministic behavior, even when table F is not full: due to
our choice of the concretization function υ, which always chooses fresh values, the
mapper induced by F will behave exactly as the mapper induced by Full(Σ), except
that the set of abstract actions is smaller. Only if the learner has formulated a
hypothesis H, the mapper has forwarded this hypothesis to the teacher, and the
teacher responds with no with a counterexample σ0 we may face a problem: the
counterexample may be due to the fact that H is incorrect, but it may also be due
to the fact that αAFΣ (JMK) is not behavior-deterministic. In order to figure out
the nature of the counterexample, we first construct the unique execution of AFΣ
with trace σo. Then we assign a color to each occurrence of a parameter value in
this execution:
Definition Let r
i−→ r′ be a transition of AFΣ with i = εI(d1, . . . , dk) and let
εI(p1, . . . , pk) ∈ TI . Let Υr(i) = εI(d′1, . . . , d′k). Then we say that a value dj is
green if d′j 6=⊥. Value dj is black if d′j =⊥ and dj equals the value of some constant
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or occurs in the codomain of state rj−1 (where rj−1 is defined as in equation (8.5)
above). Value dj is red if it is neither green nor black.
Intuitively, a value of an input parameter p is green if it equals a value of a
previous parameter or constant that is listed in the abstraction table, a value is
black if it equals a previous value that is not listed in the abstraction table, and a
value is red if it is fresh. The mapper now does a new experiment on the SUT in
which all the black values of input parameters in the trace are converted into fresh
“red” values. If, after abstraction, the trace of the original counterexample and the
outcome of the new experiment are the same, then hypothesis H is incorrect and
we forward the abstract counterexample to the learner. But if they are different
then we may conclude that αAFΣ (T ) is not behavior-deterministic. In this case,
the run for the original counterexample contains at least one black value, which
determines a new entry that we can add to the abstraction table.
8.2.1 Implementation details
In Tomte, LearnLib is employed to do the automata inference. The Tomte tool,
which implements the mapper component, sits in between LearnLib and the SUT.
Rather than using a separate model-based testing tool to test the correctness
of hypotheses, we used the ability of LearnLib to generate test sequences. Once
a hypothesis has been constructed, LearnLib can generate long test sequences to
check if the hypothesis is correct, using a library of well-known test generation
algorithms. Depending on whether LearnLib is constructing a hypothesis or is
testing one, Tomte adjusts its behavior. During the learning phase, Tomte selects
fresh concrete values whenever it receives an abstract action with parameter value
⊥. During the testing phase, instead of selecting fresh concrete values for an ab-
stract parameter value ⊥, random values are selected. In this way, we ensure that
the full concretization γA(H) is explored. By tuning the probability distribution
used by Tomte for selecting random values, we obtained an efficient and reliable
way to test the correctness of γA(H): in none of our experiments we suffered from
false positives.
Once Tomte has discovered that the current abstraction is too coarse, it must
select a black valued parameter and “make it green” by adding it as a new entry
to the abstraction table. This is done via a series of experiments in which black
values are converted one by one into fresh values, until a change in observable
output is detected.
The algorithm for finding this new abstraction is outlined in Algorithm 1. Here,
for an occurrence b, param(b) gives the corresponding formal parameter, source(b)
gives the previous occurrence b′ which, according to the execution of AFΣ , is the
source of the value of b, and variable(b) gives the variable in which the value of
b is stored in the execution of AFΣ . To keep the presentation simple, the set of
constants here is assumed to be empty. A series of experiments in which black
occurrences and their sources are converted one by one into fresh values (lines 4
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and 5) is run on the SUT (lines 6 and 7), until a change in observable output is
detected (lines 8 and 9). When the new abstraction entry has been added to the
abstraction table, the learner is restarted with the new abstract alphabet.
Algorithm 1 Abstraction refinement
Input: Counterexample c = i1 · · · in
Output: Pair (p, v) with v new entry for F (p) in abstraction table
1: Add black occurrences of values in c to queue Q
2: while abstraction not found do
3: b:=dequeued black value occurrence from Q
4: c′:=c, where b is set to a fresh value
5: c′′:=c, where source(b) is set to a fresh value
6: o′:=output from running c′ on SUT
7: o′′:=output from running c′′ on SUT
8: if o′ and o′′ are different from output of c then
9: return (param(b), variable(source(b)))
10: end if
11: end while
8.3 Experiments
In this section the operation of Tomte is illustrated by means of the Session Ini-
tiation Protocol (SIP) [85]. SIP is an application layer protocol for controlling
multimedia communication sessions, such as voice and video calls over Internet
Protocol (IP). The protocol can be used for creating, modifying and terminating
two-party (unicast) or multiparty (multicast) sessions. Sessions may consist of one
or several media streams.
In this section, SIP protocol is referred as presented in [1], and Tomte is used to
construct the abstraction for infering the behavior of the SIP Server entity when
setting up connections with a SIP Client. The input messages from the SIP Client
to the SIP Server are represented as Method(From, To, Contact, CallId, CSeq,
Via), where
• Method defines the type of request, either INVITE, PRACK, or ACK,
• From and To are addresses of the originator and receiver of the request,
• CallId is a unique session identifier,
• CSeq is a sequence number that orders transactions in a session,
• Contact is the address where the Client wants to receive input messages, and
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• Via indicates the transport path that is used for the transaction.
The output messages from the SIP Server to the SIP Client are represented as
StatusCode(From,To,CallId,CSeq,Contact,Via), where StatusCode is a three digit
status code that indicates the outcome of a previous request from the Client, and
the other parameters are as for a input message.
Tomte expects the input messages to begin with an “I ”, and the output mes-
sages to begin with an “O”. Initially, no abstraction for the input is defined in
the learner, which means all parameter values are ⊥. As a result every parameter
in every input action is treated in the same way and the mapper selects a fresh
concrete value, e.g. the abstract input trace IINVITE (⊥, ⊥, ⊥), IACK (⊥, ⊥,
⊥), IPRACK (⊥, ⊥, ⊥), IPRACK (⊥, ⊥, ⊥) is translated to the concrete trace
IINVITE(1, 2, 3), IACK(4, 5, 6), IPRACK(7, 8, 9), IPRACK(10, 11, 12). In
the learning phase queries with distinct parameter values are sent to the SUT, so
that the learner constructs the abstract Mealy machine shown in Figure 8.4. In
the testing phase parameter values may be duplicated, which may lead to non-
deterministic behavior. The test trace IINVITE, IACK, IPRACK, IPRACK in
Figure 8.5 leads to an 0200 output that is not foreseen by the hypothesis, which
produces an O481.
Rerunning the trace with distinct values as before leads to an O481 output.
Thus, to resolve this problem, the input abstraction must be refined. Therefore,
we identify the green and black values in the trace and try to remove black values.
The algorithm first successfully removes black value No. 1 by replacing the nine
in the IPRACK input with a fresh value and observing the same output as before.
However, removing black edge No. 2 changes the final outcome of the trace to
an O481 output. As a result, we need to refine the input abstraction by adding
an equality check between the first parameter of the last IINVITE message and
the first parameter of an IPRACK message to every IPRACK input. Apart from
refining the input alphabet, every concrete output parameter value is abstracted
to either a constant or a previous occurrence of a parameter. The abstract value
is the index of the corresponding entry in the abstraction table. After every input
abstraction refinement, the learning process needs to be restarted. We proceed
until the learner finishes the inference process without getting interrupted by a
non-deterministic output.
Besides SIP protocol, Tomte was successfully used to learn the following mod-
els:
• Alternating bit protocol (ABP) [13], see figure 8.1.
• Biometric Passport [2]
• A simple Login System
• Farmer-Wolf-Goat-Cabbage Puzzle
• Palindrome/Repeated Digit Checker
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All models are available at http://www.italia.cs.ru.nl/tools/.
Table 8.1 gives an overview of the systems learned, with the number of input
refinement steps, total learning and testing queries, number of states of the learned
abstract model, and time needed for learning and testing (in seconds). All models
inferred have been checked to be bisimilar to their SUT. For this purpose the
learned model is combined with the abstraction and the CADP tool set, http:
//www.inrialpes.fr/vasy/cadp/, is used for equivalence checking.
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8.4 Conclusion
Tomte implements an algorithm which uses the technique of counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement: initially, the algorithms starts with a very course
abstraction A, which is subsequently refined if it turns out that αA(T ) is not
behavior-deterministic. The idea to use CEGAR for learning state machines has
been explored recently by Howar at al [47] who developed and implemented a CE-
GAR procedure for the special case in which the abstraction is static and does not
depend on the history.
Tomte is able to construct mappers for a restricted class of extended transi-
tion systems, called scalarset automata. In scalarset automata, one can test for
equality of data parameters, but no operations on data are allowed. Scalarsets
also motivated the recent work of [23], which establishes a canonical form for a
variation of scalarset automata.
Even though the class of systems to which our approach currently applies
is limited, the fact that we are able to learn models of systems with data fully
automatically is a major step towards a practically useful technology for automatic
learning of models of software components.
Currently, Tomte can learn SUTs that may only remember the last and first
occurrence of a parameter. Apparently, it is easy to dispose this restriction. Fur-
thermore, the CEGAR based approach of this chapter can be further extended to
systems that may apply simple or known operations on data, using technology for
automatic detection of likely invariants, such as Daikon [34].
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Chapter 9
Conclusion of Part Two
During the last two decades, important developments have taken place in the area
of automata learning, see e.g. [6, 84, 83, 45, 18, 64, 46, 71]. History dependent
abstraction operators are the key for scaling existing methods for active learning
of automata to realistic applications. A major challenge is the development of
algorithms for the automatic construction of abstraction mappers: the availability
of such algorithms will boost the applicability of automata learning technology. In
paper [47], a method is presented that is able to automatically construct certain
state-free mappers. Aarts, Jonsson & Uijen [1] have proposed a framework for
history dependent abstraction operators. Using this framework they succeeded to
automatically infer models of several realistic software components with large state
spaces, including fragments of the TCP and SIP protocols. Despite this success,
the approach of Aarts et al suffers from limitations that hinder its applicability in
practice.
Chapter 7 of this dissertation provided several generalizations of the framework
of [1], leading to a general theory of history dependent abstractions for learning
interface automata. This theory offers four important improvement to the theory
of history dependent abstraction operators:
From Mealy machines to interface automata The approach of [1] is based
on Mealy machines, in which each input induces exactly one output. In practice,
however, inputs and outputs often do not alternate: a single input may some-
times be followed by a series of outputs, sometimes by no output at all, etc. For
this reason, the approach of chapter 7 is based on interface automata [32], which
have separate input and output transitions, rather than the more restricted Mealy
machines.
Learning purposes In practice, it is often neither feasible nor necessary to learn
a model for the complete behavior of the SUT. Typically, it is better to concentrate
the learning efforts on certain parts of the state space. This is achieved using the
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concept of a learning purpose [3] (known as test purpose within model-based testing
theory [87, 51, 99]), which allows one to restrict the learning process to relevant
interaction patterns only. In the theory of chapter 7, the concept of a mapper
component of [1] is integrated with the concept of a learning purpose of [3]. This
integration is nontrivial and constitutes one of the main technical contributions of
this thesis.
Forgetful abstractions The main result of [1] only applies to abstractions that
are output predicting. This means that no information gets lost and we infer a
model that is behaviorally equivalent to the model of the teacher: M≈ γA(H). In
order to deal with the complexity of real systems, we need to support also forgetful
abstractions that over-approximate the behavior of the teacher. For this reason,
in this thesis, the notion of equivalence ≈ is replaced by the ioco relation, which is
one of the main notions of conformance in model-based black-box testing [92, 93]
and closely related to the alternating simulations of [5].
Handling equivalence queries Active learning algorithms in the style of An-
gluin [6] alternate two phases. In the first phase a hypothesis is constructed and
in the second phase (called an equivalence query by Angluin [6]) the correctness of
this hypothesis is checked. In general, no guarantees can be given that the answer
to an equivalence query is correct. Tools such as LearnLib, “approximate” equiv-
alence queries via long test sequences, which are computed using some established
algorithms for model-based testing of Mealy machines. In the approach of [1], one
needs to answer equivalence queries of the form αA(M) ≈ H. In order to do this,
a long test sequence for H that is computed by the learner is concretized by the
mapper. The resulting output of the SUT is abstracted again by the mapper and
sent back to the learner. Only if the resulting output agrees with the output of H
the hypothesis is accepted. This means that the outcome of an equivalence query
depends on the choices of the mapper. If, for instance, the mapper always picks
the same concrete action for a given abstract action and a given history, then
it may occur that the test sequence does not reveal any problem, even though
αA(M) 6≈ H. Hence the task of generating a good test sequence is divided be-
tween the learner and the mapper, with an unclear division of responsibilities. This
makes it extremely difficult to establish good coverage measures for equivalence
queries. A more sensible approach, which is elaborated in this thesis, is to test
whether the concretization γA(H) is equivalent toM, using state-of-the-art model
based testing algorithms for systems with data, and to translate the outcomes of
that experiment back to the abstract setting.
The theoretical advances that are described in chapter 7 of this thesis are
important to bring automata learning tools and techniques to a level where they
can be used routinely in industrial practice.
Chapter 8 of this thesis presented a prototype tool Tomte, which automatically
constructs mappers for a restricted class of extended transition systems, using a
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counterexample-guided abstraction refinement approach.
The CEGAR technique is used for learning state machines in a recent research
of Howar at al [47], who developed and implemented a CEGAR procedure for the
special case in which the abstraction is static and does not depend on the execution
history. The approach of this thesis, however, is applicable to a much richer class of
systems, which for instance includes the SIP protocol and the various components
of the Alternating Bit Protocol.
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Chapter 10
Epilogue
This thesis was organized in two parts following two different research areas, specif-
ically, verification of wireless sensor networks and automata learning.
Part one covered my research in 2008 and 2009, when I was working in collab-
oration with the European project Quasimodo to devise a CEGAR-based method
for verification of an arbitrary size wireless sensor network provided by Chess. This
research led to considerable results, namely establishing the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions, in the form of constraints on the parameters of a fully-connected
WSN in order to guarantee its being synchronized, and discovering a flaw in Chess
implementation. Despite the original plan, we did not succeed to use CEGAR ap-
proach for conquering the state space explosion problem when verifying the Chess
synchronization protocol for a general network of arbitrary size.
Part two covered my research in 2010 and 2011 when I collaborated in de-
sign and implementation of a CEGAR-based algorithm for automatically learning
a limited class of parametric systems, called scalarset symbolic Mealy machines.
Furthermore, we provided a solid theoretical foundation for learning interface au-
tomata using a large class of abstractions.
In sum, CEGAR-based parametric model checking of WSN synchronization
protocols is difficult, if possible at all. Nevertheless, this challenge is worth more
research. CEGAR seems to be a powerful method in extending the available
approaches to automata learning.
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Samenvatting
Studies op het Gebied van Verificatie van Draad-
loze Sensornetwerken
en het Construeren van Abstracties voor het Leren
van Automaten
Ingebouwde systemen zijn computersystemen die zijn ingebouwd in apparaten en
de functionaliteit van deze apparaten voor een belangrijk deel bepalen. Voor-
beelden zijn te vinden in smartphones, moderne autos, MRI-scanners en in de
zelfscanners in supermarkten. Ingebouwde systemen zijn veelal onzichtbaar, maar
hebben desondanks een enorme invloed op de manier waarop de moderne mens
de fysieke wereld om zich heen waarneemt en er mee interacteert. Voor inge-
bouwde systemen waarbij de veiligheid van mensen in het geding is, zoals autos
en medische apparatuur, is de betrouwbaarheid van evident belang. Maar ook
in niet-kritieke toepassingen, zoals spelcomputers en dvd-spelers, kunnen onver-
wachte fouten desastreus zijn voor de reputatie van een fabrikant en de verkoop
van nieuwe apparaten drastisch verminderen.
Bij het ontwerpen van een betrouwbaar ingebouwde systeem moeten we typisch
aantonen dat dit systeem nooit in bepaalde gevaarlijke toestanden kan komen. Ve-
rificatie en validatie (V&V) zijn hierbij cruciaal. Deze dissertatie benadert V&V
vanuit twee gezichtspunten. In het eerste deel beschrijven we de modellering en
verificatie van een realistische casus op het gebied van draadloze sensornetwerken.
In het tweede deel onderzoeken we een geheel nieuwe techniek waarbij abstractie-
verfijning gebruikt wordt voor het automatisch leren van modellen van ingebouwde
systemen. Deze modellen kunnen dan vervolgens ingezet worden voor V&V.
In het eerste deel van dit proefschrift onderzoeken we de toepasbaarheid van
bestaande verificatiemethoden aan de hand van een industrile casus op het gebied
van draadloze sensornetwerken die is aangedragen door het Nederlandse bedrijf
Chess eT International BV. Een draadloos sensornetwerk (DSN) bestaat uit een
verzameling kleine apparaatjes, knopen genaamd, die verbonden zijn via een net-
werk en gezamenlijk een taak uitvoeren. Iedere knoop is in staat berekeningen uit
te voeren (gebruikmakend van een of meer micro-controllers, processoren of DSP
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chips), beschikt over wat geheugen (programma-, data- en/of flashgeheugen), over
een RF transceiver (normaliter met een bi-directionele antenne), een stroombron
(bijvoorbeeld batterijen of zonnecellen), en verscheidene sensoren en actuatoren.
De Chess casus heeft betrekking op de regels (het protocol) dat knopen gebruiken
om met elkaar te communiceren. Een effectief protocol voor draadloze sensor-
netwerken moet weinig stroom verbruiken, moet voorkomen dat knopen tegelijk
berichten versturen (door elkaar heen praten), moet gemplementeerd kunnen wor-
den met zo min mogelijk code en geheugen, moet voldoende bandbreedte leveren
voor een gegeven applicatie, en moet om kunnen gaan met wisselende radiofre-
quenties en netwerkomstandigheden. Chess heeft een DSN platform ontwikkeld
op basis van een epidemisch communicatiemodel. Om aan de strikte vereisten
ten aanzien van energieverbruik te kunnen voldoen maakt Chess gebruik van een
zogenaamd Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol, waarbij de knopen
slechts een fractie van de tijd actief zijn en zich gedurende de rest van de tijd
in een slaaptoestand bevinden waarin ze vrijwel geen energie gebruiken. Voor de
goede werking van dit protocol is het cruciaal dat alle knopen gelijk actief zijn:
het heeft geen zin wanneer een knoop berichten verstuurt wanneer al zijn buren
slapen. Dit vereist dat de klokken van aangrenzende knopen (vrijwel) gelijk lopen.
In dit proefschrift wordt de model checker Uppaal gebruikt om twee kloksynchro-
nisatiealgoritmen voor het draadloze sensornetwerk van Chess te modelleren en te
verifiren. Met behulp van Uppaal is het ons gelukt om foutscenarios te vinden die
tot toestanden leiden waarin het netwerk niet meer gesynchroniseerd is. Middels
experimenten met een draadloos sensornetwerk hebben medewerkers van Chess
aangetoond dat deze scenarios zich ook daadwerkelijk kunnen voordoen. Op basis
van de door ons gevonden foutscenarios introduceren we drie condities waaraan de
protocolparameters moeten voldoen om fouten uit te sluiten. Met behulp van be-
wijstechnieken die gebruik maken van invarianten bewijzen we dat deze condities
noodzakelijk en afdoende zijn voor correctheid in het speciale geval van netwerken
waarin alle knopen direct met elkaar verbonden zijn. Deze bewijzen zijn gecheckt
met behulp van de bewijsassistent Isabelle/HOL.
Het tweede deel van dit proefschrift beschrijft hoe tegenvoorbeeld-gedreven
abstractieverfijning gebruikt kan worden om geheel automatisch modellen (toe-
standsdiagrammen) te leren van computersystemen puur op basis van testen en
observaties van het extern waarneembare gedrag. Bestaande programmas voor het
actief leren van toestandsautomaten zijn in staat om modellen te leren met maxi-
maal circa 10.000 toestanden. Dit is ontoereikend voor het leren van modellen van
realistische softwarecomponenten die, door het gebruik van programmavariabelen
en dataparameters in berichten, dikwijls een veel groter aantal toestanden hebben.
Abstractie blijkt cruciaal voor het leren van modellen van dergelijke systemen.
In praktische toepassingen waarbij leertechnologie gebruikt word om modellen
te construeren van softwarecomponenten, definiren gebruikers dikwijls handmatig
abstracties waarbij een groot aantal concrete berichten worden afgebeeld op een
beperkt aantal abstracte berichten. In deze dissertatie wordt een complete theorie
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van abstracties voor het leren van toestanddiagrammen gepresenteerd. Er wordt
aangetoond dat zulke abstracties volledig automatisch geconstrueerd kunnen wor-
den voor een bepaalde klasse van toestanddiagrammen waarin getest kan worden
op gelijkheid van data parameters, maar geen bewerkingen op data toegestaan
zijn. Bij de constructie wordt gebruik gemaakt van tegenvoorbeeld-gedreven ab-
stractieverfijning: indien een abstractie te grof is en non-deterministisch gedrag
veroorzaakt in het geleerde model, dan wordt deze abstractie automatisch ver-
fijnd. Met behulp van een prototype implementatie van ons algoritme zijn wij er
in geslaagd modellen van verschillende realistische software componenten, zoals
het biometrische paspoort en het SIP protocol, volledig automatisch te leren.
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Summary
Studies on Verification of Wireless Sensor Networks
and Abstraction Learning for System Inference
Embedded systems are redefining how we perceive and interact with the physi-
cal world. While mission-critical embedded applications raise obvious reliability
concerns, unexpected or premature failures in even noncritical applications such
as game boxes and portable video players can erode a manufacturer’s reputation
and greatly diminish acceptance of new devices. The design of reliable systems
requires assuring that the system never moves through a dangerous state, and ver-
ification and validation (V & V) is the key. This dissertation approaches V & V of
embedded systems from two different perspectives: in the first part, modeling and
verification of a real-world case-study provided by the Chess eT International B.V.
is described, whereas the second part investigates automata learning (automatic
modeling of systems) using abstraction refinement.
In part one, the industrial case-study of Chess on wireless sensor networks is
investigated. A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a collection of nodes organized
into a cooperative network. Each node has a processing capability (one or more
micro-controllers, CPUs or DSP chips), may contain multiple types of memory
(program, data and flash memories), has a RF transceiver (usually with a single
omnidirectional antenna), has a power source (e.g., batteries and solar cells), and
accommodate various sensors and actuators. An effective protocol for wireless
sensor networks must consume little power, avoid collisions, be implemented with
a small code size and memory requirements, be efficient for a single application,
and be tolerant to changing radio frequency and networking conditions. Chess eT
International B.V. has developed a WSN platform using a gossip (epidemic) com-
munication model. In order to meet strict energy constraints, Chess used a Time
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) protocol in which the nodes are active only in
a limited period and for the remainder of the time, nodes switch to an energy
saving mode. In the first part of this thesis, the model checker Uppaal is used
for modeling and verification of two synchronization algorithms for wireless sensor
networks. Indeed, Uppaal is used for extracting the error scenarios representing
the situations where the network goes out of synch. The error scenarios are repro-
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ducible in reality. Based on such error scenarios, three conditions are introduced
for a fully connected network to work correctly. The conditions are proved to be
necessary and sufficient using invariant proof techniques. Isabelle/HOL supports
the proofs.
Part two describes how counterexample-guided abstraction refinement(CEGAR)
can be employed to infer models automatically through observations and test, that
is, through black-box reverse engineering. State-of-the-art tools for active learning
of state machines are able to learn state machines with at most in the order of
10.000 states. This is not enough for learning models of realistic software com-
ponents which, due to the presence of program variables and data parameters in
events, typically have much larger state spaces. Abstraction is the key when learn-
ing behavioral models of realistic systems. Hence, in most practical applications
where automata learning is used to construct models of software components, re-
searchers manually define abstractions which, depending on the history, map a
large set of concrete events to a small set of abstract events that can be handled
by automata learning tools. In the second part of this thesis, a full theory of ab-
straction for learning interface automata is presented. Moreover, it is shown how
such abstractions can be constructed fully automatically for a class of extended
finite state machines in which one can test for equality of data parameters, but
no operations on data are allowed. This aim is reached through counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement: whenever the current abstraction is too coarse and
induces nondeterministic behavior in the learned model, the abstraction is refined
automatically. Using a prototype implementation of the algorithm, models of sev-
eral realistic software components, including the biometric passport and the SIP
protocol were learned fully automatically.
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